Von der Heydte’s early give up of Carentan a severe mistake?

[Jürg]

Hi all

Was von der Heydte’s mistake the reason for the relatively easy take away of Carentan by the Americans? I ask myself this question after reading some first hand account by a script written by von der Heydte himself. A copy of this script is in my collection and it was also criticized by former Generalleutnant Max Pemsel on June 10, 1948. I have his comments as well

Von der Heydte says in his script that he informed the LXXXIV. Korps about his intention to give up Carentan and that the Korps authorized this. Von der Heydte was very amazed when on June 11, 1944 suddenly the 17. SS panzer-Grenadiers from Goetz von Berlichingen showed up to support the holding of Carentan. But at this point all orders have been given and Carentan was already left by troops of FJR 6.

The 17. SS Pz.Gren commander Ostendorf decided to attack Carentan again to take it back from the Americans, but all effort was not enough to retake Carentan.

Well, von der Heydte was made responsible for his mistake to get up Carentan. Not only this, he was also accused for cowardliness by the commander of SS GvB . He was sent under arrest and questioned by a SS judge right afterwards.

Only after the temporarily commanding general of LXXXIV. Korps (Meindl) approved von der Heydte’s actions regarding Carentan, he was set in command of his Regiment again. So von der Heydte's comments.

Now Max Pemsel is not the same opinion on the actions and moreover the knowledge of von der Heydte on the assignment of the 17. SS GvB to support the fight to hold on Carenatn.
Pemsel makes clear that von der Heydte’s action and descision to give up Carentan on June 11 is baffling and was of course wrong. Pemsel clearls says, that von der Heydte knew prior to his actions to give up this important town and not as von der Heydte says only after the 17. SS GvB arrived and at this point already abandoned Carentan with his troops. Pemsel says that after the telephone directory of the 7. Armee, the LXXXIV Korps was informed on June 10, 1944 and again on June 11, 1944 that the 17. SS was on the way to help holding on Carentan. After personal comments by the former Chief of Generalstab LXXXIV Korps, he did personally (Chief of Generalstab LXXXIV Korps) inform the commander of FJR 6 on June 10, that the 17. SS GvB was on the way to help. Neither the Army nor the Korps agreed the decision to give up Carentan by FJR 6 because one of the main efforts of the 7. Armee was to avoid the American to connect the Contetin sites together with the Vire sites as well the connections to the British troops.
Pemsel says also that the early give up of Carentan, which was a very important fix point in the German defense line, was tried to justify by severe lack of ammunition. The question of guilt could not be answered at this time. After Pemsel, the commander of FJR 6 also suffered a substantial and morale breakdown due to the intensity of the fights. Pemsel says that only his formidable lead of the Regiment prior to the Normandy fights as well as a quick recovery from his illness prevent him from punishment or relief.
Does anyone of you ever heard such a story, which seems to be facts. In anyway very interesting.
Any comments welcome.

Juerg

[FJR6]

Hello,
I know the manuscript you have in your archives and I have a copy as well including Pemsel's rant.

First of all, after the war, a lot of dirty laundry was washed in order to make some people look bad and as far as I am concerned, Pemsel did just that.

I have spoken to quite a few survivors of FJR6's Normandy campaign and that included my own grandfather. It is only too true that by 10 June, FJR6 had almost no ammunition anymore and on 11 June when they moved out of Carentan on Major von der Heydte's orders, almost every round was expended.
They even had to go as far as to collect ammunition from those armed with Karabiner in order to give it to the machine gunners.
At that time, the town was under attack from elements of the US 101st, 4th and 1st Division plus heavy Naval artillery bombardments. FJR6 had been in continuous combat since the night to the 6th June, lost a full battalion and suffered pretty well. It had been air-suplkied only once during that time.

If the proposed arrival of 17th SS was actually announced or not is remaining debatable. With the obvious air superiority of the Allies, it didn't take a genius to see that a large body of troops and vehicles like the 17th would have a hard time to move even near Carentan and it was only an hour or so after he pulled his men out of the town that von der Heydte accidentally ran into the Adjutant of the 17th who was scouting ahead of the advance guard of the Division.
He offered to make an effort to re-take the town if reinforced by the arriving elemements of the 17th and if replenished from their ammunition supplies. Ostendorff, commander of the 17th, let them stock up on ammo, but rejected to counterattack, because his Division was strung out too far and needed the whole night to assemble and get ready for an attack the next morning.

FJR6 was attached to the 17th, but von der Heydte was not relieved of his command nor was he court-martialled for cowardice. After the grand counterstrike of the 17th against Carentan was beaten back, Ostendorf tried to lay all fault on von der Heydte, but General Choltitz (if I'm not mistaken) rushed in and congratulated him for his great success of holding out against far superior enemy forces without support for so long. He even went as far as calling FJR6 the "Lions of Carentan" (hence the title of my just about to be published book on the subject).

best regards,
Volker

[Chris Liontas]

This is an interesting delema. My opinion from what I have read, VDH did the right thing. In fact, the German Army should not have fought in Normandy, they should have pulled back out of range of Navy Gunfire. This would have allowed more freedom of movement, consolidation of the Luftwaffe, and streatched allied airpower's fuel range.

[Jürg]

Hello,
I know the manuscript you have in your archives and I have a copy as well including Pemsel's rant.

First of all, after the war, a lot of dirty laundry was washed in order to make some people look bad and as far as I am concerned, Pemsel did just that.

I have spoken to quite a few survivors of FJR6's Normandy campaign and that included my own grandfather. It is only too true that by 10 June, FJR6 had almost no ammunition anymore and on 11 June when they moved out of Carentan on Major von der Heydte's orders, almost every round was expended.
They even had to go as far as to collect ammunition from those armed with Karabiner in order to give it to the machine gunners.
At that time, the town was under attack from elements of the US 101st, 4th and 1st Division plus heavy Naval artillery bombardments. FJR6 had been in continuous combat since the night to the 6th June, lost a full battalion and suffered pretty well. It had been air-suplkied only once during that time.

If the proposed arrival of 17th SS was actually announced or not is remaining debatable. With the obvious air superiority of the Allies, it didn't take a genius to see that a large body of troops and vehicles like the 17th would have a hard time to move even near Carentan and it was only an hour or so after he pulled his men out of the town that von der Heydte accidentally ran into the Adjutant of the 17th who was scouting ahead of the advance guard of the Division.
He offered to make an effort to re-take the town if reinforced by the arriving elemements of the 17th and if replenished from their ammunition supplies. Ostendorff, commander of the 17th, let them stock up on ammo, but rejected to counterattack, because his Division was strung out too far and needed the whole night to assemble and get ready for an attack the next morning.

FJR6 was attached to the 17th, but von der Heydte was not relieved of his command nor was he court-martialled for cowardice. After the grand counterstrike of the 17th against Carentan was beaten back, Ostendorf tried to lay all fault on von der Heydte, but General Choltitz (if I'm not mistaken) rushed in and congratulated him for his great success of holding out against far superior enemy forces without support for so long. He even went as far as calling FJR6 the "Lions of Carentan" (hence the title of my just about to be published book on the subject).

best regards,
Volker

Very intersting Voker

I already ordered your book but I was told it has been postponed again. Anyway good to hear your opinion on that as well.

Anyway in my opinion von der Heydte was a true soldier and superb fighter and commander, but this is an intersting topic in any case.

Juerg

[FJR6]

Hello,
yes it is, but highly controversial as well.
I have in my archives various letters from von der Heydte to members of the 17th. One is especially interesting, because a former officer in the 17th was telling him that the entries about these days were missing in the war diary of the 17th and nobody knew what had really happened so they were looking for von der Heydte for clarification...

best regards,
Volker

[Darrell]

consolidation of the Luftwaffe

The Luftwaffe was a non-factor in France at this time. The only significance of the Luftwaffe was in Germany trying to stem the hordes of allied bombers blasting their cities into rubble.

[Jean-Loup]

To reply to the question in a more philosophical way: no, Van der Heydt's surendur was not a mistake. If other German leaders had done the same thing, a lot of sweat, blood, suffering and money would have been saved.

JL

[John Hodgin]

Agree Jean Loup. A friend was relating a US 101st veteran's experiences at Carentan to me a few nights ago. This 101st veteran felt sadness for the Fallschirmäger. Many Fj were pinned in an open area by some the 101st. The Fj refused to surrender and were slowly destroyed. Why add more deaths to these?

[Jürg]

.

The question was only because of the statements made in the review made by Pemsel. In my personal opinion von der Heydte did the right thing. It is funny that two clompletely other opinions and stories have been made: one by the former commander of FJR 6, Major von der Heydte and the vice-versa opinion of Max Pemsel. As Volker mentioned here, it seems that there was washing some dirty laundry going on just 3 years after the war. I really can't see why Pemsel is telling such things and accusing von der Heydte of doing such a severe mistake.

Any of you guys heard of that von der Heydte became sick during the heavy fighting around Carentan? I only heard now after reading Pemsels comemnt.

Anyway many thanks for your replies.

Juerg

[J.von Canon]

A new book has just come out about Maj.(ret.)Richard Winters(The Big Brother of the Band of Brothers;think is the title)and the major visited Oberst Von der Heydte : they discussed this action in some detail. Von der Heydte mentioned his being unaware at the time just how badly outnumbered around Carentan the 6th. was...

[Homer Hodge]

Winters Book

A new book has just come out about Maj.(ret.)Richard Winters(The Big Brother of the Band of Brothers;think is the title)and the major visited Oberst Von der Heydte : they discussed this action in some detail. Von der Heydte mentioned his being unaware at the time just how badly outnumbered around Carentan the 6th. was...

The book is The Biggest Brother: The Life of Major Dick Winters, The Man Who led the Band of Brothers, by Larry Alexander and available on amazon.com...

[Luftm40]

I am about 2/3 of the way thru the new book about Winters...a very well written account

[Les]

no argument here...

Hello,
I know the manuscript you have in your archives and I have a copy as well including Pemsel's rant. <...snip....> I have spoken to quite a few survivors of FJR6's Normandy campaign and that included my own grandfather. It is only too true that by 10 June, FJR6 had almost no ammunition anymore and on 11 June when they moved out of Carentan on Major von der Heydte's orders, almost every round was expended.
<snip>Volker

Volker,

I'm waiting for the Maxim Opus on the 6th, and when it comes out will twist your arm for a signed copy, and also to try getting the few surviving vets from the 6th to sign the book elsewhere. Got a large photo that could be used for that?

Last summer when we were in Normandy with the 6th vets, I listened to the vets, looked at the terrain, and especially where they took us and what happened at those places. Carentan for those who aren't familiar with the town, was an important road and rail junction with important river crossings. The river itself would not prevent infantry from crossing, but without bridges, vehicles of any sort could not cross the deep banks from one side to the other.

Carentan was important to both sides for those river crossings. Without the bridges, the towns importance would be minimal, and in fact a liability. (Think artillery and heavy stuff magnet and trying to occupy a town that was getting blasted from one side or othe other.) Von der Heydte tried to hold the town so that German forces could cross over (either way), presumably to attack American forces in the area. Once he started to realize the town would have to be evacuated, he had the bridges set and wired for demolition, and our mutual friend Herr Gontermann was among those who blew them. That action denied American armor and lighter vehicles direct river crossings, and minimalized the strategic importance of the town to either side at that point. No bridges, no value. Either side trying to hold the town after they were blown would invite shelling, etc. Von der Heydte's giving up the town was not a real victory for the Americans, because when he did, the bridges were gone and so was the value of the town. "Turf" isn't important, it's what you do to your enemy and what you deny him that's far more important.

Herzliches Gruss!

Les