I recently read Robert M. Citino's new book, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich . This is the latest of a series of excellent books the author, a history professor at Eastern Michigan University, has written on military art and doctrine in an historical context. Citino focuses on Bewegungskrieg, or war of maneuver at the operational level, to describe and demonstrate continuity in the Prussian and German conduct of campaigns from the late 17th Century up until 1941. A major, if not the primary, characteristic of Bewegungskrieg was the independence of the commander (what is usually called Auftragstatik or mission-type orders today). Citino's choice to end his book at 1941 is due to his conclusion (a correct one in my view) that after Barbarossa, the independent authority of higher level commanders to determine the means and methods that they chose to accomplishment their respective missions was precluded by the "micro-management" style of Hitler's as well as der Fuehrer's military staff from 1941 until the end of the war.
In sum, if you have an interest in the historic roots of Germany's conduct of maneuver warfare at the operational level, I think you'll enjoy as well as learn from this book.
Homer
In sum, if you have an interest in the historic roots of Germany's conduct of maneuver warfare at the operational level, I think you'll enjoy as well as learn from this book.
Homer
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