Death of a Sniper – The Gothic Line in Italy

[InfanterieSammler]

Hi John,

Yes, as described in the March 25, 1945 War Department Technical Manual, and discussed in this thread, the design was well-known to the allies and published in the German journals well before that in October 1944, but that's the existence of the approved design not proof of the physical existence of the badge on the field.

There are many examples of official award documents bestowed long in advance of the physical availability of the award, and in some cases, like the Marine-Frontspange and the Luftwaffe Seekampfabzeichen (both instituted in November 1944), we know the award was never actually produced in wartime.

Actually, in September 1944, although the Scharfschützenabzeichen had been announced, the final design hadn't yet been published so Martin Wagner (or his family) could not have received the actual badge at that time, just the citation.

I'm not saying the award was never made in wartime, it may very well have been. It's just that we still lack ironclad proof that it was --- all evidence is circumstantial at best and most of the numerous examples that we see posted were likely post-war.

Best regards,
---Norm

Hi Norm,

Very well summed-up. Yes, I definitely agree there is not conclusive proof necessarily that the badge was awarded. I do believe, I have read on several occasions years ago in books written by/about snipers where they mentioned having physically receiving the badge.

We just moved into a new home and I still have not unpacked my books, but will try to find my sources on the badge being issued to soldiers.

Regards,
John

[Norm F]

Hi Norm,

I'm not familiar with the terminology of Type 1 or Type 2. I probably had stopped collecting them when someone came out with these terms. That said, reading that thread briefly and using the image you posted as a reference. The "Type 2" has a field grey wool base cloth - this was a style I never owned nor considered original. I understand the design of the eagle more closely resembles the "Type 2". Either way, I have never seen anything that proves to me that any of these styles positively "wartime-issued." Everything seems to just be conjecture.

Regards,
John

H John,

The terms are defined in the previous thread and Type 2 is found with both types of base cloth — grey and feldgrau — unlike the Type 1 which has only a grey background. Within Type 2, regardless of the backing cloth, the embroidery pattern is identical so these are just different production runs on the same machinery, and different from the Type 1. So the definition of types is based upon the embroidery design, not upon the backing cloth.

Best regards,
—-Norm

[Pie]

Hi John,
very intresting indeed! The 715th it's my favourite!
I will copy here a research I did on a SB of soldier of the Grenadier-Regiment 735 who fought in the area (Poggio Prefetto) on those days!
------------
Attack on the Gothic Line

At the beginning of September the allied planes of attack towards the Gothic Line north of Florence were accelerated, once the retreat of the Germans towards the north was certified. The XIIIEnglish Corps, assigned to the 5th American Army, had the right flank of the advance. The forward movements of the troops did not encounter particular difficulties and were quick enough, despite the fact that the German Pioniers had blown up all the bridges on the Sieve and blocked by various ways the streets. Except these difficulties they not had much contact with the enemy. The British 1st Infantry Division had sporadic clashes with troops of the rearguard 4.Fallschirmjager-Division, without suffering losses and also capturing prisoners.
Between 7 and 8 September, the British managed to push forward by occupying all the key points of the mountains between the Arno and the Sieve. On September 9, the II Corps (US) moved up the road 65 leading to the Pass of Futa; XIII English Corps was deployed on the right, the 1st Infantry-Division (British) moved along the Faentina road, who lead to Borgo San Lorenzo.
The German front had further weakened at the beginning of September: by 9th of the month, three divisions had been transferred to the Adriatic sector (29. Panzergrenadier-Division, 26. Panzer-Division and 356. Infanterie-Division),
where the offensive of the 8th British Army was taking place. The weakening of this sector was only remedied by the sending of the 334. Infanterie-Division, but no replacement units had been sent for the 356. Infanterie-Division.
On September 10, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st English Infantry Division reached the Sieve River under Borgo San Lorenzo. The 1st King Shropshire, on the same day evening, managed to cross the river west of Borgo with two companies, occupied the monastery near the railway and had some contact with the enemy. During the night, the 2nd Forester along with the 1st Duke of Wellington set in position south of the River on a collection area. The next day the Forester continued its advance, side by side King's Shropshire, and after 8 km Grezzano and Ronta were occupied. British units came in contact with US troops on the left.
A Company of Forester had spent the night at Pulicciano (Ronta) and his platoon carrier was vanguard in Ronta's country. On 12 September resumed the attack and began crossing the town with Duke of Wellington's B company in the head. After some clashes the Germans retreated and stood at the sides of the railroad. Units from 715. Infantry-Division tried to attack the carrier platoon, who managed to keep the position and at the end of the clash 11 prisoners were taken. This made possible to establish the enemy unit in the Ronta sector. On the left, King's Shropshire captured an outpost at the Houses of Risolaia (Grezzano) and took 6 prisoners of the 9th Company of the Sturmregiment (12th Fallschirmjaeger-Regiment). The units remained to withstand the advance were then the 4. Fallschirmjaeger-Division and the 715. Infanterie-Division.
The first had just received about 900 soldiers from Germany to strengthen the divisional hard-tested by the last battlesand for the formation of III/FJ-Regiment Battalion 11. These soldiers, however, were sent in the front lines to small groups because they proved, in addition to their young age, unsafe in the shooting and would have been an obstacle for the first-line troops already having a fight experience. The division was therefore under organic and responsible for a very wide front, from the Passo della Futa to Monte Verruca (15km); The second, proven by the fights around Florence, was definitely under organic and as the first did not have any reservations. Was in charge of an area that went from the east to Ronta to Poggio Rotto (alongside Monte Verruca). The area between these two units was also the one that demarcated the area of competence of X and XIV German Armies, thus an ideal point for an attack.
The 1st Infantry Division was therefore in contact with the German defenses of the Gothic Line along its sector. On September 12, he managed to carry across the Sieve all the divisional artillery and some heavy batteries needed to support the attack on Germanic defenses. The streets were clogged with American and English traffic carrying ammunition, men and supplies in view of the offensive.
A Bailey Class 40 bridge was built on the Sieve River in Borgo San Lorenzo.
On the evening of the 12th, the 66th Brigade took over the left part of the divisional sector, the one who was in contact with the left with the 85th Infantry Division American and right with the 3rd Brigade. The 2nd Royal Scots replaced King's Shropshire the following morning.
They remained only 24 hours before the attack and the British were hesitant to make the latest preparations.
The English plans provided that the main axis would be to the left of the Arrow Route (the road leading to theColla Pass and crossing Ronta) from Poggio Prefetto to Monte Paganino and the Faggeta; on the right the 3rd Brigade would keep the pressure on the German front to prevent the arrival of reinforcing units in the main area of the attack.
The 66th Brigade plan foresaw that 1st Hertfordshire left the left side of Poggio Prefect's side, attacking and deflecting at that point, followed by the 11th Lancaschire Fusiliers who had to pass the first unit and then assault the Poggio Prefetto. Once he took the position, it would be held by the 2nd Royal Scots. The attack would began at 4.30 pm on September 14th.
The artillery would have supported the advance and prepared the ground in the previous hours. It should be noted that even in 48 hours before each 25-pound cannon shot 400 hits and 500 hits the cannons of the 2nd Artillery Regiment. This power of fire weakened further the forces of 715. Infantry Division and morality was already very low, according to the words of many prisoners.
The artillery of 715. ID had been repeatedly attacked by fighter-bombers, they were still some batteries ready for counter-battery fire. Although no damage was caused by German batteries, impossible to exert a decisive fire due to allied area superiority.
The Germans had placed their positions on the slopes of the protruding mountains on the valley, huts were dug into the ground, and obviously the access roads had been mined or interrupted by barbed wire barriers. The defenses were not properly identified because of the vegetation. One of the weaknesses, as we shall see, will be the supply shortage of the forward positions. The ceaseless barrage fire will cause massive losses to the Wehrmacht troops and lots of difficulties in supplying the first line.
When the British units moved forward, the Germans were very surprised: the incredible amount of fire did not allow them to determine from which direction the attack would come.
The Commander of the 305th Infantry Division, alongside 715th, declared "under the heavy artillery fire and against the constant assaults clinging to the slopes of the slender defensive line of 715. I.D ''.
The Hertfordshire and the Lancaschire Fusiliers attacked in the established schedule of the plans. The first had a few small battles along the line of attack and managed to neutralize a German company. The Lancaschire, taking advantage of the success of the other battalion, reached mid-western midday at midnight. At dawn on the 15th even the Royal Scots began its advance and took away the soldiers of the Grenadier-Regiment 735, who retreat to the north of Poggio Prefect. By noon the mountain was firmly in the hands of British troops. During the morning, the Germans attempted to recover the positions they had just lost by counterattacks, but they were rejected and attacked by the Lancaschire Fusiliers who loaded them to the bayonet, supported by the fire of machine guns.
At the same time the 3rd Brigade was getting some small successes to the right of the Arrow Route: after several attempts, King's Shropshire managed to take over the Giuvigiana hill; The Duke of Wellington took over the area of Madonna dei Tre Fiumi; The 1st Recce (Recognition) occupied the stations in the area of the Gattaia railway tunnel, abandoned by German troops.
The principal attack of the Fifth US Army was not giving the desired results: at the Giogo-Pass units of Sturmregiment resisted fiercely, despite the heavy losses. The number of allied losses increased every day, however, the Americans held high morale despite the difficulties.
While waiting for the change with the US unit, a 13-man Hertfordshire patrol attempted to arrive at Monte Pratone, connected to Poggio Prefetto by a ridge with very steep hills but after passing a first hill (Quota 952 - Mansalto) and taken some prisoners, they were hit by the cross fire in front, at the sides and behind them. Only 2 soldiers survived.
The 735th Grenadier-Regiment units were still deployed on the crest of Poggio Signorini. During the night between 15 and 16, the Royal Scots attempted a night attack, but the German defenses did not seem to give signs of collapse, arrived in the Mansalto area and took the hill, underwent a violent fire behind. They retreated and thrashed behind the hill.
n the 16th at 6.30 pm, the avant-garde troops of the 3rd battalion of the 337th Infantry Regiment arrived at Poggio Prefetto and settled in Quota 938 next to Poggio Signorini, but failed to establish a contact with the Royal Scots Head Company, currently dispersed during the previous action. Likewise, under a concentrated fire of mortars and machine guns, they could not continue to take the southern part of Poggio Signorini. At 1 pm, German positions on Monte Pratone were hit by a violent artillery bombardment. The companie 'K' (339th I.R) was aggregated to the 3rd Battalion (337th I.R) and was ordered to occupy Poggio Signorini.
At 13.30 companies K 'and' I 'started their attack, but met a strong resistance from Quota 970 and 885. The first under Massalto the second on the right. The company 'L', after reinforcement, succeeded with a slow advance to take Massalto, was targeted by the German units in front and during the night lost contact with the battalion command.
The I Battalion was brought at the first line, ready for the attack, passing through the east channel of Poggio al Pruno.

On the same night a German mortar uni at Poggio ai Prati Piani to locate the Royal Scots and keep it under fire, from the information I had, itwas probably out of the area and was in contact with the 12th Fallschirmjaeger-Regiment.
Although the position of the Royal Scots was uncertain, it was decided to carry out an intense bombing against German positions, running the risk of striking British unity. "This is the worst ground I've ever found," said the 337th commander.
The 715. ID units were now overwhelmed, and every bombardment blew the already small forces: the companies had only 20/30 men and no more reserves were available. The Grenadier Regiment I Battalion was at the out of forces and from four days did not receive any supplies.

Only on the 17th came the exhausted Fusilier-Battalion 305, which was deployed between I and II battalions of 735. Gren. Regiment. The German resistance had begun to become weak, but between the slopes of the mountains continued the clashes between the companies.
At 13.45, an urgent communication came to the command: 'L' company was on crest 1018/1019, but suffered losses due to the fire of British mortars. The 'I' company of the 337th passed Massalto was rejected by the enemy fire, retired in the Fosso Rampolli, began to move from this position held by the German mortars, even this fire was at midnight at the top of Monte Pratone; While the other units attacked Monte Pratone from positions on Poggio Prefetto and Poggio al Pruno. With repeated attacks, the positions at Acqua Bona were taken.
By 10.30 pm the 3rd Battalion held firm Monte Pratone.
The 2nd Battalion of 339th took over before the Pianacci and then aimed at the Prati Piani. On the morning of 17th the 1st Battalion (339th) met a smaller resistance and also took Monte Verruca, which during the phases preceding the attack had been heavily bombarded. The 2 / Grenadier-Lehr-Brigade units had been practically decimated and the few arriving in the positions were inexperienced boys and many of them had lost their arms while approaching the front line; The 339th also captured Poggio Rotto, where the 735 Grenadier-Regiment's Battalion's fighting capacity was running out. At the end of the day all the positions were firmly held by the Allies.
On the 18th, the Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo at the Giogo Pass were taken and Lemelsen gave the general retreat order: the front line crumbled and began to fold backward positions.
During the day the Germans surrendered in large numbers; many remained isolated from their unit and in this confusion they had not received the order of retreat and had been abandoned to themselves; Others had no ammunition or food.

--------

20 September is the worst days for the German Army in the area. After the Battle for the Passes (Giogo - Colla - Futa) the german divisions in the area were completely shattered. The 362. ID was drafted in the Firenzuola area to fix the flaw in the 4. FJ-Division's sector; The 715th ID loss the contact with the 4th FJ-Division on the right and had several losses too. Reinforcement came from 305. ID and 44. HuD Division.

Probably the soldier is not fallen in ''Casaglia'', but somewhere in that area!
On 20 September the Royal Scots taken Monte Paganino, defended by 305. Fus.Batl and found 20 death german soldiers and taken 12 POW.
On ''La Faggeta'' 2° North Staffordshire found a platoon position abandoned.
Then the 1° Hertfordshire taken Poggio dell'Altello (North of Poggio dei Ronchi on the map). Here the unit estimate 40 KIA/POW germans.

Greetings,
Pietro

[Pie]

Some maps I made:

10/11-September
10-11.jpg

12-September
12.jpg

14/15-September
14-15.jpg

16/17-September
16_17_Sett.jpg.cb5b38e21f8ffcbb83aed4cff9977a6d.jpg

[Pie]

...and 19-September!
19 Settembre.jpg

[InfanterieSammler]

H John,

The terms are defined in the previous thread and Type 2 is found with both types of base cloth — grey and feldgrau — unlike the Type 1 which has only a grey background. Within Type 2, regardless of the backing cloth, the embroidery pattern is identical so these are just different production runs on the same machinery, and different from the Type 1. So the definition of types is based upon the embroidery design, not upon the backing cloth.

Best regards,
—-Norm

Hi Norm,

I am not a fan of the Type 2 on field grey base cloth. While they appear to look similar to the Type 2 on grey base cloth, they are clearly not done by the same machine. IMO, the Type 2 on field grey are a modern copy of the Type 2 on grey base cloth. My opinion for what's it's worth. I had never seen these Type 2 on the field grey base cloth until about 10 years(?) ago and the first time I saw them was for sale at HSC's table at the SOS. He had several Type 2 field grey for sale and all priced about 1/2 the going rate for a sniper badge at the time.

Best,
John

[InfanterieSammler]

Hi John,
very intresting indeed! The 715th it's my favourite!
I will copy here a research I did on a SB of soldier of the Grenadier-Regiment 735 who fought in the area (Poggio Prefetto) on those days!
------------
Attack on the Gothic Line

At the beginning of September the allied planes of attack towards the Gothic Line north of Florence were accelerated, once the retreat of the Germans towards the north was certified. The XIIIEnglish Corps, assigned to the 5th American Army, had the right flank of the advance. The forward movements of the troops did not encounter particular difficulties and were quick enough, despite the fact that the German Pioniers had blown up all the bridges on the Sieve and blocked by various ways the streets. Except these difficulties they not had much contact with the enemy. The British 1st Infantry Division had sporadic clashes with troops of the rearguard 4.Fallschirmjager-Division, without suffering losses and also capturing prisoners.
Between 7 and 8 September, the British managed to push forward by occupying all the key points of the mountains between the Arno and the Sieve. On September 9, the II Corps (US) moved up the road 65 leading to the Pass of Futa; XIII English Corps was deployed on the right, the 1st Infantry-Division (British) moved along the Faentina road, who lead to Borgo San Lorenzo.
The German front had further weakened at the beginning of September: by 9th of the month, three divisions had been transferred to the Adriatic sector (29. Panzergrenadier-Division, 26. Panzer-Division and 356. Infanterie-Division),
where the offensive of the 8th British Army was taking place. The weakening of this sector was only remedied by the sending of the 334. Infanterie-Division, but no replacement units had been sent for the 356. Infanterie-Division.
On September 10, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st English Infantry Division reached the Sieve River under Borgo San Lorenzo. The 1st King Shropshire, on the same day evening, managed to cross the river west of Borgo with two companies, occupied the monastery near the railway and had some contact with the enemy. During the night, the 2nd Forester along with the 1st Duke of Wellington set in position south of the River on a collection area. The next day the Forester continued its advance, side by side King's Shropshire, and after 8 km Grezzano and Ronta were occupied. British units came in contact with US troops on the left.
A Company of Forester had spent the night at Pulicciano (Ronta) and his platoon carrier was vanguard in Ronta's country. On 12 September resumed the attack and began crossing the town with Duke of Wellington's B company in the head. After some clashes the Germans retreated and stood at the sides of the railroad. Units from 715. Infantry-Division tried to attack the carrier platoon, who managed to keep the position and at the end of the clash 11 prisoners were taken. This made possible to establish the enemy unit in the Ronta sector. On the left, King's Shropshire captured an outpost at the Houses of Risolaia (Grezzano) and took 6 prisoners of the 9th Company of the Sturmregiment (12th Fallschirmjaeger-Regiment). The units remained to withstand the advance were then the 4. Fallschirmjaeger-Division and the 715. Infanterie-Division.
The first had just received about 900 soldiers from Germany to strengthen the divisional hard-tested by the last battlesand for the formation of III/FJ-Regiment Battalion 11. These soldiers, however, were sent in the front lines to small groups because they proved, in addition to their young age, unsafe in the shooting and would have been an obstacle for the first-line troops already having a fight experience. The division was therefore under organic and responsible for a very wide front, from the Passo della Futa to Monte Verruca (15km); The second, proven by the fights around Florence, was definitely under organic and as the first did not have any reservations. Was in charge of an area that went from the east to Ronta to Poggio Rotto (alongside Monte Verruca). The area between these two units was also the one that demarcated the area of competence of X and XIV German Armies, thus an ideal point for an attack.
The 1st Infantry Division was therefore in contact with the German defenses of the Gothic Line along its sector. On September 12, he managed to carry across the Sieve all the divisional artillery and some heavy batteries needed to support the attack on Germanic defenses. The streets were clogged with American and English traffic carrying ammunition, men and supplies in view of the offensive.
A Bailey Class 40 bridge was built on the Sieve River in Borgo San Lorenzo.
On the evening of the 12th, the 66th Brigade took over the left part of the divisional sector, the one who was in contact with the left with the 85th Infantry Division American and right with the 3rd Brigade. The 2nd Royal Scots replaced King's Shropshire the following morning.
They remained only 24 hours before the attack and the British were hesitant to make the latest preparations.
The English plans provided that the main axis would be to the left of the Arrow Route (the road leading to theColla Pass and crossing Ronta) from Poggio Prefetto to Monte Paganino and the Faggeta; on the right the 3rd Brigade would keep the pressure on the German front to prevent the arrival of reinforcing units in the main area of the attack.
The 66th Brigade plan foresaw that 1st Hertfordshire left the left side of Poggio Prefect's side, attacking and deflecting at that point, followed by the 11th Lancaschire Fusiliers who had to pass the first unit and then assault the Poggio Prefetto. Once he took the position, it would be held by the 2nd Royal Scots. The attack would began at 4.30 pm on September 14th.
The artillery would have supported the advance and prepared the ground in the previous hours. It should be noted that even in 48 hours before each 25-pound cannon shot 400 hits and 500 hits the cannons of the 2nd Artillery Regiment. This power of fire weakened further the forces of 715. Infantry Division and morality was already very low, according to the words of many prisoners.
The artillery of 715. ID had been repeatedly attacked by fighter-bombers, they were still some batteries ready for counter-battery fire. Although no damage was caused by German batteries, impossible to exert a decisive fire due to allied area superiority.
The Germans had placed their positions on the slopes of the protruding mountains on the valley, huts were dug into the ground, and obviously the access roads had been mined or interrupted by barbed wire barriers. The defenses were not properly identified because of the vegetation. One of the weaknesses, as we shall see, will be the supply shortage of the forward positions. The ceaseless barrage fire will cause massive losses to the Wehrmacht troops and lots of difficulties in supplying the first line.
When the British units moved forward, the Germans were very surprised: the incredible amount of fire did not allow them to determine from which direction the attack would come.
The Commander of the 305th Infantry Division, alongside 715th, declared "under the heavy artillery fire and against the constant assaults clinging to the slopes of the slender defensive line of 715. I.D ''.
The Hertfordshire and the Lancaschire Fusiliers attacked in the established schedule of the plans. The first had a few small battles along the line of attack and managed to neutralize a German company. The Lancaschire, taking advantage of the success of the other battalion, reached mid-western midday at midnight. At dawn on the 15th even the Royal Scots began its advance and took away the soldiers of the Grenadier-Regiment 735, who retreat to the north of Poggio Prefect. By noon the mountain was firmly in the hands of British troops. During the morning, the Germans attempted to recover the positions they had just lost by counterattacks, but they were rejected and attacked by the Lancaschire Fusiliers who loaded them to the bayonet, supported by the fire of machine guns.
At the same time the 3rd Brigade was getting some small successes to the right of the Arrow Route: after several attempts, King's Shropshire managed to take over the Giuvigiana hill; The Duke of Wellington took over the area of Madonna dei Tre Fiumi; The 1st Recce (Recognition) occupied the stations in the area of the Gattaia railway tunnel, abandoned by German troops.
The principal attack of the Fifth US Army was not giving the desired results: at the Giogo-Pass units of Sturmregiment resisted fiercely, despite the heavy losses. The number of allied losses increased every day, however, the Americans held high morale despite the difficulties.
While waiting for the change with the US unit, a 13-man Hertfordshire patrol attempted to arrive at Monte Pratone, connected to Poggio Prefetto by a ridge with very steep hills but after passing a first hill (Quota 952 - Mansalto) and taken some prisoners, they were hit by the cross fire in front, at the sides and behind them. Only 2 soldiers survived.
The 735th Grenadier-Regiment units were still deployed on the crest of Poggio Signorini. During the night between 15 and 16, the Royal Scots attempted a night attack, but the German defenses did not seem to give signs of collapse, arrived in the Mansalto area and took the hill, underwent a violent fire behind. They retreated and thrashed behind the hill.
n the 16th at 6.30 pm, the avant-garde troops of the 3rd battalion of the 337th Infantry Regiment arrived at Poggio Prefetto and settled in Quota 938 next to Poggio Signorini, but failed to establish a contact with the Royal Scots Head Company, currently dispersed during the previous action. Likewise, under a concentrated fire of mortars and machine guns, they could not continue to take the southern part of Poggio Signorini. At 1 pm, German positions on Monte Pratone were hit by a violent artillery bombardment. The companie 'K' (339th I.R) was aggregated to the 3rd Battalion (337th I.R) and was ordered to occupy Poggio Signorini.
At 13.30 companies K 'and' I 'started their attack, but met a strong resistance from Quota 970 and 885. The first under Massalto the second on the right. The company 'L', after reinforcement, succeeded with a slow advance to take Massalto, was targeted by the German units in front and during the night lost contact with the battalion command.
The I Battalion was brought at the first line, ready for the attack, passing through the east channel of Poggio al Pruno.

On the same night a German mortar uni at Poggio ai Prati Piani to locate the Royal Scots and keep it under fire, from the information I had, itwas probably out of the area and was in contact with the 12th Fallschirmjaeger-Regiment.
Although the position of the Royal Scots was uncertain, it was decided to carry out an intense bombing against German positions, running the risk of striking British unity. "This is the worst ground I've ever found," said the 337th commander.
The 715. ID units were now overwhelmed, and every bombardment blew the already small forces: the companies had only 20/30 men and no more reserves were available. The Grenadier Regiment I Battalion was at the out of forces and from four days did not receive any supplies.

Only on the 17th came the exhausted Fusilier-Battalion 305, which was deployed between I and II battalions of 735. Gren. Regiment. The German resistance had begun to become weak, but between the slopes of the mountains continued the clashes between the companies.
At 13.45, an urgent communication came to the command: 'L' company was on crest 1018/1019, but suffered losses due to the fire of British mortars. The 'I' company of the 337th passed Massalto was rejected by the enemy fire, retired in the Fosso Rampolli, began to move from this position held by the German mortars, even this fire was at midnight at the top of Monte Pratone; While the other units attacked Monte Pratone from positions on Poggio Prefetto and Poggio al Pruno. With repeated attacks, the positions at Acqua Bona were taken.
By 10.30 pm the 3rd Battalion held firm Monte Pratone.
The 2nd Battalion of 339th took over before the Pianacci and then aimed at the Prati Piani. On the morning of 17th the 1st Battalion (339th) met a smaller resistance and also took Monte Verruca, which during the phases preceding the attack had been heavily bombarded. The 2 / Grenadier-Lehr-Brigade units had been practically decimated and the few arriving in the positions were inexperienced boys and many of them had lost their arms while approaching the front line; The 339th also captured Poggio Rotto, where the 735 Grenadier-Regiment's Battalion's fighting capacity was running out. At the end of the day all the positions were firmly held by the Allies.
On the 18th, the Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo at the Giogo Pass were taken and Lemelsen gave the general retreat order: the front line crumbled and began to fold backward positions.
During the day the Germans surrendered in large numbers; many remained isolated from their unit and in this confusion they had not received the order of retreat and had been abandoned to themselves; Others had no ammunition or food.

--------

20 September is the worst days for the German Army in the area. After the Battle for the Passes (Giogo - Colla - Futa) the german divisions in the area were completely shattered. The 362. ID was drafted in the Firenzuola area to fix the flaw in the 4. FJ-Division's sector; The 715th ID loss the contact with the 4th FJ-Division on the right and had several losses too. Reinforcement came from 305. ID and 44. HuD Division.

Probably the soldier is not fallen in ''Casaglia'', but somewhere in that area!
On 20 September the Royal Scots taken Monte Paganino, defended by 305. Fus.Batl and found 20 death german soldiers and taken 12 POW.
On ''La Faggeta'' 2° North Staffordshire found a platoon position abandoned.
Then the 1° Hertfordshire taken Poggio dell'Altello (North of Poggio dei Ronchi on the map). Here the unit estimate 40 KIA/POW germans.

Greetings,
Pietro

Hi Pietro,

This is terrific - thank you so much for sharing!

I tend to agree that the sniper was not killed in the town of Casaglia proper, but more likely defending the pass or the approaches to the town. Pure speculation on my part, of course.

Best,
John

[Norm F]

I am not a fan of the Type 2 on field grey base cloth. While they appear to look similar to the Type 2 on grey base cloth, they are clearly not done by the same machine. IMO, the Type 2 on field grey are a modern copy of the Type 2 on grey base cloth. My opinion for what's it's worth.

Hi John,

You're right, I should have said "very similar" rather than "identical", but they're so close in design I assumed they were simply different generations of production from the same source. But your point is well taken that one could be a very good copy of the other. Of course, that doesn't prove that the earlier generation isn't also post-war.

Best regards,
---Norm

[John A.]

Thank you for sharing!!

Many thanks to John, the OP, for sharing the death card, photo and information about Unteroffizier Wagner! I find things which tell the individual stories of the soldiers to be most interesting, and this was very evocative of the time and circumstances!

Just one of the many, many gefallen, but you have given him a face, a family, the final duty which he faithfully fulfilled, and his last resting place. By doing so, you've helped ensure that his memory will not fade away, forgotten, into time, as has happened to so many countless others.

Thank you very much for sharing this unique story and information!

Sincerely,
John

[TWS]

Here is the reverse of portrait with a dedication.

Can someone give me a hand with this? I can read "XX XX Grüssen. von deinem Martin."

Thank You,
John

Im herzlichen Grüssen


basically "with kind regards"


Interesting wear of a transitional helmet in 1944.

[InfanterieSammler]

Im herzlichen Grüssen

basically "with kind regards"

Interesting wear of a transitional helmet in 1944.

Hi Todd,

Thank you.

It's funny, now that you say that it reads clear as day to me.

Take Care,
John

[Gran Sasso]

Im herzlichen Grüssen


basically "with kind regards"

Die herzlichsten Grüße - the dearest regards

[TWS]

Hi Todd,

Thank you.

It's funny, now that you say that it reads clear as day to me.

Take Care,
John

You're quite welcome. Yeah, that's how it goes. Once you know what is should read, it jumps out at you.

[NickG]

Interesting wear of a transitional helmet in 1944.

The picture is probably from 1941, wearing an M40 tunic and transitional helmet To date this better notice his Romanian Eastern Front
“Crusade Against Communism” Medal which was instituted in 1941.

[John A.]

Thanks!

"Die herzlichsten Grüße - the dearest regards"

Thank you, Sir!


John