The man who warned against Market Garden.

[gary42-43]

In the film; A Bridge Too Far he's a tired and emotional pessimist but in reality he was confident and stood his ground.
Major Urqhaurt (name changed in film to avoid confusion) from the Intelligence Corps was interviewed in 2004

Interview

sections copy & paste:

Montgomery wanted to get back onto center stage and conceived a dotty plan, which was to take every parachute and glider unit in the allied forces, American and British, something like three-and-a-half divisions, and let them take the three bridges over the tributaries of the Rhine going through Holland, where the Rhine divides into three large rivers -- take the bridges over these rivers and let his forces pour through Holland into Germany and finish the war. The fact that they didn't have any logistics to do this seems not to have occurred to the general. They didn't have enough gas to get over the bridges, let alone anything else.

I was then twenty-four years old. I was the chief intelligence officer of the British Airborne Corps, which was two parachute divisions and a lot of special forces.It seemed to me a completely ludicrous plan. I became increasingly alarmed looking at the intelligence -- first of all, the anti-aircraft positions of the Germans. We were going to arrive in slow-flying transport planes, after all. And the British First Airborne Division, which is the one in the movie, was going to be on the northern river at Arnhem, on the wrong side of that river, and had to be relieved within four days if it was going to survive.

Nobody would listen. They even said, "Oh, no, no, no, the Germans are finished. It's just a matter of one more push." And, "We remember 1918, when the Germans collapsed, " and all this kind of thing. I said, "There's no evidence whatsoever that the Germans have stopped fighting. On the contrary, they're on the borders of Germany. Why would they stop fighting there?" The Germans forces had all taken a personal oath to Hitler, incidentally, which was not an oath to be taken lightly.

The Dutch Resistance discovered it first. The two best armored divisions in the German army in the west, the Ninth and Tenth SS Panzer Divisions -- the crack armored divisions of the Germans army -- had been beaten up in Normandy, and they were refitting just outside Arnhem, where the British division was going to drop. I said, "This is really terrible. You cannot drop lightly-armed parachutists on top of the two best armored divisions in the world." "No, no, no, you don't understand," they said, "They won't fight. This is going to go like clockwork."

Well, of course, it didn't. I was such a pain in the neck that I was sent away two days before we were due to take off. When the thing went wrong, I immediately got called back. I had a hell of a job getting there, because they were cut off, but anyhow there it was. Everybody was extremely polite, and they said, "Good to see you, old boy. You're looking great." And I said, "Well, what seems to be going on?'

I discovered then two things: one is that if soldiers want to do something which they think is going to be a glorious victory, no amount of good intelligence, once they've got going, will stop it. Another thing I discovered is that it's bad enough to be against something they all want to do, but if you turn out to be right, people hate you with a loathing which is beyond any belief.

[kammo man]

Thanks for posting this story .
'It is a subject that has always made me wonder"
But ...its history .
owen

[paddywhack]

i always wondered what happened to him! thanks for posting that!!!

[Gary Jucha]

Brian Urquhart

This is your man ... Brian Urquhart

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Urquhart

http://www.paradata.org.uk/media/168...howZoomify=yes

I believe he is still with us ..

Gary J.

[Viscount]

Very interesting. Thanks for posting.

[force136]

Problem

Thanks for posting that. It is interesting. However he is an intelligence officer within an army formation and NOT an intelligence officer with SIS. The intelligence he would have been privy to would have been very limited and exclusively limited to the operation. In short he had no REAL insight as to WHY the operation was mounted.

For one, the Allies were stalled in Antwerp. The approaches to Antwerp were still in German hands. It was awful hard ground to fight in and no one looked forward to clearing Shealt Estuary. Antwerp remained useless as a port until this ground was taken. Then there was the German use of Dutch territory further north to fire their rocket bombs towards Antwerp and the UK.

In short the emphasis to mount Market Garden may have been for more reasons than just to drive into Germany and shorten the war. For one, the actual plan was to drive to the Sea. This, not to go into the industrial heart of the Germany, but to cut off the enemy in the vicinity of Antwerp and along the Shealt and also to cut off the V weapons sites from their sources.

Then there is the ever important factor that nothing else could be done at that time. Like the Americans further south, Churchill feared that remaining idle and having to clear ground behind your lines ie the shealt would be counter productive and only serve the enemy. In other words, no forward movement of any kind would be a disaster. After all the winter was approaching and the Germans were in retreat. If Market Garden had NOT been mounted, it would have given the Germans a respite of almost half a year.

Look what happened to the US in the Ardennes when they sat on their ass for a short period of time. If Market Garden had NOT been mounted, the Germans, including the 9th and 10th SS could have mounted a more broad offensive than that which occurred. OR the 9th and 10th SS could have been added in some considerable strength to the actual Ardennes offensive.

Market Garden did deplete the German forces in Holland at that time and reduced their threat to the Allied main line in that sector.

Then you have to look at WHY Airborne units were formed in the first place. They were formed to take risks, mount near suicide operations and to harass the enemy behind their lines. THAT was their purpose.

In short sometimes tactical failures can be just as beneficial to winning the war as out right victories. In MY opinion all invovled knew the risks, including Churchill, Montgomery, Browning etc. They probably knew of the chances of failure but figured it would be better than sitting on their ass while the enemy held huge swaths of land behind their forces while possibly preparing for their own offensive. The Shealt left the Allies in a precarious situation at the end of 1944 and many historians and critics of Market Garden forget this. They also forget the looming trajedy of the Ardennes.

I strongly feel that once still secret documents are released on planning at higher levels, this will become evident. While Major Urquarts premonitions were correct, he may not have been privy to discussions at the top regarding the grand strategy of the war.

I think Market Garden was mounted due to the stagnating problem at Antwerp and the Shealt not as a gamble to win the war but more as an operation to keep the enemy occupied until the Shealt could be cleared, Antwerp supplied and a concerted offensive mounted. If Market Garden worked, great. If it did not, at least it would help to disrupt any plans by the enemy to strike over the fall and winter in the north. Like they did further south in the Ardennes.

Ken

Very interesting. Thanks for posting.

[Viscount]

An excellent anaysis Ken, and a view that is not often heard. It can sometimes be the case that an apparent tactical defeat becomes an overlooked strategic success.

Whether by design or good fortune may be another matter.


Regards,
Bob.

[Mike C]

Ken,

With respect, I would strongly disagree. Army Intelligence or SIS is irrelevent - he identified two panzer divisions near the landing zones of the 1st Airborne Division that posed a fatal threat to that formation...the kind of tactical information that has nothing to do with SIS. That should have been sufficient to call off the drop but the warning was ignored and the result was the destruction of the 1st Airborne Division and a large part of the Polish Airborne Brigade as well as not insignificant losses to the 82d and 101st Divisions as well as the engaged ground forces.

The capture of Antwerp was not a failure - the port was taken intact on 4 September 1944 (with superb help from the resistance) but Horrocks (in my opinion an over-rated Corps Commander) and XXX Corps sat on their arses when a drive of 60 miles against then weak resistance would not only have cleared the Scheldt but would also have cut off good parts of the German 15th Army then desperately attempting to extract itself from northern France and get across the Scheldt estuary to establish strong positions to block the sea approaches to Antwerp. Nothing was done however and the 15th Army redeployed in good order leaving the LXVII Corps to hold the approaches.

As for the objectives of Market Garden, there is little doubt that Montgomery saw it as the potential knock-out blow that would take Germany out of the war. Hamilton, amongst others, is clear on this point - and it was sold as such. There are no secret plans or documents hidden away that would suggest anything else.

Nothing else going on? The US First Army was pressing on Aachen, Patton was fighting through Metz while the future 6th Army Group was driving up the Rhone Valley to close on to Germany`s southern western border. The drain on supplies to support the link-up for Market Garden had a negative effect on these operations. This being said, there was no respite - except for that which flowed from the diversion of the majority of logistical resources to support Market Garden.

The thought that the the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions could have posed a serious offensive threat to the British 21st Army Group is far-fetched. Indeed one of those divisions was in the process of being withdrawn from the front for re-fitting when Market Garden happened. They were strong enough to defeat dispersed and ill-armed airborne forces but they would have been handed their asses (as occurred at Mortain and the Bulge) if they had attempted a counter-offensive. In any case, there were no German plans for a counteroffensive in the west, in any sense, before the Ardennes.

Finally - airborne divsions exist to achieve operational level effect as occurred in Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1940; Corinth and Crete in 1941; Sicily in 1943; and Normandy in 1944. They are not suicide forces to be thrown about on a whim or when there is nothing else to do.

Mike

[force136]

Damn

After sitting here and writing a big blurb, it clocked out and I lost my reply. Now I am too tired to remember what the hell I said.

With respect Mike....

Ken,

With respect, I would strongly disagree. Army Intelligence or SIS is irrelevent - he identified two panzer divisions near the landing zones of the 1st Airborne Division that posed a fatal threat to that formation...the kind of tactical information that has nothing to do with SIS. That should have been sufficient to call off the drop but the warning was ignored and the result was the destruction of the 1st Airborne Division and a large part of the Polish Airborne Brigade as well as not insignificant losses to the 82d and 101st Divisions as well as the engaged ground forces.

KEN>>> What I meant by SIS, which is a very broad organization, is that they are privy to strategic discussions not found in history books. A prime example of this is the London Controlling Section which controlled STRATEGIC DECEPTION. I was not talking tactical BUT higher policy and discussions between Churchill and his intelligence apparatus and the Chiefs of Staff. But that said, SIS was a field intelligence organization as well and had teams in Holland. Has anyone tried to access THIER files????? Most are still classified as are much of the strategic discussion that went on at the top. You need to dig, but you might find something that surprises you. I still cant access many files on SOE operations. Another good example of information coming out is my book on the FSSF. Until I delved into intelligence records no one had a clue that JUPITER was an actual deception and that ruse was the primary reason winter warfare units were being raised in the US and UK. So never say documents DO NOT exist or DID NOT exist. So could Market Garden have been mounted for other motives - your darn tootin!

MIKE >>>>The capture of Antwerp was not a failure - the port was taken intact on 4 September 1944 (with superb help from the resistance) but Horrocks (in my opinion an over-rated Corps Commander) and XXX Corps sat on their arses when a drive of 60 miles against then weak resistance would not only have cleared the Scheldt but would also have cut off good parts of the German 15th Army then desperately attempting to extract itself from northern France and get across the Scheldt estuary to establish strong positions to block the sea approaches to Antwerp. Nothing was done however and the 15th Army redeployed in good order leaving the LXVII Corps to hold the approaches.

KEN >>> I did not say Antwerp was a failure. I think your strategic opinion of how easy it would have been for Horrocks is a bit off. Things were stalled for many reasons other than a lazy Horrocks, reasons which contributed to the need to mount MARKET GARDEN.

MIKE>>>As for the objectives of Market Garden, there is little doubt that Montgomery saw it as the potential knock-out blow that would take Germany out of the war. Hamilton, amongst others, is clear on this point - and it was sold as such. There are no secret plans or documents hidden away that would suggest anything else.

KEN>>> What else did you expect Montgomery to say? We are going to mount this operation hoping and praying it will work? That there are other factors invovled in its mounting? You say it yourself, "it was SOLD as such". SOLD is the key word there. HOWEVER, it is stating in the planning for the operation that cutting off German forces in the surrounding Antwerp area and V weapon sites was paramount. They would never say in operational planning that they were mounting such an operation just to keep the enemy on his toes. Churchill himself states at this time that waiting for a clearing of the Shealt while doing nothing along the front could cause disaster. It was his idea never to let the front line go idle.

>>>I think it is foolish to state there there are no documents hidden away that may state something else. Man I can tell you about documents hidden away and the sometimes stupid authors that never do the research but continue to read other peoples books and continue to revamp the same nonsense over and over again. You would be surprised waht archives hold. You just can't be lazy about it.

MIKE>>>Nothing else going on? The US First Army was pressing on Aachen, Patton was fighting through Metz while the future 6th Army Group was driving up the Rhone Valley to close on to Germany`s southern western border. The drain on supplies to support the link-up for Market Garden had a negative effect on these operations. This being said, there was no respite - except for that which flowed from the diversion of the majority of logistical resources to support Market Garden.

KEN>> I was talking about the Ardennes and YES there was a respite there. I was also talking about a possible respite along the British front line if Market Garden had NOT been mounted. I was not talking about US operations further south. BTW - The invasion of Southern FRance was mounted in order to supply US forces from the Med. So what happened with those supplies? It was not heavy fighting in the south because the FFI had already taken everything.

MIKE>>The thought that the the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions could have posed a serious offensive threat to the British 21st Army Group is far-fetched. Indeed one of those divisions was in the process of being withdrawn from the front for re-fitting when Market Garden happened. They were strong enough to defeat dispersed and ill-armed airborne forces but they would have been handed their asses (as occurred at Mortain and the Bulge) if they had attempted a counter-offensive. In any case, there were no German plans for a counteroffensive in the west, in any sense, before the Ardennes.

KEN>>OH really. Well the 9th SS went on to operate in the Ardennes and the 10th against your forces in Southwest Germany. When US forces landed at Normandy they faced a Panzer Grenadier Division, a few para units and a few infantry units. Yet those forces made a real mess of things. Not panzer divisions but they still wreaked havoc. So to say that even two SS panzer divisions with oodles of experience at half strength did not pose a threat is silly. There were other units in Holland you know. In fact the fighting that will take place to clear a path to Wessel proves that. If these units had say three or four months to refit and get freshened up while the British were farting around in the Shealt, you dont think they could do damage. Nonsense.

MIKE>>>Finally - airborne divsions exist to achieve operational level effect as occurred in Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1940; Corinth and Crete in 1941; Sicily in 1943; and Normandy in 1944. They are not suicide forces to be thrown about on a whim or when there is nothing else to do.


KEN >> Ok this is nonsense. All German airborne operations up to 1943 were complete disasters. While segments of these operations were successful, the suicidal casualty rates virtually excluded them from mounting further large scale operations during the war. The Neherlands was a disaster and Create was a disaster. The only thing that saved Crete was the airlanding units flown in on near suicide landings to reinforce the almost destroyed airborne element. The first operational use of British airborne troops was a suicide operation. The Tragino Aquaduct. They did not expect to get any of the Commandos back. Sicily was also a near disaster. In fact after Airborne operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy the Allied command began to wonder whether they should use airborne troops AT ALL for NEPTUNE-OVERLORD. The main concern, the same that would show up for MARKET GARDEN> enemy ARMOUR. However the risk did not outwiegh the benefits. The British landings on the left could have been wiped out by the 21st Panzer, 12thSS and Panzer Lehr if those units had been given time to organize. In fact the path of advance for the 12th SS was straight through the 8th Parachute Battalion. This only changed due to a fluke. The 21st Panzer was charged to destroy the airborne bridgehead until it was learned about the seaborne landings. So to say that Allied command never dropped airborne troops in near suicidal operations is frankly a joke. Nothing except strange twists of fate prevented a disaster for airborne troops at Normandy. The Allied command did not even have much confidence that they could land enough men in a concentrated area to capture their objectives let alone HOLD them.

So Arnhem is no different. There were tanks, so-what, there were tanks in Normandy and they still dropped those guys in. Even during the Rhine operation they were still required to mount highly risky coup de main attacks to take bridges. In fact most real sucessful airborne operations mounted by the enemy and Allies invovled glider troops supported by parachutists. But to say that airborne operations were a strategic certainty is crazy and I stand by my comment that most operations were close to suicidal.

Arnhem was a risk that needed to be taken and that risk invovled other factors than just shortening the war by a drive into the industrial heart of Germany. There was simply too much bad stuff going on at that time. It is my strong opinion that Churchill pressed Montgomery to mount the operation despite the possible outcome. Airborne troops were NEVER a strategic certainty and their primary purpose has always been to harry the enemy. If they took their objectives, great, but no one was holding their breath. The odds were only on the side of the airborne if they were used in such massive numbers that the odds were slightly tilted to their side. Could Market Garden have succeeded YES. They came damn close and killed a huge number of Germans. It was not necessarily the British fault either but that is another debate.

I still think more research needs to be done esp. with regard to higher policy and Britains intelligence service.

Sorry I wrote this in a big hurry
Ken
Mike

[Gary Jucha]

Shealt Estuary

Even after Arnhem, the Shealt Estuary was not cleared until way into 1945.
.. So if this had been the sub-plot, this was a failure.

Didn't some of the Northern islands in the Shealt remain firmly in German hands, .. thus blocking a clear route to the port of Antwerp ? ... (I presume the allies were well aware of this, and thus would have made provisions in an initial attack for waterborne crossings to take both sides of the estuary ? it would be interesting to know if there is any evidence of such undertakings.)

Gary J.

[Mike C]

Ken,

While I appreciate that you wrote this in hurry, you are providing a target rich environment and I cannot resist. Where to begin?

Horrocks recognized, post-war, that he had botched the opportunity to cut-off large elements of the 15th Army by striking north from Antwerp. This is the context for his memorable quote, along the lines, that while Napoleon might have recognized this opportunity, Horrocks did not. His Corps was still in reasonable shape (albeit tired) and the 60 kms to the Scheldt were virtually unguarded - a point clear for example in the CMHQ reports (among others) at the national archives. The Germans could not believe their luck.

Sorry - we will have to agree to disagree on the rationale for Market garden (MG). However virtually every primary and secondary source on this operation states that the intent was to break into northern Germany - Nigel Hamilton uses a fair amount of primary material in his biography. It was not a spoiling attack to keep the Germans busy but a knock-out blow. Remember that almost every Allied commander thought the European war would be over by Christmas - why would anyone support an attack with such limited objectives when a strategic prize of the first rank beckoned? An attack "just to keep the enemy on his toes" - risking three crack divisions and a brigade - come on. In any case, you are alone in arguing this thesis. And MG was remotely feasible - until the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions appeared around Arnhem.

As for the respite - check your timelines. When MG went down range (mid/late September), the US had yet to close on to the Ardennes. If you are stating that after MG, the US went on the defensive in the Ardennes - fair enough and a reasonable enough strategy at the time.

Your assessment of Normandy is completely at odds with reality. I mean what is not to like? The successful landing of a massive invasion force? The retention of a bridgehead and then a breakout that saw the liberation of most of France and the Low Countries ahead of the projected timelines? The destruction of huge swaths of the 5th and 7th Armies? The appearance of Allied troops on German soil in early October 1944? Rundstedt summed up the situation well when he told Keitel at the end of June, when asked what could be done, to: "Make peace you fools!" This cost him his job and he was replaced by an optimistic von Kluge - who lasted about six weeks before recommending "a political solution to the war" and committing suicide.

At a more tactical level, yes really...two SS panzer divisions that had been decimated in Normandy did not pose any significant threat to the 21st Army Group. Period. Consider the results at Mortain - three and half panzer divisions, five infantry divisions and five kampfgruppen went into the attack and it was a disaster with losses of armoured vehicles of about 50%. As for the Ardennes, the results for the Germans were not any better.

I think that the wheels really come off the cart however with the gross generalization of German failure in every airborne operation up to 1943. You are kidding right? The successful occupation of the key Waalhaven Airfield (among others) and the Dordrecht bridge were failures? Or Eben Emael in Belgium? The facts speak for themselves...

Lets talk about Crete - consider the respective losses. The Germans seized this island at the cost of about 4000 dead/missing and 2700 wounded. Allied losses were about 23000 of which 17000 were prisoners. Of these prisoners, 12000 were high quality Commonwealth troops - or about a divisions worth. The Royal Navy lost three cruisers and six destroyers sunk with another 18 warships (including two battleships) damaged. And this was a German disaster?

And of course the invasion would have failed had their been no link-up with the planned airlanding of mountain troops - just as, for example, the Normandy landings would have failed without a link-up. I mean..duh!

I never said that airborne landings were a strategic certainty (not certain what you mean by this) but rather that they served to achieve operational effect - exactly as they did in Holland, Crete, Sicily, Normandy, Germany etc, etc. Was this risky - of course. However to suggest that the Allied high command considered these guys as expendable suicide troops to be thrown hither and yon to simply "keep the Germans on their toes" is a gross misrepresentation.

Well enough - best post this before I lose it too. Cheers,

Mike

[force136]

Airborne

Mike

My comments regarding airborne history are based on the comment you made that basically airborne operations were a certainty ie. Crete and Normandy were great victories and that is all that matters. That airborne troops were not suicide troops or more appropriatly EXPENDABLE and most airborne operations were a success. I returned by stating that most airborne operations were near failures and were only likewise due to some amazing flukes.

You dont have to take my word for it. After Crete the Germans were finished with large scale airborne operations. There is an important reason for that which I stated. Losing 40% of your force is not very productive. Yes, they got the Island but due to a suicide assualt by Mountain troops in aircraft. However that is not the point, the point is how close it came to failure and how those losses paralysed the German airborne.

Then you need to look into SHAEF on Airborne planning for Normandy. How that was far from a certainty and so much so that there was pressure from within to severely modify airborne planning or cancel the airborne drops altogether because of prior airborne operations.

As for Market Garden, it was Churchill and Eisenhower who were afraid that without Market Garden, due to severely stretched and limited access to supplies, it would result in a PAUSE. The battle maps for MG clearly indicate a move north to the Zuider Zee NOT a hook into the heart of Germany. This obviously would have happened but at the time of the operation, it was not the main goal. The goal was to CUT OFF THE ENEMY STILL TO THE WEST AND TO CUT OFF THE V WEAPON SITES WHICH HAD JUST BEGAN TO FIRE ITS ROCKETS ON LONDON AND ANTWERP. I am sure if it was possible both would be done. But still without the clearing of the Shealt, what would those forces do even if they took Arnhem bridge?The supply situation would not have changed?

It was the out come of both OVERLORD and MG that created the planning for the Rhine crossing. The Allied command were now so scared of airborne operations they made sure the ground forces were already across the Rhine before they dropped the airborne troops. You need to study the reasoning as to why they chose to do it that way.

You contradict yourself in your reasoning for a German victory at Crete. You are NOW saying that 40% casualties to achieve an objective by luck is OK. Well then, could you not apply the same reasoning to MG? Like I said, there were tanks in Normandy, LOTS OF TANKS. Yet we still dropped airborne troops. So they knew there were tanks in Holland, again so what? If casualties are not a problem ( ie. suicide troops ) then your intelligence ( and you say it yourself, the 9th and 10th SS were ineffective) should only be considered a nuisance by Allied planners. After all airborne troops have anti-tank units and the ground forces were coming with tanks.

As for being alone with my thesis, I feel good about that. I did not say it was completely to keep the enemy on his toes now did I? NO I said it was part of the rationale used by Churchill and to a certain extent Eisenhower for accepting the operation.

Then you admit that the US forces WENT ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE ARDENNES, that my friend is called a PAUSE!!!!!!

You did not read my points very well regarding the airborne operations in Normandy. I was attempting to support my argument that airborne troops were used en masse to achieve a strategic goal. Meaning that you have to drop four times as many men ( or whatever) than required to achieve your goal. So in fact the roll of many airborne troops was not to capture a bridge or building but to simply harrass the enemy. This is because statistics proved that most would not get anywhere near their objective during a drop anyway. So while airborne troops are expensive to train and equip and bring into battle, it was generally accepted that confusion and HUGE losses would be incurred. If a handful of guys made it to their objective and could hold on, that would be a happy consequnce. My point was that in prior airborne operations those objectives were achieved more by the grace of God than the strategic certainty of airborne troops. SO in saying that, if MG had a chance of success, even if it was slim, they had used airborne troops before in a similar manner, what should stop them dropping men into Holland? And as you say, the 9th and 10th SS were spent?

My main reason for this argument was to prove that there were OTHER objectives and motives for MG other than Montgomery ending the war in 1944. Also to prove that it was not out of the ordinary for such operations to be mounted, tanks or NO tanks, expecting huge casualties and possibly failure.

Dieppe comes to mind as well. For someone to say that CO did not know in advance that Dieppe would be a near disaster is also nonsense. One simply has to look at Dieppe to know that. Again battles are fought for reasons other than victory. There are political reasons. You can argue that till your blue in the face but I keep saying that you need to look at the complete picture. In order to find info you may not have seen before you need to come up with some imaginative theories. You may prove yourself wrong but then again you may find something that will change history. A true historian is one that covers all the bases, even those not accepted by the repeat offenders.

Anyway it is fun debating this Mike. I appreciate your knowledge and info.

Regards

Ken

Ken,

While I appreciate that you wrote this in hurry, you are providing a target rich environment and I cannot resist. Where to begin?

Horrocks recognized, post-war, that he had botched the opportunity to cut-off large elements of the 15th Army by striking north from Antwerp. This is the context for his memorable quote, along the lines, that while Napoleon might have recognized this opportunity, Horrocks did not. His Corps was still in reasonable shape (albeit tired) and the 60 kms to the Scheldt were virtually unguarded - a point clear for example in the CMHQ reports (among others) at the national archives. The Germans could not believe their luck.

Sorry - we will have to agree to disagree on the rationale for Market garden (MG). However virtually every primary and secondary source on this operation states that the intent was to break into northern Germany - Nigel Hamilton uses a fair amount of primary material in his biography. It was not a spoiling attack to keep the Germans busy but a knock-out blow. Remember that almost every Allied commander thought the European war would be over by Christmas - why would anyone support an attack with such limited objectives when a strategic prize of the first rank beckoned? An attack "just to keep the enemy on his toes" - risking three crack divisions and a brigade - come on. In any case, you are alone in arguing this thesis. And MG was remotely feasible - until the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions appeared around Arnhem.

As for the respite - check your timelines. When MG went down range (mid/late September), the US had yet to close on to the Ardennes. If you are stating that after MG, the US went on the defensive in the Ardennes - fair enough and a reasonable enough strategy at the time.

Your assessment of Normandy is completely at odds with reality. I mean what is not to like? The successful landing of a massive invasion force? The retention of a bridgehead and then a breakout that saw the liberation of most of France and the Low Countries ahead of the projected timelines? The destruction of huge swaths of the 5th and 7th Armies? The appearance of Allied troops on German soil in early October 1944? Rundstedt summed up the situation well when he told Keitel at the end of June, when asked what could be done, to: "Make peace you fools!" This cost him his job and he was replaced by an optimistic von Kluge - who lasted about six weeks before recommending "a political solution to the war" and committing suicide.

At a more tactical level, yes really...two SS panzer divisions that had been decimated in Normandy did not pose any significant threat to the 21st Army Group. Period. Consider the results at Mortain - three and half panzer divisions, five infantry divisions and five kampfgruppen went into the attack and it was a disaster with losses of armoured vehicles of about 50%. As for the Ardennes, the results for the Germans were not any better.

I think that the wheels really come off the cart however with the gross generalization of German failure in every airborne operation up to 1943. You are kidding right? The successful occupation of the key Waalhaven Airfield (among others) and the Dordrecht bridge were failures? Or Eben Emael in Belgium? The facts speak for themselves...

Lets talk about Crete - consider the respective losses. The Germans seized this island at the cost of about 4000 dead/missing and 2700 wounded. Allied losses were about 23000 of which 17000 were prisoners. Of these prisoners, 12000 were high quality Commonwealth troops - or about a divisions worth. The Royal Navy lost three cruisers and six destroyers sunk with another 18 warships (including two battleships) damaged. And this was a German disaster?

And of course the invasion would have failed had their been no link-up with the planned airlanding of mountain troops - just as, for example, the Normandy landings would have failed without a link-up. I mean..duh!

I never said that airborne landings were a strategic certainty (not certain what you mean by this) but rather that they served to achieve operational effect - exactly as they did in Holland, Crete, Sicily, Normandy, Germany etc, etc. Was this risky - of course. However to suggest that the Allied high command considered these guys as expendable suicide troops to be thrown hither and yon to simply "keep the Germans on their toes" is a gross misrepresentation.

Well enough - best post this before I lose it too. Cheers,

Mike