Hi guys
today I would like to show you one of the few objects in my collection that certainly participated actively in the events related to the landing in Sicily, a suit of jacket and pants found years ago in a Sicilian inland market in the province of Caltanissetta. It belonged to a soldier of the 208th Coastal Division, at the time appointed to defend the Sicilian coast between Marsala and Carini and formed by the 133rd and 147th rgt. of infantry and from the 28th gr. of artillery.
As we know, the coastal divisions did not shine for their combativeness ... but now I would now like to analyze a little more deeply the reasons that partly contributed to this, trying to change, at least in part, the negative judgment that history assigned to these soldiers.
Starting from 1941, perhaps already foreseeing the future, the need arose to create coastal units with the specific task of defending the Italian coasts.
Initially, infantry regiments and artillery groupings were organized to constitute 10 Coastal Brigade Sectors, that were soon joined (and some replaced) by 17 Coastal Brigades, later all of them were transformed into Coastal Divisions.
Unfortunately, these large units, were never up to the tasks assigned to them due to the neglect and ignorance of the military institutions alongside the omnipresent and chronic lack of economic resources.
The first indicator, that we immediately notice, of the lack of consideration for these soldiers by the military authority was that to these divisions, unlike all the others of the Royal Army, was never assigned a specific name but only a numbering between 200 and 230. Furthermore, there was no numerical link between the division and the assigned regiments or a standardization of any kind in the equipment, that almost always dates back to the Great War.
More serious indicators, than the previous one, in outlining the actual fighting strength of these units were:
- the recruitment of personnel only from the older classes of the local population (the oldest was in 1907);
- the poor training and the extremely poor equipment, the helmets assigned for example were those of the First World War;
- the obsolete armaments, both individual and group.
- the artillery anti-ship consisting exclusively of old models with an insufficient range to respond to the shots of the enemy naval artillery. The old 149/35 indeed could shoot at a maximum distance of 10 Km as opposed to the big allied naval calibers that had instead a range of 30-40 Km.
Great deficiency was also found in the fortifications built on coast and in the immediate hinterland constituted by bunkers without any armouring due to the lack of the necessary steel.
In summary we can say that the Coastal Divisions certainly did not have the elevated qualitative standards that had their similar units of the GAF, despite both having the task of defending the borders of the nation. As we know the GAF soldiers were trained as if they were Alpine. They had the same physical suitability required with in addition the possession of an high psychological health profile (for example: claustrophobics were excluded), in consideration of the garrison life sometimes carried out in small fortification with a little space available and very often in conditions of extreme discomfort. The armament was the classic one of the army.
Given these premises, we can well imagine how these poor soldiers of the Coastal Divisions, poorly armed, no longer young and often with families, found themselves fighting a battle against an immensely superior enemy, made up of the best and super-trained Anglo-American fighters such as the paratroopers American 82nd AD and British 1st AD, the Royal Marines, the Commandos and the Special Raiding Squadron, in addition to the normal allied infantry divisions, all of them excellently trained and equipped.
Shortly, a veil of 36 men per km of coastline armed with 4 machine guns and 2 submachine guns, 1 cannon every one and a half kilometer and 1 mortar every four kilometers, found itself facing the tide of men of the 7th and 8th armies that landed on the first day of the invasion 66,000 Americans and 115,000 Britons.
prisoners belonging to the 206th Cost. Div.
today I would like to show you one of the few objects in my collection that certainly participated actively in the events related to the landing in Sicily, a suit of jacket and pants found years ago in a Sicilian inland market in the province of Caltanissetta. It belonged to a soldier of the 208th Coastal Division, at the time appointed to defend the Sicilian coast between Marsala and Carini and formed by the 133rd and 147th rgt. of infantry and from the 28th gr. of artillery.
As we know, the coastal divisions did not shine for their combativeness ... but now I would now like to analyze a little more deeply the reasons that partly contributed to this, trying to change, at least in part, the negative judgment that history assigned to these soldiers.
Starting from 1941, perhaps already foreseeing the future, the need arose to create coastal units with the specific task of defending the Italian coasts.
Initially, infantry regiments and artillery groupings were organized to constitute 10 Coastal Brigade Sectors, that were soon joined (and some replaced) by 17 Coastal Brigades, later all of them were transformed into Coastal Divisions.
Unfortunately, these large units, were never up to the tasks assigned to them due to the neglect and ignorance of the military institutions alongside the omnipresent and chronic lack of economic resources.
The first indicator, that we immediately notice, of the lack of consideration for these soldiers by the military authority was that to these divisions, unlike all the others of the Royal Army, was never assigned a specific name but only a numbering between 200 and 230. Furthermore, there was no numerical link between the division and the assigned regiments or a standardization of any kind in the equipment, that almost always dates back to the Great War.
More serious indicators, than the previous one, in outlining the actual fighting strength of these units were:
- the recruitment of personnel only from the older classes of the local population (the oldest was in 1907);
- the poor training and the extremely poor equipment, the helmets assigned for example were those of the First World War;
- the obsolete armaments, both individual and group.
- the artillery anti-ship consisting exclusively of old models with an insufficient range to respond to the shots of the enemy naval artillery. The old 149/35 indeed could shoot at a maximum distance of 10 Km as opposed to the big allied naval calibers that had instead a range of 30-40 Km.
Great deficiency was also found in the fortifications built on coast and in the immediate hinterland constituted by bunkers without any armouring due to the lack of the necessary steel.
In summary we can say that the Coastal Divisions certainly did not have the elevated qualitative standards that had their similar units of the GAF, despite both having the task of defending the borders of the nation. As we know the GAF soldiers were trained as if they were Alpine. They had the same physical suitability required with in addition the possession of an high psychological health profile (for example: claustrophobics were excluded), in consideration of the garrison life sometimes carried out in small fortification with a little space available and very often in conditions of extreme discomfort. The armament was the classic one of the army.
Given these premises, we can well imagine how these poor soldiers of the Coastal Divisions, poorly armed, no longer young and often with families, found themselves fighting a battle against an immensely superior enemy, made up of the best and super-trained Anglo-American fighters such as the paratroopers American 82nd AD and British 1st AD, the Royal Marines, the Commandos and the Special Raiding Squadron, in addition to the normal allied infantry divisions, all of them excellently trained and equipped.
Shortly, a veil of 36 men per km of coastline armed with 4 machine guns and 2 submachine guns, 1 cannon every one and a half kilometer and 1 mortar every four kilometers, found itself facing the tide of men of the 7th and 8th armies that landed on the first day of the invasion 66,000 Americans and 115,000 Britons.
prisoners belonging to the 206th Cost. Div.
Comment