FJ Winter Helmet - Operation Nordwind

[WalterB]

I acquired the following helmet from an auction house in December 2014. This helmet has never before been in a collection until now. A true "out of the woodwork" find. Based on direct communications with the representative of the auction house that picked up the helmet, he indicated that this helmet came from the estate of John Stycharz, along with some other bring backs (some headgear, firearms and edged weapons). The representative indicated that he personally got this stuff from the family and that it had literally been in an attic.

Armed solely with the name of the GI, I commenced the search and was eventually able to confirm that Pfc. John Strycharz had, indeed, been a GI during WWII. As I continued my research, I found that Pfc. Strycharz had died in 2007 and was from a small town in Massachusetts. This bothered me since the information provided by the auction representative indicated that he obtained the helmet in Rhode Island in 2014. So I dug deeper and found out that Pfc. Strycharz had a wife and daughter. The daughter was married, had two daughters herself, lived in Rhode Island and died about 4 years ago (sad). Pfc. Strycharz's wife outlived them both and died in April 2014 in Rhode Island. It appears that the GI's wife moved to Rhode Island to be with her daughter sometime after Pfc. Strycharz died in 2007 and, apparently, moved everything to Rhode Island. Anyway, so Pfc. Strycharz's wife died in April 2014 and that corroborated the information provided by the auction representative.

My research continued online and I eventually was able to obtain his army serial number. With such information, and through the terrific help of Mike Westmoreland of Westmoreland Research, I was able to obtain copies of Pfc. Strycharz's records. The research I undertook online, together with the information provided by Westmoreland Research, yielded fascinating information to me as a WWII history fan. Although I was originally hoping that the information obtained would support that the helmet had a link to Operation "Wacht Am Rhein"/Battle of the Bulge, it was not to be. However, the actual facts revealed a story that, in my view, is equally fascinating from a historical perspective.

John Strycharz was born and raised in Chicopee, Massachussets in January 1923 and was drafted into the US Army on December 13, 1943. After basic training, he was assigned to the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division (the "Rock of the Marne"). He departed the United States on July 1, 1944 and, according to his military records, arrived in the "EAME" (European African Middle Eastern) theater on July 15, 1944. Specifically, he probably arrived in Naples, Italy, where the 3rd Infantry Division was located at that time (such division had arrived in Naples on July 4, 1944). As you may know, the 3rd Infantry Division is a storied US infantry division that had already been involved in combat operations in North Africa and Italy. The next phase for the 3rd Infantry Division was to participate in Operation "Dragoon": the invasion of southern France. Along with the 36th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division, they assaulted the beaches in an area near St. Tropez on August 15, 1944. Attached below are maps showing the area of operations for Operation Dragoon.

[WalterB]

Pfc. Strycharz does not appear to have been involved in Operation Dragoon (his military records do not list, in his list of campaigns, "Southern France", but instead list "Rhineland Campaign", which is subsequent to Operation Dragoon). In any event, Pfc. Strycharz's records do indicate that he was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division's 15th Infantry Regiment. His records also indicate that he earned his combat infantryman's badge in October 1944 as part of the 15th infantry regiment of the 3rd infantry division as it was moving up the Rhone valley.

The month of October 1944 proved a difficult month for the 3rd Infantry Division, as part of the 6th Army Group (which was composed of the Seventh Army and the French First Army). Supply shortages and increasingly harsh weather conspired to slow the advance of the Seventh Army and the French First Army at they pushed deeper into the heavily wooded Vosges Mountains. Below is a map showing the march up the Rhone Valley:

[WalterB]

During November 1944, the 3rd Infantry Division and the rest of the 6th Army Group made the most significant Allied gains by attacking through the Vosges Mountains, taking Sarrebourg and the Saverne Gap on 20th of November and, spearheaded by General Jacques P. LeClerc's 2d French Armored Division (part of the First French Army), reaching Strasbourg on November 23rd. By November 27th, the Seventh Army had secured a widening and dangerous salient into the German defensive line. Only in the High Vosges Mountains, just west of Colmar, did the Germans manage to hang on.

As many of you know, by mid-December 1944, the Germans launched Operation "Wacht-am-Rhein" by launching attacks in the Ardennes. In the mist-shrouded early morning of December 16th, Hitler launched the Fifth Panzer Army, the Sixth Panzer Army, and the Seventh Army in a vain attempt to cross the Meuse River, seize Antwerp, and split the Allied front. It soon became known as "the Battle of the Bulge". The following map has a layout of the units in Western Europe during that time frame. The red arrow on the top of the map shows Operation Wacht-am-Rhein.

[WalterB]

As you may know, upon launching such offensive, General Patton, commander of the 3d Army, turned left (north) and raced to reinforce the allied units and attack the German offensive. This caused the front formerly held by the 3d Army to be lightly defended. As a result, units in the Alsace-Lorraine area (6th Army Group) were shifted northward to fill-in the area formerly held by the 3d Army. This caused the allied front in the Alsace-Lorraine area to be significantly weakened. Hitler understood this, and as Hitler's offensive in the Ardennes ground to a halt, Hitler launched the two red arrows in the middle of the map above by launching Operation Nordwind against the weakened 6th Army Group in the Alsace-Lorraine area of operations.

Operation Nordwind.

The objective of Operation Nordwind was to tear gaps in the lines of the 6th Army Group (composed of the US 7th Army (which included the pfc. Strycharz's 3d Infantry Division) and the French 1st Army), annihilating them in the process, opening a major breach for other German units to undertake, if successful, a subsequent operation to be known as Operation "Zahnarzt" (Dentist), which was a planned offensive into the rear of the US 3rd Army which would lead, in Hitler's hopeful expectations, to its destruction.

Just before midnight on January 1st, Operation Nordwind was launched on the thinly-stretched line of the US 7th Army. Once again, the fighting took place in bitter winter weather where frostbite and trenchfoot were almost as dangerous as the German attackers. See the map below for details of the German offensive during Operation Nordwind.

[WalterB]

The following was taken from "Riviera to the Rhine" by Jeffery J Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, published in 1993.

The initial attack of Operation Nordwind was carried out by three Corps of the German 1st Army of Army Group G: General Max Simon's XIII SS Corps was the primary assault force, consisting of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier ("Gotz von Berlichingen") and the 36th Volksgrenadier Divisions, the 404th and 410th Volks Artillery Corps, the 20th Volks Werfer (rocket-launcher) Brigade, two armored flame-thrower companies, two army artillery battalions, and one observation battalion (see map above). In the Bitche area the second attacking force consisted of General Petersen's XC Corps on the right, or western, wing, controlling the strengthened 559th and 257th Volksgrenadier Divisions, and General Hoehne's LXXXIX Corps on the left, or eastern, wing, with the refitted 361st and 256th Volksgrenadier Divisions. The Vosges forces were also beefed up by additional self-propelled and assault guns, supported by two army artillery battalions and an army engineer battalion, and later reinforced by the experienced 6th SS Mountain Division as it arrived from the Finnish front. In reserve, temporarily under the direct control of Army Group G, lay the XXXIX Panzer Corps, under Lt. Gen. Karl Decker, with the requipped 21st Panzer and 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions-the former with 18 medium (Mark IV) and 31 heavy (Mark V) Panther tanks, and the latter with 9 medium and 20 heavies, with about 20 additional Panthers and more assault and self-propelled guns en route, which had been temporarily delayed by Allied air attacks on the German transportation network. To further strengthen the reserve forces and serve as a basis for Operation Zahnharzt, OB West began preparations for assembling the 10th SS Panzer Division, the 7th Parachute Division, and other units behind the lines of the First Army. [NOTE: The only FJ division involved in Operation Nordwind was the 7th FJ Division. No other FJ units were in the area.]

The leading German units of General Simion's XIII SS Corps began to hit the main American lines about midnight. In the Sarre valley the assault force was met by determined resistance from the 44th and 100th Infantry Division troops, who were well dug in and deployed in depth. An attack had been expected and US commanders had jammed the zone with three infantry and armored divisions. The Germin attack barely made a dent in the beefed-up Allied line. In some cases the SS troopers advanced in suicidal open waves, cursing and screaming at the American infantrymen who refused to be intimidated. The infantry of the 36th Volksgrenadier did little better.

Although Simon's forces finally managed to poke a narrow hole, about two miles in depth, at Rimling on the right wing of the 44th Division. The 100th Infantry Division held firm. In the days that followed, the Germans saw their small advances continuously eroded by repeated counterattacks from the 44th, 100th, and 63d Division infantry supported by elements of the French 2d Armored Division. Allied artillery and, when the weather broke, Allied air attacks, together with the bitter cold, also sapped the strength of the attackers.

On January 4th, the German high command formally called off the effort of XIII SS Corps. As General Simon, the attacking corps commander, caustically observed, the Sarre assault had shown only that the German soldier still knew how to fight and how to die, but little else. Blaskowitz, with Hitler and von Rundstedt's approval, obviously chose not to throw the German armored reserves into the battle there, as planned, and sought weaker links in the American lines.

The second attack, launched from the Bitche area south through the Low Vosges, was more successful. Believing that the major German effort would be west of the mountains, the American generals had not expected an enemy drive through such rough terrain, where snowy, narrow roads bisected rather than paralleled the southward German axis of advance. The assembly areas of the attacking infantry on New Year's Eve had been hidden in the Maginot Line bunkers still in German hands; there had been no pre-attack artillery bombardment to warn the defenders; and the overcast sky and thick mountain forests had provided cover for the assault throughout the first day of the offensive. Moving south through the dark forests, leading elements of the 559th, 257th, 361st, and 256th Volksgrenadier Divisions easily penetrated the positions of the small American mechanized force, bypassing strongpoints and scattering the roadbound armored units as they withdrew and tried to regroup. US units (Task Force Hudelstone) launched local counterattacks, but they were hampered by the snow-both wheeled and tracked vehicles losing traction on the icy mountain roads-and were too minor to have any effect on the general progress of the German offensive. Quickly the various components of the light mechanized unit found themselves retreating to the east and west, abandoning many of their snowbound vehicles in the process.

As American reinforcements met German attackers, the battle quickly turned into a bitter winter infantry fight focusing on the towns that lay along the snow-covered mountain roads. Here at Lemberg, Sarreinsberg, Wildenguth, Wingen, Wimmenau, Reipertswiller, Mouterhouse, Baerenthal, Philippsbourg, Dambach, and a host of other tiny Alsatian mountain villages and hamlets, the Americans finally began to hold their ground. Yet, even before the four attacking volksgrenadier divisions began to tire, the Germans started deploying elements of the 6th SS Mountain Division ("Nord") into the battle. This SS division, an experienced unit trained and equipped for cold-weather warfare, fresh and at full strength, began to deploy-on the battlefield sometime on 2 January and was soon spearheading a renewed drive south. Nevertheless, elements of the 45th and 79th Divisions, reinforced by more battalions from Task Force Herren as well as units of the 540th Engineers, which also served as infantry, continued to protect the vital Vosges exits, constantly counterattacking the now overextended German forces.

Without possession of the exits to the Vosges, Hitler refused to commit the mobile reserves, and as long as the Americans controlled the Savern Gap and the road networks on either side of the Vosges, they could bring reinforcements into the area faster than the attackers. With nowhere to go, NORDWIND was essentially grinding to a halt. The Germans, however, still had their uncommitted armor reserves (as well as the 7th FJ Division) -but so did the Americans have reserve units as well. The struggle was far from over.

By January 9th, the XXXIX Panzer Corps was also taking part in the fierce fighting. By January 15th, at least seventeen German divisions, from Army Group G and Army Group OberRhine, were involved in the vicious combats that broke out after the initial attack. It included the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, 7th Fallschirmjäger, 21st Panzer, and 25th Panzergrenadier divisions. The 7th FJ division attacked the town of Hatten and then fought in the Hagenau forest until reaching the town of Hagenau. Fearing the total destruction of the US 7th Army, Eisenhower rushed already battered divisions from the Ardennes, southeast over 100 km, to reinforce the 7th Army. As their arrival was delayed, on January 21 the Americans were forced to withdraw to defensive positions on the south bank of the Moder River. See map below for further details.

[WalterB]

When the US forces finally seemed to crumble under the ferocious German attacks, Operation Nordwind ground to a halt on January 25th, as a result of the German's lack of fuel and ammunition. The next day the American reinforcements began to arrive from the Ardennes. Operation Nordwind had failed.

Going back to Pfc. Strycharz, as mentioned previously, he earned his combat infantryman's badge in October 1944 as part of the 15th infantry regiment of the 3rd infantry division as it was moving up the Rhone valley. Pfc. Strycharz's military file contains two very descriptive letters he wrote to the government well after the war asking for a Purple Heart. In those letters he explains how "sometime in November 1944" he was wounded when an 88 shell blew up nearby and he was thrown in the air with some shrapnel in the legs and hip. Attached is a copy of his first letter.

[WalterB]

His second letter is more descriptive of his wounds (sharpnel from the 88 shell, but more importantly, serious "combat fatigue"). His second letter also is more descriptive of the hospitals he was interned in after being wounded. In his second letter he indicates that he was hospitalized in the 59th field hospital which, according to records obtained through my research, was only 15 miles from the front (in Epinal, Vosges). His second letter goes on to mention that he stayed in Epinal for approximately two months under the supervision of the 59th Field Hospital, the 236th General Hospital and the 35th Evacuation Hospital.

Online research of the 59th Field Hospital, 236th General Hospital and the 35th Evacuation Hospital corroborate this information since such hospitals were moved into Epinal, Vosges during the November 1944 through January 1945 time frame. As discussed above, Operation Nordwind commenced on January 1, 1945 and ended January 25, 1945. What is of great interest to me is that the online research revealed that during the November 1944 through January 1945 time-frame in Epinal, Vosges, the 59th Evacuation Hospital, 236th General Hospital and the 35th Evacuation Hospital received 10,460 US and allied personnel as patients and 736 German POWs as patients. Thus, even though Pfc. Strycharz was not involved in the fighting during Operation Nordwind, he was hospitalized in the direct area of operations during that time. As a side note, Pfc. Strycharz was moved in February 1945 to another hospital in Marseilles, France and then eventually sent back to the United States on July 1945 and medically discharged on October 8, 1945. As a result of this information, and given that his direct combat operations were limited to the September 1944 through November 1944 time frame and that he was hospitalized in the vicinity of were Operation Nordwind occurred (and subsequently evacuated to other hospitals for the duration of the war), the only logical possibilities of how he could have received the helmet are the following: (a) buddies of his who visited him at the hospital brought him the helmet, (b) a wounded GI was brought into the hospital and he was carrying the helmet, or (c) possibly more likely (based on the large number of wounded German POWs that were admitted to the hospital), from a wounded FJ POW who was brought in and his stuff removed at the hospital.

On to the helmet.

Based on additional pictures I had received from the auction house, I was able to determine that the helmet was a late war, no decal FJ helmet with two solid aluminum bolts and two vented aluminum bolts. In addition, I was also able to determine that the liner and the chinstraps were authentic. As a result, I bid on the auction based on the price of a late war FJ helmet. I won the auction for a price of a late war FJ helmet, so I figured I would not be too bad off. When I got the box from the auction house on December 26th, I was trying to remain as objective as possible. The following pictures show what was in the box. Keep in mind, however, that taking pictures of white surfaces (winter camos) is very hard because the whiteness tends to overpower the small details. Here are the pictures:

[WalterB]

The helmet has a winter field made cover. The cover shows some very nice patina of dust and grit and rust. The material of the cover has some sort of floral pattern and the fabric is made of something like a table cloth or a curtain, in my opinion. Keeping in mind that the 7th FJ division was held in reserve, the FJ should have had time to prepare for the upcoming winter offensive.

[WalterB]

One thing I like about the cover is that if you see the rear of it, there is a concentration of dirt/grime build-up. As if the FJ reclined his head/rested the back of his head against something dirty.

[WalterB]

Right side and Front angle:

[WalterB]

Front:

[WalterB]

There was also a relatively thick layer of dust on the liner, so it was evident that the helmet had been stored upside down for a long time. The top of the helmet cover has remnants of paper and I speculate that the helmet was left upside down on some paper that, through time became stuck to the top part of the cover as a result of humidity and changes in temperature.

[WalterB]

Rear shots. One can see the dirt build-up on the back of the helmet cover that I mentioned previously:

[WalterB]

Right side:

[WalterB]

On to the liner. The liner shows some neat age and use. It is NOT one of those late war FJ helmets that has a minty liner that was not used during the war.