York's famous Machinegun finds a home

[Don D.]

The beauty of the "truth" is that it can survive scrutiny on its own.

[Jean-Loup]

Anybody is free to write things on wikipedia, and you should feel welcome to correct the parts, or add to the parts about Dr Nolans work, to make it more accurate.
You can also post this thread as a source/link at the bottom of the wikipedia page.

JL

[Brad Posey]

Yes, I have been working that, but the Wiki editors are reluctant to change what they call an article that has been “stable” since its creation. It seems the SYDE was able to be the “first to strike” and anything else submitted afterwards must undergo a higher level of scrutiny.

I have been able to upload the maps the editor’s inquired about and I am now waiting for their reply as to how I should proceed.

True, anyone can add or subtract from Wiki articles, but they are subject to the scrutiny and censorship of Wiki editors, who can accept, delete or modify new submissions at their leisure.

As I said before, it is a slow uphill battle, but progress is being made. Independent support from WAF members would be greatly appreciated. The only way that this apparent distortion can be corrected is by support and action on the behalf of non-associated individuals who are not connected to either of the two groups involved.

Everyone here can see that I am presenting the research, what I think, is in an open and transparent manner, which cannot be said for the other group. It does not take a rocket scientist to look at what is currently available on each group’s research and come to some sort of conclusion. Then that individual could contact what I would classify as one of the reviewing authorities like the US Army Center of Military History or the director, Dr. Clarke’s boss, and ask why the center does not look into this matter more closely. Especially in light of a doctoral dissertation that contradicts everything the army officer says. Doctoral dissertations are not handed out like candy and must undergo a rigorous review through a dissertation committee. The candidate must prove to the committee that that the research is accurate. The army officer’s research was conducted, supervised and “accepted” under his own auspices and would not withstand any academic scrutiny at any level. Particularly being that his research methodology is not considered acceptable by any historical or archaeological standard.

Here are the new Wiki additions I made today. We will have to wait and see if the editors accept these maps and add the to the article or discussion page.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Buxton_Map.c.jpg

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...ervice_Map.jpg

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...bution_Map.jpg

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...erview_Map.jpg

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...trol_Route.jpg




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[Brad Posey]

Just a quick update:


The Army Officer (SYDE) has very recently changed his web site and now he says that their updated report will be published in August 2010. It seems they missed their earlier publication date of May 2010 so I do not expect to see anything in the near future from these guys.

But, I just found a 2007 version of their report that is still online on the Transatlantic Council - Boy Scouts of America server. This is what used to be on the SYDE web site where the now “dead link” is for their report in English. I noticed a few things that I had not seen before and they are found following the “END NOTES” section.

For those following this thread you will certainly enjoy reading this fine masterpiece.

http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf


This is the "evidence" that supports thier claim. I think if you compare the maps, archival documents and interpretations with what I posted in this thread you will see that something is very wrong here.


For those interested I can disect this thing if you like.



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[Don D.]

I'm interested.

[Brad Posey]

Ok, since you insist – here goes.

The best way to follow this is open up the SYDE report in a separate browser. I will address each page one at a time.

Here again is the link to the 2007 report. It is all we have to go on right now since the SYDE has failed to meet their own deadline of May 2010 for publishing their new and updated report and it looks like will more than likely miss their new August 2010 deadline.

http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf

I will paste this link at the top of each of my posts so it will be easier to get to as I add to this.


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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 1 - 2007 SYDE Report


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf


Page 1 starts with York’s CMOH citation, which has been slightly abbreviated. This may be splitting hairs, but this citation is the only source I can find in ANY of the documentation that says York “charged” the German machinegun nest. For the SYDE’s story to work York has to “charge” the German machinegun nest. The reality is that York did not charge at all and was more or less stationary or moved within a several square meter area at the base of the slope where the fight occurred. This is confirmed in every account of the fight to include York’s own testimony. The SYDE has taken this single phrase from the CMOH citation and turned it into something that fits their version of how the fight took place. I have already discussed previously the reasons this citation reads the way it does and in this case, has nothing to do with the analysis of the SYDE report.

The main problem I see on Page 1 is this statement:

“Following years of exhaustive research and nearly 40 days surveying a small ravine in the Argonne Forest behind the village of Châtel Chéhéry, France – the site where Alvin York made history has been located and verified via multiple sources. A fused application of battlefield archeology, historical research, geospatial technology……”


The two things that catch my eye here is where the SYDE mentions: “…..40 days surveying a small ravine….”


There location is clearly NOT in a ravine at all and could better be described as an eastern facing slope with a valley in between their hill (Hill 167) and Hill 223. See map.



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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 1 - 2007 SYDE Report (continued)


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf


The next eyebrow raiser for me is: “A fused application of battlefield archeology, historical research, geospatial technology……”


I am really fond of the geospatial technology they claim to use. I was with the Army officer and his SYDE team and spent 4 days with them in July 2008 and not once did I see a GPS being used by anyone. In fact our instructions were to keep artifacts from various parts of the hill separate from ones found in other areas. At the end of the day big bags full of artifacts found over several hundred square meters were handed to the team leader and he simply wrote something like: “top of hill”, “northern end of hill” or ”York Spot” on the bags. This is NOT applying geospatial technology to their research.


The photo below shows the Army officer collecting the days finds.



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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 2 - 2007 SYDE Report


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf



On page 2 we find this statement:


“Years passed, memories faded and witnesses passed away leaving no definitive location as to where the events associated with Sgt York’s feat occurred in the ravine behind the small village of Chatel Chehery, France.”


As we have seen earlier in this thread this statement is simply not true. In 1929 York’ former battalion and company commander (Major Buxton and Captain Danforth) drew on a 1918 French Foret d’Argonne map sheet the route the patrol took and where the fight took place. In addition the US Army Graves Registration Service left us with grid coordinates to 5 of the 6 temporary burials of York’s comrades killed during the fight.


I think that is a pretty definitive location as to where the events took place. The 82nd Division History and numerous other documents are very clear where this fight took place and it is not where the SYDE claims it did.


Overwhelmingly the historical record of this fight says that it occurred in a narrow ravine and western facing slope of the hill located directly southwest of hill 223 – not on Hill 167 wher ethe SYDE’s site is.


(see maps)



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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 3 - 2007 SYDE Report


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf



On page 3 you will see a list of “Valuable Partners/Friends who made the discovery possible”.



Entry I - we find:


“i. Conservateur Régional de L’archéologie, Mr. Yves Desfossés”


I find this not only very strange that they should list the name of the regional director of archaeology, but also find it rather amusing. NO archaeological research can be conducted in the region without Mr. Desfossés specific written approval in the form of a permit and the SYDE did not have a permit from Mr. Desfossés.


Here is what Mr. Desfossés had to say about authorization for the Army officer and his SYDE team. This interview can be found in the Western Front Association Bulletin 84, June/July 2009 on page 29:


“His methodology appeared not to be particularly accurate. At that point he asked me for a permit for further research, but I turned him down.”


Mr. Desfossés went on to say:


“I think Mastriano simply didn't know that a permit was needed. And, by the way, I suspect that afterwards he went on with his digs anyway.”


And:


“I met Mastriano only once, and I told him at the time that I did not agree with his methods. Mastriano was already convinced that he had found the exact spot. That's where he looked, and that is also where he found those twenty-one cartridges. Of course, that is much too obvious. Clearly it was not an objective investigation. Nolan took a scientific approach. And at the spots where his team worked, one will still be able to carry out archaeological research in the future, while Mastriano ruined his research site.”



Below is one of Dr. Nolan’s permits for the research he carried out in 2009. The SYDE had no such authorization.




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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 4 - 2007 SYDE Report


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf



On page 4 I find this statement:


“(to our knowledge no other York research effort has had the opportunity to exploit the vast historical resources contained in the German archives)”


At the time they wrote this report (2007) no one other than the Army officer had visited the German archives, but I changed all of that last year. Not only do I have the same documents that the SYDE does but I have had all of mine officially translated by a German court appointed translator, so they are considered accurate translations. In addition I found material that the SYDE did not find that sheds more light on this subject from the German perspective.


I have already discussed earlier in this thread the German archival material in great detail and will again have to discuss as we move forward through this report, so I will leave it at this with Page 4 comments.



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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 5 - 2007 SYDE Report

http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf



Page 5 is more or less an introduction to the German troop deployments prior to the York fight in addition to the basic orientation of the American attack that morning.


Number 1: The American attack is shown on the SYDE map to be almost in a northwesterly direction against the Champrocher Ridge (also called Cornay Ridge). Every historical account that discusses the direction of the American attack says that the actual direction of attack of the 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry that morning was on a compass azimuth of 10 degrees north of west, in other words, 270 degrees. That would put the American attack a little more to the south than shown on the SYDE – of course – because the main American effort cannot be directed against the site the claim is where the York fight took place.


Number 2: On the SYDE page 5 map you notice that the 210th RIR sits down to eat breakfast on a slope that is facing a major American attack. Why would they do that there with a bunch of Americans attacking to their front?


The 210th RIR joined the 1st Battalion, 120th LDW under LT Vollmer in the ravine, not on Hill 167 as the SYDE tries to illustrate here. Hill 167 was already occupied by the 125th LDW.


Perhaps the only thing slightly accurate about the page 5 SYDE map is the position of the 125th LDW who had the 7th Company on the forward (eastern facing) point of Hill 167. The other thing that is somewhat accurate is the location of the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company under LT. Thoma, however the spot that the SYDE indicate on their map is the actual position of LT Thoma and only one platoon of his Bavarian Mineurs. The other platoon was waiting for further instruction on the western facing slope above the ravine. These Bavarians on the western facing slope are who York later did battle with.


Number 3: The location of the “Humserberg” and the “Bavarian Ridge” are totally inaccurate. The Humserberg is actually the Champrocher or Cornay Ridge and the Bavarian Ridge is much further to the southeast and would not even be on this map.



The main point the SYDE emphasizes throughout their report is that the fight must have occurred in an area that was co-occupied by the 120th LDW, the 210th RIR, 7th Bavarian Mineur, 2nd MG Company (120th LDW) and the 125th LDW.


The reality is, despite their claims, there is no single location anywhere in the world where these five units could have been co-located at any point in time before, during or after this battle. I am not sure how the 2nd MG Company even enters this because it is quite clear in the German war diaries of the units involved that the 2nd MG Company was no where near the fight when it occurred. In fact, the 1st Battalion, 120th LDW was attempting to link up with the 2nd MG Company shortly before the York fight took place. The Bavarian Mineurs were sent forward to occupy the gap in the line that existed between the 1st Battalion, 120th LDW (Vollmer) and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 120th LDW (von Sick). The 2nd MG Company was in reserve along the Chatel-Lancon Road juts behind (west of) von Sick’s position on Hill 244.


As we have already seen earlier I the thread and will surely see again, the 1st MG Company did play a small role in the fight by providing two NCOs as prisoners that York captured while they were reconnoitering suitable positions for their guns and stumbled into the wrong spot and the wrong time.


I will explain later how/why the SYDE brings the 125th LDW into this picture, but they too, had absolutely nothing to do with York’s heroics in the ravine. Their paths may have crossed after the fight, but not before or during it.


See maps below for actual German and American place names and actual German unit locations when the York fight took place. Notice where the SYDE says the Humserberg and the Bayern Ruecken (Bavarian Ridge) are located. Not even close to where they were really located. Reason for this error? Who knows, it makes no sense to me...... I personally feel that this is the work of amateurs who felt that they could pull the wool over the eyes of easily dazzled Army superiors, battlefield tourists and news media. I guess they never considered what might follow.



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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 6 and 7 - 2007 SYDE Report


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf



Pages 6 and 7 are really bizarre. This is where the researchers (Army officer and SYDE team) set up their own criteria for determining if their findings are valid.


Here is something I wrote over a year ago. I took all of their “questions” and answered them the way I see it from my perspective:


Here are their questions with my answers:




“There must be a “yes” to all of these points to be at least at the correct location of York’s action”


"a. Does it agree with historical facts about German units involved and unit defense locations?"


No. There is no archaeological evidence provided by the SYDE supporting the exact locations of ANY of the German regiments involved in this action. The German and American historical records do not confirm that York captured any soldiers from the 125th LW and according to the SYDE the 120th and 125th LW boundaries are critical in determining this spot. German records show that the 4th Company of the 120th LW was not located at their site and was in fact further to the southeast in and at the mouth of the wooded ravine. In addition the German records show that the 210th RIR was located in this same wooded ravine 600 meters southeast of their “York Spot”.


"b. Does the location make sense historically?"


No, The area the SYDE claims to be the site of the York fight is located west of Hill 223 and not “directly southwest” as is reported almost unanimously by every all American testimony and historical records. Furthermore the SYDE site is located directly in front of the axis of 2/328 Infantry attack.


"c. Is the location consistent with contemporary German and American tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs)?"


No, the SYDE alludes to the use of terrain as something new in 1918 German tactics. The use of the high ground to emplace machine guns is not something new or unique to this battle and the American also knew this.


"d. Is it along the flank of the German 125 and 120 regiments?"


No, there is no convincing evidence offered by the SYDE to confirm the exact location of the 120th and 125th regimental boundaries or artifacts found marked or in any other way can be associated with a particular unit other than the latest announcement of the 125th LW dog tag found higher on their hill at the location where this unit should have been according to the German records.


"e. Does the terrain match the February 1919 photographs taken in the 1919 during BG Lindsey’s investigation of SGT York’s combat action on 8 October 1918?"


No, the 1919 Signal Corps photographs of the graves of the soldiers killed during this fight show terrain that resemble absolutely nothing that compares to anywhere near the SYDE site.


"f. Is it supported by battlefield archaeology?"


No, the SYDE did not conduct battlefield archaeology; they conducted a “relic hunt”. In their last press release they even claim that the Boy Scouts conducted metal detector searches and found the German soldiers personal effects. This will not hold up to ANY scrutiny from professional archaeologists or historian let alone the implications of letting untrained boys digging on a WW I battlefield that is still loaded with potential UXO hazards.


As mentioned earlier, the SYDE offers no archaeological evidence that will agree with any of the historical accounts of this fight. The 21 cartridge casings mean nothing on a battlefield that was full of soldiers carrying and firing the same weapon. Many .45 caliber cartridges have been found all over this area and alone cannot constitute conclusive evidence. In addition there certainly seems to be a problem with the exact count of the number of .45 cartridges actually found at this site.


"g. Is it close to the 1/120 regimental battlefront and within the 1/120th sector?"


No, as shown in the previous arguments, the SYDE offers no convincing evidence of the exact location of any of the German units involved with the exception of the 125th LW dog tag found west of their area where a portion of the 125th is reported to have been. So, that particular find only illustrates the 125th was where they were supposed to be.


"h. Is it logical from a tactical military perspective?"


No, for the SYDE site to be correct the patrol would have had to advance in front of their own front line.


"i. Does it agree with written German and American testimony?"


No, the German testimony and records show that the German units were positioned differently that the SYDE says they were and the American accounts and records do not agree at all with anything concerning where this fight took place.


"j. Is it located where the machine guns are in the fight – engaging Americans in the valley?"


As both groups found, there were machine guns “in the fight” at several locations on the hill west of Chatel Chehery. The Nolan team found the machine guns that were firing into the left flank of G Company, 328th Infantry and the SYDE found machine guns ht were firing into the front of the 2/328 Infantry attack. The SYDE also found and failed to report the machine gun “nest” that was found above and slightly to the north of their spot. These machine guns were reported by Major Tillman as being captured by E Company, 328th Infantry.


"k. Is it on key terrain that dramatically impacted the outcome of the battle (decisive terrain)?"


No, the German machine gun position the SYDE claim York defeated is not located on decisive terrain in comparison to the large nest of machine guns that were located a few hundred meters northwest and up the hill from their York spot. In addition the patrol was sent out to destroy the machine guns firing into their unit’s left flank, it would be impossible for the SYDE machine guns to pose more of a threat than those German machine guns located no the hill directly southwest of Hill 223.


"l. Does it agree with the battle progression/sequence as recorded by the 2nd Landwehr Division sequence as recorded by all of the American and German units involved in the action?"


No, as stated earlier none of the German or American records support the SYDE location of this fight. IN addition, the SYDE claims that the Nolan site was the scene of action between the 122nd LW and the 28th Division at 1400 hours on 8 October, after the York fight. The 122nd LW Infantry was at least a kilometer further to the southwest of here and never came anywhere close to this ravine. In addition by 1400 ALL German forces in the entire area gad pulled back west of the Decauville railway and when the 28th Division finally did move forward from Hill 223 to the railway they met little if any resistance and reported no casualties in this area.


"m. Is the location positioned where the German machine gunners were able to observe both the action of the America 328th Infantry Regiment trapped in the valley and the meadow where York attacked the 120th?"


No, the fight actually occurred in an isolated ravine with German soldiers in the bottom of the ravine and on a western facing slope with other machine guns located on the “nose” of the hill or ridge which fired down into the left flank of G Company, 328th Infantry. The SYDE German machine guns are located in the direct front of the 2/328 Infantry attack.


"n. Is it close to a trench (York’s and Vollmer’s testimony)?"


There are NO defined trenches in the area, however there are old boundary ditches, but the “trench” the SYDE claims was used by Endriss actually appears to be a drainage ditch and runs east-west vs. north-south as it should be against an attack coming from the east in a westerly direction. The Germans even admit there were no trenches as a part of their defense.


"o. Is it near two roads that head east – out of the Argonne (York’s testimony)?"


There are many roads that lead east out of the Argonne; there is no document to my knowledge that indicate the presence of two roads heading east playing any serious role in determining the location of this fight.


"p. Is it close to Vollmer’s headquarters?"


No, the headquarters for the 1st Battalion, 120th LW (Vollmer) was located in the ravine where the Nolan site is. (See the 2nd LW Division War Diary and the German 1;25,000 topographical map from 1918)What the SYDE claims to be LT Vollmer’s “HQ building” is actually a local trash dump. The area is littered with bricks and other building materials and the ground is saturated with iron nails, junk, broken glass and other debris that point top a dump vs. the site of a structure. In York’s own words he describes the “HQ” as a wooden shack.


"q. Is it on terrain that dramatically impacted the battle (decisive terrain) – in which both the 120th and 125th would suffer sufficient damage that would cause the line of the German 2nd Landwehr Division (Wuerttembergische) to collapse?"


The event that initially triggered the German withdrawal was when several men from the 210th RIR and Bavarian Mineur Company, who escaped capture, reported to Captain von Sick, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 120th LW on Hill 244. They reported that they had been attacked in the flank and rear. Not knowing this was the action of only a small American patrol, and realizing that their was a huge gap in the German line on “Hill 2” that a larger American force could easily slip through, von Sick reported the position no longer tenable and the 2nd LW Division ordered the withdrawal to positions west of the North-South Road. Simultaneously other German positions were caving in to the 2/328 Infantry attack and no doubt this too played a role in the time line for withdrawal, but the capture of the 210th RIR and 7th Bavarian Mineur Company and portions of the 4th Company, 120th LW are what convinced von Sick that his flank and rear was threatened and he risked being cut off and surrounded. The loss of the German machine guns at the SYDE location would play a minor role for the German commander in comparison to the value of the other crew served weapon positions employed around the valley that day.




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[Brad Posey]

PAGE 7 - 2007 SYDE Report (continued)


http://www.tac-bsa.org/ResHistTrail_...expedition.pdf


Page 7 ends with a list of German units the SYDE says York took prisoners from:


"120. Württembergische Landwehr Regiment, 2. Württembergische Landwehr Division”
“125. Württembergische Landwehr Regiment, 2. Württembergische Landwehr Division”
“210. Prussian Reserve Regiment, 45th Prussian Reserve Division”
“7. Bayern Mineur Kompanie”


But, on page 46 we find this statement:


“While York marches the approximately 100 German prisoners back to the American lines at Hill 223, he encounters the 7th Bavarian Mining Company and elements of the 2nd Machine Gun Company, which surrender. York now has 132 prisoners.”


Where/when did the 2nd MG Company enter this fight? The 2nd MG Company was actually stationed in reserve along the Chatel-Lancon Road just west of Rittmeister von Sick on Hill 244 (Hohenborn Hoehe) with the combined 2nd and 3rd battalions, 120th LDW.


From everything I have read only two NCOs from the 1st MG Company were captured by York. No one from the 2nd MG Company was anywhere near the scene of the York fight in the ravine.



The 125th LDW soldiers were captured by E company, 328th Infantry and were added to York’s column of prisoners when they reached the 328th Infantry CP near Chatel later that morning. One of the 120th LDW officers captured in the ravine mentions an officer from the 125th LDW, but in the context of his testimony, the 125th LDW officer joined the group of prisoners long after the York fight took place.


More on this will follow.


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[Brad Posey]

Page 8 tomorrow....



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