This is an edit after the article was posted and the first comments were made. I had intended to make this dsclaimer originally but got lazy and didn't do it at the initiation of the thread. What I have said below is not first hand researcj and I have done what I could to sunstantiate what I wrote but there are bound to be mistakes from secondary research. Since we have a member of the squadron with us, and making comments below, perhaps we can have a thread that gives first hand accounts of the MiG 29 in the BW Luftwaffe from those who were there. My applogese in advance for any erors I have made.
The MiG 29 in service with the BW Luftwaffe
Effective midnight October 2, 1990, the Bundeswehr became the owners of all of the military hardware of the DDR NVA. Because of the Limitation of Forces Treaty the vast majority of this NVA equipment had to be sold or destroyed. Of all of the Soviet aircraft then on inventory of the NVA Luftsteitkrรคfte only the MiG 29 entered service with the BW Luftwaffe. The NVA squadron of MiG 29s, based at Lagge, remained intact and was absorbed in total by the BW Luftwaffe as JG3. However, the training, of the NVA pilots and the tactical role they had used previously did not fit with the BWs tactical plans. For example, Soviet doctrine called for a rigid flight plan totally controlled from the ground. The NVA pilots were not trained, indeed they were discouraged from, using any initiative of their own. Most combat mission training would see the aircraft climb quickly to cruising altitude to conserve fuel en-route to their destination. The pilot would complete his assigned tasks and return to his base while fully under the control of those on the ground. Soviet aircraft were designed to meet the Soviet tactical thinking of the day. The BW Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were directed to the location of their mission by ground control radar but once they arrived they were pretty much allowed to carry out their mission in the best way they could. It didn’t take the BW Luftwaffe long to find out that the ex NVA pilots were more interested in their own agendas than in those of the air force. It didn’t help, that after the STASI files were opened they revealed that seven of the JG3 pilots had been employed as informants by the STASI. These seven were released very quickly and the remainder of the ex NVA pilots followed shortly thereafter.
The ground crew were a different matter. Following the dismissal of the pilots they were heavily screened and only those who passed this screening remained with the BW Luftwaffe. Since all of the MiG 29 manuals were in Russian retaining these trained maintenance personnel was critical to keeping the MiGs in the air. BW Luftwaffe maintenance personnel were sent to JG3 for on-the-job training on the MiG 29s while the plane’s manuals were translated into German. A task that took two years. Some manuals were acquired from the Soviets but they were sent in Russian and not in English which was the practice when MiG 29s were sold outside of the Soviets Union.
BW Pilots were sent to the squadron, now known as JG73, to pilot the MiG 29s. Before they could fly the aircraft the designations on the flight instruments had to be changed from Russian to German. Some other modifications were made to the communications equipment and the laser range finder used in the MiG 29 was disabled as it was considered a danger to those on the ground and in the air.
Retaining the MiG 29 was a political decisions, and implementing this decision proved to be a difficult job for the BW Luftwaffe. Pilot training had to be a problem and I am not exactly sure how this was managed. The MiG 29 test equipment used by the squadron had been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that most of it did not work when it was absorbed by the BW Luftwaffe. Having it repaired was costly and time consuming. Maintenance schedules, as laid out in the manufacturers specifications of the aircraft, required engine overhaul and airframe maintenance at unacceptably low levels. Much time and effort was spent by the BW Luftwaffe in redesigning them to increase the length of time between these mandatory maintenance checks/overhauls while keeping them within safe and acceptable monetary limits.
Some other pressures on the BW Luftwaffe, and the squadron itself, were;
1- Frequent requests by other NATO air forces to schedule combat trials with their aircraft against those of the MiG 29s. The MiG 29 proved to be a very formidable weapon when freed of the restrictions of the Soviet Unions and flown by experienced BW Lufwaffe pilots. These trial combat missions were not necessarily indicative of how a NATO forces would have faired in a fight with a Soviet MiG 29 because JG73 flew their aircraft in a totally different tactical manner than a Soviet pilot would have. Besides, it was embarrassing when the MiGs won most of the duels. Eventually heavy restrictions were placed on the MiG 29 pilots to compensate when the MiG29s did participate in a simulated combat situation.
2-Russia was keen to promote the sale of MiG 29s to NATO countries and often "distorted" the operational performance data released by the BW Luftwaffe so they had to be very careful in what they published, or said verbally, about the aircraft.
However, the BW Luftwaffe was able to over come, or mitigate, all of the obstacles inherited in adopting the MiG 29 and it was a valuable tool in their arsenal until sold to the Rumanian air force.
The photos below were taken by a USAF photographer who's name I recorded when I stored the pictures but I could not find his name this morning. That is what I get for cleaning off my desk last night! Anyway, the photos were taken in 2003 during live firing exercises over the Gulf of Mexico. If I remember correctly, the MiG in most of the picture was being flown by the Colonel in command of the squadron.
Regards,
Gordon
The MiG 29 in service with the BW Luftwaffe
Effective midnight October 2, 1990, the Bundeswehr became the owners of all of the military hardware of the DDR NVA. Because of the Limitation of Forces Treaty the vast majority of this NVA equipment had to be sold or destroyed. Of all of the Soviet aircraft then on inventory of the NVA Luftsteitkrรคfte only the MiG 29 entered service with the BW Luftwaffe. The NVA squadron of MiG 29s, based at Lagge, remained intact and was absorbed in total by the BW Luftwaffe as JG3. However, the training, of the NVA pilots and the tactical role they had used previously did not fit with the BWs tactical plans. For example, Soviet doctrine called for a rigid flight plan totally controlled from the ground. The NVA pilots were not trained, indeed they were discouraged from, using any initiative of their own. Most combat mission training would see the aircraft climb quickly to cruising altitude to conserve fuel en-route to their destination. The pilot would complete his assigned tasks and return to his base while fully under the control of those on the ground. Soviet aircraft were designed to meet the Soviet tactical thinking of the day. The BW Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were directed to the location of their mission by ground control radar but once they arrived they were pretty much allowed to carry out their mission in the best way they could. It didn’t take the BW Luftwaffe long to find out that the ex NVA pilots were more interested in their own agendas than in those of the air force. It didn’t help, that after the STASI files were opened they revealed that seven of the JG3 pilots had been employed as informants by the STASI. These seven were released very quickly and the remainder of the ex NVA pilots followed shortly thereafter.
The ground crew were a different matter. Following the dismissal of the pilots they were heavily screened and only those who passed this screening remained with the BW Luftwaffe. Since all of the MiG 29 manuals were in Russian retaining these trained maintenance personnel was critical to keeping the MiGs in the air. BW Luftwaffe maintenance personnel were sent to JG3 for on-the-job training on the MiG 29s while the plane’s manuals were translated into German. A task that took two years. Some manuals were acquired from the Soviets but they were sent in Russian and not in English which was the practice when MiG 29s were sold outside of the Soviets Union.
BW Pilots were sent to the squadron, now known as JG73, to pilot the MiG 29s. Before they could fly the aircraft the designations on the flight instruments had to be changed from Russian to German. Some other modifications were made to the communications equipment and the laser range finder used in the MiG 29 was disabled as it was considered a danger to those on the ground and in the air.
Retaining the MiG 29 was a political decisions, and implementing this decision proved to be a difficult job for the BW Luftwaffe. Pilot training had to be a problem and I am not exactly sure how this was managed. The MiG 29 test equipment used by the squadron had been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that most of it did not work when it was absorbed by the BW Luftwaffe. Having it repaired was costly and time consuming. Maintenance schedules, as laid out in the manufacturers specifications of the aircraft, required engine overhaul and airframe maintenance at unacceptably low levels. Much time and effort was spent by the BW Luftwaffe in redesigning them to increase the length of time between these mandatory maintenance checks/overhauls while keeping them within safe and acceptable monetary limits.
Some other pressures on the BW Luftwaffe, and the squadron itself, were;
1- Frequent requests by other NATO air forces to schedule combat trials with their aircraft against those of the MiG 29s. The MiG 29 proved to be a very formidable weapon when freed of the restrictions of the Soviet Unions and flown by experienced BW Lufwaffe pilots. These trial combat missions were not necessarily indicative of how a NATO forces would have faired in a fight with a Soviet MiG 29 because JG73 flew their aircraft in a totally different tactical manner than a Soviet pilot would have. Besides, it was embarrassing when the MiGs won most of the duels. Eventually heavy restrictions were placed on the MiG 29 pilots to compensate when the MiG29s did participate in a simulated combat situation.
2-Russia was keen to promote the sale of MiG 29s to NATO countries and often "distorted" the operational performance data released by the BW Luftwaffe so they had to be very careful in what they published, or said verbally, about the aircraft.
However, the BW Luftwaffe was able to over come, or mitigate, all of the obstacles inherited in adopting the MiG 29 and it was a valuable tool in their arsenal until sold to the Rumanian air force.
The photos below were taken by a USAF photographer who's name I recorded when I stored the pictures but I could not find his name this morning. That is what I get for cleaning off my desk last night! Anyway, the photos were taken in 2003 during live firing exercises over the Gulf of Mexico. If I remember correctly, the MiG in most of the picture was being flown by the Colonel in command of the squadron.
Regards,
Gordon
The connection between the K-36 seat and this board was unchanged. 
Comment