Michael Wittman

[behblc]

Has Witmann been aware of the Fireflys nad how they , he might have been more cautious in his actions.

Has a claim ever been found to relate to the Typhoon claim ?

Eyewitness accounts are always useful but they can be mistaken , often time cements mistakes into place - cross checking is always worth while.
Not saying that mistakes cannot work both ways but it is always worth checking from several different sources if at all possible.
It would still be worth seeing this gentlemans recollection of the day - in itself it is a rare opportunity to see or hear the like.

[Greg]

Wittmann was killed when his Tiger was penetrated by Allied tank gunfire on 8/8/44. There is some doubt as to which unit fired the shot that got Wittmann but there is no doubt that they did get him. No Typhoons and no accident. Just a man who took a risk and paid the price for his mistake.

Well put! There shouldn't be a mystery about how Wittmann's tank (and others) were destroyed by enemy tank fire on that day at Cintheaux - the Tiger tanks weren't invincible (especially against a 17 pdr Firefly) and neither were their commanders. Wittmann was an outstanding leader at individual tank and tactical unit level, but he was moving in a very dangerous situation. He was in what the US Army would call today a "movement to contact," because while they expected enemy contact the Germans didn't know where the enemy was located. If you go to Cintheaux today the woodline where the Firefly was looks like a danger area from where Wittmann advanced, but most probably he didn't have the resources available to send a recon element to check it off, or even call artillery smoke to screen it. As Michael said he took a risk to execute his mission, and got caught that time.

Best,
Greg

[SurvivingPanzer]

Wittmann was killed when his Tiger was penetrated by Allied tank gunfire on 8/8/44. There is some doubt as to which unit fired the shot that got Wittmann but there is no doubt that they did get him. No Typhoons and no accident. Just a man who took a risk and paid the price for his mistake.

I do subscribe to the idea of "tiger confusion" which is people thinking they saw Tigers when it was really a Panther or PV IV. But I guarentee you that if you actually did engage a Tiger and knock it out you would know about it, I think the answer lies in the endless paperwork of the period. Most importantly what tanks where involved in this area on 8/8, who claimed Tiger kills, and after action ammunition reports (how many shells of AP expended vs amount of kills).

Claims from that time are iffy, there where only 1,300 tigers produced, spread between N. Africa, Russia and Northern France. But I've never read a book that the author did not talk about seeing four or five Tigers and knocking at least one of them out. My guess is if you tallied them up we would have more than our 1,300.

[DaveM]

adding to the debate

Adding to the debate........ apart from the gunner - Trooper Joe Ekins
<O</O

Another unit in the area also has a historical claim to the knocking out the Tiger ace, that being Major Sidney Radley-Walters of the <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:City w:st="on">Sherbrooke</ST1</st1:City> Fusilier Regiment of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division positioned within a 500 yd close ambush on Wittmann's left rear flank
<O</O

An excellent examination of this is provided in the recent book "No Holding Back" by Brian Reid, which provides a detailed topographical map of the engagement, and is based on extensive review of Allied and German records In his book, Reid concludes that there is much to support the Canadian Sherman's claims in the destruction of Tiger 007...

As for the RAF Typhoons... Allied Tactical Air Force have generally been given too much sway in post-war accounts of the Normandy fighting... serious scientific analysis has found that while the USAF and RAF Tac Air had some impact in the fighting, the actual damage they wrought was far less than believed at the time. Reid also examines the RAF Tac Air possibility and finds no supporting evidence of RAF in the destruction.

[tinus]

Well put! There shouldn't be a mystery about how Wittmann's tank (and others) were destroyed by enemy tank fire on that day at Cintheaux - the Tiger tanks weren't invincible (especially against a 17 pdr Firefly) and neither were their commanders. Wittmann was an outstanding leader at individual tank and tactical unit level, but he was moving in a very dangerous situation. He was in what the US Army would call today a "movement to contact," because while they expected enemy contact the Germans didn't know where the enemy was located. If you go to Cintheaux today the woodline where the Firefly was looks like a danger area from where Wittmann advanced, but most probably he didn't have the resources available to send a recon element to check it off, or even call artillery smoke to screen it. As Michael said he took a risk to execute his mission, and got caught that time.

Best,
Greg

Well it's quit clear isn't it? The personal story of the former Hauptscharfführer pnzreg LSSAH is a lie? Maybe he made his story when he stood in a small room with 100s of germans (most of them dead) for 5 days without food or water in siberia.

But to be serious, I will discuss this with him when I get the chance, if he wants to. I will update it here by then.

[michael kenny]

Well it's quit clear isn't it? The personal story of the former Hauptscharfführer pnzreg LSSAH is a lie?

LSSAH was not sSS PzAbt 101 (later sSS PzAbt 501) so if that bit is true he was not in Wittmann's unit.

But I guarentee you that if you actually did engage a Tiger and knock it out you would know about it, I think the answer lies in the endless paperwork of the period. Most importantly what tanks where involved in this area on 8/8, who claimed Tiger kills, and after action ammunition reports (how many shells of AP expended vs amount of kills).

They did know they knocked out Tigers and they claimed them at the time. 8 wrecks were left in the area and there is absolutely no confusion about the losses. Let me clear this up. The Wittmann group of Tigers advanced into the path of Allied tank units. They were fired at by several sub-units. The Tigers were knocked out. That is crystal clear. The 'confusion' if it exists, is which of the several tanks firing at the Tigers hit which Tiger. It looks like some were hit by the Canadians and some by the British.
It is as if 20 guns were aimed at 10 targets. All the targets were hit. How do you work out which guns hit which target? If all the targets are hit does it matter?
If you do any serious research then you will find no doubt about the kills.
Onlt incomplete information allows you to question the destruction of these 8 Tigers.

[Fightclub]

Wow, this thread is more then 4 years old. Let him rest in peace


Why not open a new one with today knowlegde?

[tinus]

LSSAH was not sSS PzAbt 101 (later sSS PzAbt 501) so if that bit is true he was not in Wittmann's unit.

Hmm, I will check on that, my knowledge isn't that great. I jumped in it two weeks ago.

[Blitzvogel]

Recent Research

You wanted more current research, well here you go.
Out of all of these posts, only one touched on the subject of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers as being the potential 'hunters' of Wittman and tank 007. A documentary on the History Channel aired several nights ago detailing the methods used to determine who fired the killing shot. This fact, in and of itself, is hardly a definitive answer, but I had the fortune to interview the host a few days later to determine the research methods and content that was not included in the show. The host is Norm Christie and makes a compelling case.

The range from Ekins and the Yeomanry was approx 800 yards to the 3 Tigers they destroyed that day. However, the final resting place of Wittman's Tiger was well over 1000 yards away. Ekins and the Northhamptonshire Yeomanry accounts tell of 3 tanks, thus not accounting for the other 2 that were destroyed (out of a total of 7 in the initial engagement)

The Yeomanry were located approx 800m to the front right of Wittman's zug as he proceeded to Hill 112 to attack forces on the reverse slop of that hill. The Sherbrooke's were approx 147m to Wittman's left rear AND elevated. Although there were some Firefly's in the Canadian order of battle that day, even a Sherman 75mm AP round fired into the top rear deck armour would have easily penetrated.

The ranges, number of tanks killed and claims made support the Sherbrooke's as the killers. The gaps in information stem from the following occurrences:
1. The Sherbrooke's lost several crews in the following days, eliminating some of the corroboration of the story.
2. The Sherbrooke's signal and comms vehicles, containing AARs etc were destroyed the next day.

As for possible reasons as to why Wittman made such a costly mistake:
1. Lack of Allied air power (eliminates the Typhoon claim) lulled him into a sense of security causing him to be cavalier and move during the day.
2. Neither German nor Allied armies had any idea where the enemy was. Wittman himself did not know the extent of the penetration of the Allies after Operation Totalize.
3. The focus on the counterattack was the task at hand.
4. Once his tanks to the right were engaged, he focused on the battle and neglected his right flank.
5. Wittman's success in June in Villers Bocage created his own feeling of invincibility.
6. Fatalistic view; Wittman and others knew the end was coming and what defeat meant. The did not seek safety but rather faced battle and death headlong by taking chances. These chances when successful were legendary but when not, fatal.

I thank Norm Christie for taking the time to provide details on his research and findings and hope that I have contributed to this discussion.