Here is a small group for Joseph Lechner, a student from the Tirol region in Austria, who ended up finding himself involved in some of the toughest, most awful combat that either German or American soldiers would see during the entire war. <O
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In late September of 1944, the German 275. Infanterie Division was transferred to the Hürtgen Forest area of operations to fill a gap between the 12. Volksgrenadier Division and the 353. Infanterie Division. On 1 October, LXXIV Army Corps put the 275. Infanterie Division in control over the entire Hürtgen sector. At this time, the Division absorbed various combat and support units from the 353. Infanterie Division.<O</O
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On 6 October, the US 9<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Division launched an attack on the 275. Infanterie Division, which “although the Ami made progress, it was slow and bloody, with the German soldiers tenaciously hanging on in bunkers while artillery shells burst in the trees above.” The following day, the 983<SUP>rd</SUP> Infanterie Regiment (Lechner’s unit) counterattacked, along with division engineers from the 275. Infanterie Division, near Reichelskaul, but made no progress against the American troops.<O
With the goal of clearing the Hürtgen forest and seizing Schmidt, 1<SUP>st</SUP> Army commander, General Courtney Hodges, visited with the 28<SUP>th</SUP> Division’s commanding officer, General Norman “Dutch” Cota at his headquarters in Rott. At this meeting, the V Corps staff laid out the plan for Cota’s attack which would be launched on 2 November. The plan called for 28<SUP>th</SUP> Division to split its axes for the attack into three different directions, sending one regiment each way. The southern-most axes was given to the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Regiment.
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With the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> and 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalions of the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry leading the way, and the 1<SUP>st</SUP> Battalion in reserve the attack began. “At nine A.M. on November 2, a cold misty Thursday, GI’s heaved themselves from their holes like doughboys going over the top. Eleven thousand artillery rounds chewed up German revetments and flayed the forest with steel from shells detonating in the tree canopy. But the brisk brrrr of machine-gun fire from pillboxes on the division’s right flank mowed down men in the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Regiment –‘singly, in groups, and by platoons,’ the division history recorded by days end, the 110<SUP>th</SUP> had gained not a yard, and by week’s end the regiment would be rated ‘no longer an effective fighting force’.” <O</O
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The American attack resumed on 3 November, as the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> and 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalions pushed forward again. “The entire front received heavy mortar and artillery fire. The advance was not great.” It is interesting to note, two “Close Combat” entries in Lechner’s Soldbuch for 2/3 Nov.’44 at Bunker 112. This bunker was located directly in the path of the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry’s attack on 2/3 November.<O</O
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</OIn late September of 1944, the German 275. Infanterie Division was transferred to the Hürtgen Forest area of operations to fill a gap between the 12. Volksgrenadier Division and the 353. Infanterie Division. On 1 October, LXXIV Army Corps put the 275. Infanterie Division in control over the entire Hürtgen sector. At this time, the Division absorbed various combat and support units from the 353. Infanterie Division.<O
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</OOn 6 October, the US 9<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Division launched an attack on the 275. Infanterie Division, which “although the Ami made progress, it was slow and bloody, with the German soldiers tenaciously hanging on in bunkers while artillery shells burst in the trees above.” The following day, the 983<SUP>rd</SUP> Infanterie Regiment (Lechner’s unit) counterattacked, along with division engineers from the 275. Infanterie Division, near Reichelskaul, but made no progress against the American troops.<O
With the goal of clearing the Hürtgen forest and seizing Schmidt, 1<SUP>st</SUP> Army commander, General Courtney Hodges, visited with the 28<SUP>th</SUP> Division’s commanding officer, General Norman “Dutch” Cota at his headquarters in Rott. At this meeting, the V Corps staff laid out the plan for Cota’s attack which would be launched on 2 November. The plan called for 28<SUP>th</SUP> Division to split its axes for the attack into three different directions, sending one regiment each way. The southern-most axes was given to the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Regiment.
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</OWith the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> and 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalions of the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry leading the way, and the 1<SUP>st</SUP> Battalion in reserve the attack began. “At nine A.M. on November 2, a cold misty Thursday, GI’s heaved themselves from their holes like doughboys going over the top. Eleven thousand artillery rounds chewed up German revetments and flayed the forest with steel from shells detonating in the tree canopy. But the brisk brrrr of machine-gun fire from pillboxes on the division’s right flank mowed down men in the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry Regiment –‘singly, in groups, and by platoons,’ the division history recorded by days end, the 110<SUP>th</SUP> had gained not a yard, and by week’s end the regiment would be rated ‘no longer an effective fighting force’.” <O
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</OThe American attack resumed on 3 November, as the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> and 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalions pushed forward again. “The entire front received heavy mortar and artillery fire. The advance was not great.” It is interesting to note, two “Close Combat” entries in Lechner’s Soldbuch for 2/3 Nov.’44 at Bunker 112. This bunker was located directly in the path of the 110<SUP>th</SUP> Infantry’s attack on 2/3 November.<O
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. Having visited the battle site it is beyond comprehension how an attack could be ordered through the area.
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