York's famous Machinegun finds a home

[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – PAGE 41 (Continued) - 1

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf


Picking up where I left off: The SYDE said in this 2007 report that upon securing “concurrence” from the US Army Center of Military History they would then submit a formal request to the French regional archaeological curator in order to proceed with Phase IV research and conduct battlefield research.


As you recall in Post# 579 you can see what the archaeological curator, Mr. Desfossés said about the so-called “formal request”:


Hot on the York Trail
By: Stephan van Meulebrouck
Published: Western Front Association Bulletin 84, June/July 2009



“Desfossés had, in fact, never heard of Mastriano at the time. In December of 2006 he finally spoke to the lieutenant-colonel. ‘His methodology appeared not to be particularly accurate. At that point he asked me for a permit for further research, but I turned him down.’ Desfossés refuses to speak of a criminal offence. ‘I think Mastriano simply didn't know that a permit was needed. And, by the way, I suspect that afterwards he went on with his digs anyway.’


As we now know, the Army officer did know that a permit was required and did, in fact, go on with his digs anyway.


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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – PAGE 41 (Continued) - 2

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf


If you look on the current SYDE web site you can see in their “endorsement” section this letter written by CMH Director Dr. Jeffrey Clarke:


http://sgtyorkdiscovery.com/uploads/CMHWeb.jpg



On the official website the SYDE says that the CMH fully endorses their discovery as accurate and that they (the CMH) are the final word in Army history.


http://sgtyorkdiscovery.com/SYDE_NEWS.php


I have read this letter many times and I do not see anything that indicates the CMH is “fully” endorsing anything.



Here is another excerpt from the Western Front Association article about an interview the author had with Dr. Clarke about this letter:



Hot on the York Trail
By: Stephan van Meulebrouck
Published: Western Front Association Bulletin 84, June/July 2009



Several years ago, Lt. Col. Mastriano told Dr. Clarke about his plans to look for the York Spot. ‘He asked me for official support from the CMH, to demonstrate that he was not some troublemaker, but a person engaged in serious research.’ Clarke says he would provide such endorsement to anyone working in a scientific fashion. The only problem is: ‘There's no way to judge if the findings are correct. From the United States, that's not possible either.’ An interesting comment from someone whose words have been quoted as evidence in favor of the SYDE's conclusions. But had he actually read the report at the time? ‘Probably not,’ is his matter-of-fact reply. ‘I'm not interested that much.’ As manager of a large institute, he explains, he has too many other things on his mind.

Why then did he allow Mastriano to use his letter on the SYDE website? Dr. Clarke says he is unaware of any such use. ‘He did what he wanted to do. Maybe I made a mistake. There's no real way to find the exact spot.’ That letter, he adds, cannot be considered evidence either, seeing as the CMH was not present during the fieldwork. And describing research conclusions in terms of ‘100% accuracy’, as the SYDE has, is something he would never venture to do.



I want to emphasize one of Dr. Clarke's statements: "He did what he wanted to do. Maybe I made a mistake."

And Dr. Clarke admitied that he probably had not read the SYDE report. No wonder the CMH says now that they do not have a position on this matter, but they had no problem accepting the artfacts in FEB 2009:


http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/02/06...ros-artifacts/



To me it looks like the Army officer used the CMH to add credibility to his research in an attempt to coerce the French regional archaeologist into issuing him a permit – but, it did not work – his request for an archaeological permit was denied.



That was in 2007 before they began “Phase IV” research. But, what was all of the relic hunting that occurred at the site afterwards in 2008?


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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – PAGE 41 (Continued) - 3

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf



And what about this article:

http://rss.ireport.com/docs/DOC-258231


First, I did not know that Boy Scouts did archaeology. Second, this evidently took place on August 2008 in what I assume is Phase IV research that they did not have proper authorization to do in the first place. The Army officer himself stated that in order to conduct Phase IV research he would need to approval of the French regional archaeologist, who turned his request down……


I can elaborate more on this German dog tag story later.





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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – PAGE 41 (Continued) - 4

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf



In conclusion of Page 14 discussion here is another statement by the SYDE:


“The artifacts will be divided between the French authorities, York estate and the US Army”



As far as I know the town of Chatel Chéhéry got a couple cartridges in a frame and the CMH got the rest of the artifacts. That does not sound like a very fair division of artifacts to me. The town in Germany where the soldier was from (the dog tag mentioned in last post) got a small case of artifacts they say belonged to him and half of his dog tag, the other half went to the CMH. I have also heard of nothing going to any museum in Tennessee either.


I will discuss this dog tag sensation later, but what surprises me is that the two halves were split up. Whether it was found broken or not they should have stayed together in my opinion.


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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – PAGE 42

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf


Page 42 contains more SYDE discussion about the historic trail.


Now, on to ANNEX B of this report.



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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – ANNEX B

http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...expedition.pdf


ANNEX B is more of a summary of the events of 8 October, 1918 the way the SYDE sees it. As I mentioned earlier both ANNEX A and ANNEX B were omitted from their official web site 2008 report. Why? The only reason I can think is because ANNEX A discusses the planned 2007 Phase IV research, which did take place, but without the proper authorization from the French archaeological authorities.


Both ANNNEX A and B can only be found on the 2007 Boy Scout report that has very recently been removed from the BSA web site and only available in this cached version. Unfortunately the maps and graphics do not show up on the cached version, but saved a PDF copy of this report with all of the maps and graphics.


I will show what one map (Map# 7) found on page 47 at the end of ANNEX B in the 2007 BSA report says about Dr. Nolan’s site. On this map the SYDE depicts Dr. Tom Nolan’s site as where the 122nd LDW moved east to secure the German right flank and were involved in a fight that occurred hours after the York fight and long after York had left the area.


In a rebuttal to Dr. Nolan’s research findings submitted to the “Tennessean” the Army officer made several interesting statements about this: (When the officer mentions “Birdwell” he is referring to Dr. Michael Birdwell who was with Dr. Nolan during the 2006 field research in France.)


Here is what the officer said to the “Tennessean”:


“The location where Birdwell asserts as the York spot is the flank of the German 122nd Regiment. York captured NO 122nd soldiers and he never fought there.”



“What Birdwell uncovered is a different fight altogether that transpired as the German right flank collapsed AS A RESULT of York's actions - several hours later.”



Here is my recreation of the SYDE Map# 7 from ANNEX B. I omitted all of the confusing smaller graphics. The point here is that the SYDE depicts Dr. Nolan’s site as the scene of a fight between the US 28th Division and the German 122nd LDW not the York fight.


We will look very closely at what the 28th Division and 122nd LDW was really doing on 8 October 1918.


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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – ANNEX B – Map# 7 – Discussion (Continued)


The SYDE alludes to the York fight being the trigger that set in motion the German withdrawal from the hills west of Chatel Chéhéry, thus enabling the American units to reach their objective: the Decauville Railroad. This is partially true, but here is what really happened:


Das Wuerttembergische Landwehr Infanterie Regiment Nr. 120 im Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918, Band 25
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
EIIe 101/25
Page 163 - 165



“The flank security element of the 6th Company reported an enemy surprise attack. Soon afterwards individual men from the 4th Company came up and reported that their company and men from the 210th Regiment had been attacked with surprise, that the company commander Lieutenant Endress had been killed, and that the company had been reduced to stragglers or captured. Lieutenant Vollmer also fell into the hands of the Americans. Now the situation was worse than ever, bad news followed more bad news. From Chatel and from Schoene Aussicht (Hill 180) heavy enemy columns penetrated, following the course of the Schiesstalmulde (Valley west of Chatel Chéhéry) and the Boulasson creek (the creek in the valley) through the woods towards the North – South Road. Major Ziegler, who viewed the situation from his position between the Humserberg and Hohenbornhoehe (Hill 244), gave the order to withdraw at 10:30 in the morning to Rittmeister von Sick and Captain Krimmel. The companies packed up in full order, without the enemy advancing from the southern edge of the Hohenbornhoehe.”



So, it looks like it was Major Ziegler who ordered the withdrawal at 1030 hours due to American penetration on all fronts between Cornay (Humserberg) and the North-South Road (west of Chatel Chéhéry). It is certain that the York fight played a certain role in this because the Germans felt that a large American force had penetrated their lines on “Hill 2” – the gap in their line between Rittmeister von Sick’s 2nd and 3rd Battalion, 120th LDW and Vollmer’s 1st Battalion, 120th LDW.


The 120th History also says that the companies on Hill 244 were able to orderly pack up and without the Americans advancing from the southern edge of the hill. This I is referring to the American 28th Division. In other words the 28th Division did not advance on their right flank according to the German accounts.


Here is what Major Tillman (Commander, 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry) said about the 28th Division advance in his 1919 interview with Major Buxton, the 82nd Division Historian:


“Q. (Major Buxton)

Did you get any fire assistance from the 28th Division at all? Was your left flank open and fired on?

A. (Major Tillman)

Yes, sir. The 28th did not protect me at all. Both of my flanks were open from the time I jumped off in the morning until I was relieved by the 325th on the morning of the 10th.”


The 28th Division eventually did advance up Hill 244, but von Sick’s unit had already departed. Late in the afternoon of 8 October the 28th Division reached the objection at the crossroads of the North-South Road and the Decauville Railroad. Their advance was virtually unopposed and I can find evidence that they encountered any German opposition during this advance, especially from the 122nd LDW.


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[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – ANNEX B – Map# 7 – Discussion (Continued)


The SYDE says that General Franke ordered his cavalry squadron up to cover the withdrawal of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 120th LDW under Rittmeister von Sick. Here is what really happened:


Here is what Captain Winzer said who had been sent down to the front to assess the situation:


Testimony of German Officers and Men Anent Sergeant York
Statement of Captain Winzer - 11 March, 1929
National Archives and Records Administration
College Park Maryland
Record Group 165
Entry 310b
“Thomas File”



“In the area back of the Division, there prevailed a regular panic. “The Americans have broken through!” In order to bring the stream of retreating men to a halt, the Division Commander ordered a cavalry squadron, which he had at his disposal, to cut off the retreat in the rear. The Brigade Commander had lost all contact with his regiments.”



Here is what Major Spang said in the same report:


“It was impossible for the Division Staff to make a detail investigation of each individual report. Captain Winzer, the Division Supply Officer, was sent to the Brigade and Regiments for the purpose of making an estimate of the situation.”



The way I see it, General Franke sent his cavalry squadron to stop the GERMANS from retreating – not to cover Rittmeister von Sick’s withdrawal as the SYDE claims.


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[Don D.]

Sounds that way to me also.

[Brad Posey]

The 2007 SYDE Report – Google Cached version – ANNEX B – Map# 7 – Discussion (Continued)


The SYDE says that Dr. Nolan’s site is where the 122nd LDW fought the 28th Division a few hours after the York fight took place.


Here is a map found in the war diary of the 3rd Battalion, 122nd LDW who were positioned on the right of the 120th LDW on 8 October, 1918. This map shows where the individual companies were located on this day.



III. Battalion, 122. Landwehr Infanterie Regiment – Kriegstagebuch
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
M411 403/2890
MAP


(See first map below)


Here is what the 122nd LDW says they were really doing on 8 October, 1918. In this account found in the 122nd LDW history it is easy to see the 12nd LDW was nowhere near the area the SYDE claims the 122nd LDW engaged the American 28th Division hours after the York fight took place.



You can see the 122nd lost contact with their 12th Company and Rittmeister von Sick’s (120th LDW) was lost and the 122nd sent two platoons from the 5th Company and the remainder of 1st Battalion in the evening as a “blocking force”.



Das Wuerttembergische Landwehr Infanterie Regiment Nr. 122 im Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918, Band 27
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
EIIe 101/27
Page 187


Describing the position of the 122nd LDW on 8 October, 1918:


“Deployment of the companies. In the new position the 10th Company was positioned in the center, the 7th on the right, the 12th on the left, the rest were kept in close ready reserves, namely the 6th in a small depression behind the right flank of the 10th Company, the 8th as a contact company to the right in the Valerinetal, the 5th is on the left flank behind the 12th Company. This time the left flank was in danger. The enemy pushed with weapons against the Hohenbornhoehe, Chatel and Schlossberg, which were held at great cost by the Landwehr Infantry Regiments 120 and 125 in bloody, seesawing fighting. Contact with the 12th company on the left and the battalion of Rittmeister von Sick was lost during the fighting, and therefore two platoons of the 5th Company and the remainders of the 1st Battalion, which arrived towards evening, were deployed as a blocking force.”


The officer leading this “blocking forces”, LT Goebel said:



“So I was left with only 15 men, one machine gun, and the one indefatigable noncommissioned officer, Christian Gauter, all that I could move out to the 12th Company with. During the afternoon the remains of the 1st Battalion, a force of 35 men, arrived, which happily made us a “combat effective” company of 50 men again.”



On page 188 we find this:



“Last station in the Argonne: The 8th of October again demanded bloody casualties, such as the 5th company, which on this day, as they were trying to bridge a gap between Landwehr Infantry Regiment 120 and Landwehr Infantry Regiment 125, suffered 5 dead and a large number of wounded; and the 12th company also lost brave men fighting off the American forces. The losses due to illness were even higher: 94 men of the 2nd Battalion reported sick. Now the good old core of the companies was itself dangerously decimated, and many a man battle-hardened in four years of war now had to go back. Many who had been spared by enemy fire died in the military hospital, carried off by exhaustion and the flu.”



You can see this "blocking force" annotated on the 1929 Reichsarchiv report map, but again, it is no where close to where the SYDE claims it engaged the American 28th Division.

(See 2nd map below)


This “blocking force” action did not occur until late in the afternoon or evening of 8 October and again was no where near the area the SYDE claims they fought the American 28th Division – at Dr. Nolan’s site.


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[Brad Posey]

DOUBLE POST - see below - Post# 597


Brad

[Brad Posey]

Until the SYDE updates their official web site I cannot speculate on what their current or new position is on any of this. The report that I just finished analyzing is a 2007 version they had posted on the Boy Scouts of America web site (Trans-Atlantic Council), but it was unexpectedly removed shortly after I started the analysis of it here in the WAF.


As a result I had to skip over pages 20 through 36 due to now missing graphics, but at least the text is still available to read on the Google “cached” copy of the report. It was really the last few pages of the report that interested me the most: ANNEX A and ANNEX B. Both of these annexes were not found on ANY versions of their official web site report.


In these annexes I found what I believe are interesting pieces of information that illuminate the Army officer’s “plan” and how when things did not go quite the way he hoped they would he went about his research anyway.


I also found their explanation for why they think Dr. Nolan’s site cannot be the correct site of York’s heroics. It was very interesting and full of things that cannot be backed by anything factual, but that is no big surprise in itself when you look at their story as a whole.


So, at the moment, I really cannot think of what else to add to this thread. I could discuss the Haerer dog tag issue, but I was really hoping to find that in their updated report, which is still missing from their web site.


I guess we will have to wait and see if or ever we get to see the updated report. But, without the report there are a lot of questions that need to be answered:



1.) What is the US Army Center of Military History, General (retired) Zabecki and all of the other SYDE endorsers and supporters really signing off to? There is only a web site that says they found the spot, nothing there or anywhere else that backs up any of their claims. I guess we have to take their word for it. I am surprised their supporters are satisfied with only “their word”.



2.) Why is there a monument where it is today? There is nothing factual that supports anything about this monument and where it is.



3.) Why does no one from the SYDE camp reply to any questions about this, especially the founder COL Mastriano and co-founder Mr. O’Keefe. Both men have received numerous emails, questions and interview requests that remain unanswered.



4.) Why is there no email or contact link to anyone from the SYDE on their official web site? You can donate money, but that is through the Bill Rudge Ministries web site and there is no contact possible with anyone from the SYDE when making a donation.




My last question is why does the SYDE not mention any of the other patrol members? Especially the patrol leader SGT Bernard Early? SGT Early received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions that day, but no mention of it in ANY of the SYDE’s writings. They do mention Savage and Cutting, I think, but I do not remember reading much else about any of the other patrol members. There were 17 of them - 6 of them never left that ravine alive.



If I were to read what they have written without knowing the whole story I would think that there were only three men involved in this fight: York, Vollmer and Endriss.



I am sure there will be much more to follow on this very soon.



Until then I welcome any comments or questions.



Brad


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[Brad Posey]

Another article just popped up:

http://www.battledetective.com/battlestudy19.html


I really like the way he overlayed the 1918 map anotated by York's former commanders over the modern landscape.


http://www.battledetective.com/image...ot/Overlay.jpg




Brad



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[Brad Posey]

The Sergeant York Project (Dr. Nolan’s team) web site has just been updated with an in-depth report, excerpts from some of the archival documentation and two You-Tube videos filmed at the site last month by project team member Michael Kelly.


http://sergeantyorkproject.com/fight...right-site.htm


So far no update on the SYDE web site which was promised last May and another missed deadline in August.


Brad


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[Don D.]

Thanks for the update Brad.