Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model

[Steve P]

Gents, I recently read the book "Hitler's Commander, Field Marshall Walther Model - Hitler's Favourite General"...Despite being a prominent senior commander in the wehrmacht, I had not strong understanding of Model's backrground (where he came from) nor his capability as a commander. I had, of course, heard the conventional wisdom that he was a devout nazi in theory and practice and as such was Hitler's so-called "Fireman". Perhaps the latter is true in that he was sent to "fix" many a tough situation in both the Eastern and later in the Western theatres. Though as the book presents it is unclear as to whether Model was as committed a Nazi or sycophantic 'Yes-Man' as is often suggested.

The book reviews, as well as probably can be done without the benefit of a greater volume of documentation...much of which was destroyed by Model himslef before he committed suicide, the early career and military vicissitudes of Model. The book is well contexted in respect of many credible sources well-known and others not so well-known, including the War Diaries of the formations, command and staff roles to which he was appointed. It reviews Models story through analysing many documents and informal communications (German and Soviet) in reaching its conclusions and/or comparisons. The book is well worth reading as it presents a very clear, well supported 'story' of the career and learnings of Model, from his entry into service of the Great German General Staff, describing how he was afforded the textbook path to the highest ranks of the German High Command, at least in as much as the orthodoxy of the Deutches Heer was concerned. I recommend this book to all with an interest in German Generalship and the dynamics of the high command in the Third Reich.

Given the weight and clarity of evidence that is provided by Steven H. Newton it is unlikely that anyone will read it without having had their understanding, and perhaps opinion, of Model changed if not transformed. I'd be very interested in any comments that anyone has on this topic?

Cheers, S

[Federico Perez]

I have read this book, is a good overal view of the Field Marshall Model path and rise in the Heer ranks as well as his role in battles and the tactical dessicions he made. His reputation as a "fireman" was due mostly because of his success in holding "the line" in "hopeless" situations in the eyes of other generals/field marshalls.....some historians who say he was a yes man all the way use this same view, that he keep the fight up even if it was hopeless in the end.

But at the same time Model live by the code of the German officer/field marshall of following the orders and make the best he could in view of the situations he confronted, some allied commanders said after the war that by comiting suicide at the end and not surrender and respond for his actions, Model tarnished his brilliat military career...even if he was in the wrong side.....I have always wondered about this statement since is almost certain he would have been put in trial as a common political war criminal and probably executed, like the other prominent field marshalls where.

One thing I got from reading this book was that this field marshall knew very early on that this was the "final battle"...if Germany lost the war again, all the traditions,rules,and way of life that he knew where over, the line was crossed and for better or worse he was part of it, when the end came he just saw it as the last bullet and end his life with this last war, no retreat no surrender for this soldier, it must seem trivial now or even "tacky" for some....but for a lot of officers who witness the Great War capitulation and their consecuenses, a second chapter was just no possible, like in Roman times, this general preffer to fall on his sword and die with his country.....the country HE knew then.

[Steve P]

Hi Frederico,

...great comments on the book and Model himself...I agree with you, I have real issues with any historian who, without investigation accepts or touts conventional wisdom of the time...I am quite convinced from this book, and Marcel Stein's most recent work on von Manstein et. al., that one can make a very credible argument that Model was a very sound General (at the operational/tactical level) and far less a committed National Socialist than is often assumed. What was very evident to me was that his use of military diplomacy (perhaps even to the extent of expediency in Nazi rhetoric) was vital to his tactical aims and winning his tactical arguments - especially his wishes to make tactical withdrawals on the Eastern Front- ...to me there was an element of politico-military savvy in his ways that eluded many German Generals of the Prussian tradition. I was intrigued at the manner in which Model managed the resources at hand in a very flexible and effective manner, achieveing in my view a very effective balance between planning (General Staff-based and often orthodox) and at times inspired understanding and insight...as in the case of his straightening of defensive lines and use of natural defences to create depth. As far as the principles of war - economy of effort and concenrtaion of force - hardly a misstep.

I was also interested in the discussion of the Model, as a defensive commander...rather than an offensive commander, albeit that it is often discussed...I think it could well be argued that given the resource constraints and strategic, and follow-on tactical situations faced by Model that it may be argued that he really had not the opportunity to demonstrate his offensive capability (except in a relatively limited fashion through local counter attacks) and, of course at the Ardennes was again heavily constrained by time, resources, terrain and the inability (by then) to influence and limit the strategic objectives to something more managable than the governing Fuhrer directive.

A final thought to part on at this point...is that while he was thought harsh and difficult by his officers and men (as was Rommel by many incidentally) his results were nontheless quite amazing and he deserves credit for achieving what he did under exceptionally difficult political and military conditions. My view is probably that with the weight of command he bore, and the circumstances with which he was faced he perhaps can be forgiven his temper.

Cheers, S

[pasoleati]

If I recall it right, as a biography I felt the books did not contain enough true primary research. However, what made the book interesting is Newton´s comments on how the "mobile defence" lot of German generals (e.g. Manstein&Guderian) have prevailed in getting their version accepted as the gospel how Eastern Front should have been managed while there are solid arguments in favour of the more "fixed defence" lot of German generals (like Rendulic&Model) and their tactics. Newton does have a point for e.g. how many English books exists on Rendulic and his tactics?