a couple of questions about the German armed forces

[organix]

Hi everybody,

I didn't really know what section to post this in as most other sections deal with collecting, but I have a couple of historical questions that are both completely unrelated.

Firstly, it is a widely accepted theory that the Wehrmacht went into Russia expecting a short campaign, and therefore did not properly prepare themselves for the harshness of the Russian winter. I can see how this impacted German defeats in the winter of 1941, but what about the following years? Surely The High Command would have ordained suitable supplies for them to prepare for the following winters after a tough lesson learned. German winter clothing of the period looks pretty warm e.g the Waffen SS Rabbit fur lined parkers etc and splinter pattern parkers etc. So was it a case of too little too late? Or was it a case that suitable winter supplies were in effect by 1942, however after Stalingrad etc the Wehrmacht was militarily on the retreat anyway, and the winter impacted less?

The next question concerned Flak 88 crews. Were the majority of the crews who manned these guns Luftwaffe ground forces? I think probably yes when it comes to the weapons anti-aircraft role, but what about when the gun was deployed with the Wehrmacht in an anti tank role? Did Heer units have detachments of Luftwaffe ground troops to man these?

Anyway, just a couple of wee questions I thought I would pose on a Friday afternoon, hope you are all keeping well and I look forward to your answers and the following discussion :-)

Andy

[Woolgar]

Hi Andy

Regarding your question on the Flak units, many were manned by Hitler Youth Flak helfers, young boys and girls as young as 15, under the auspices of the Luftwaffe

Nick

[pzrwest]

I remember building the Tamiya 88 gun kit and you had 2 options one was an antiaircraft or an antitank gun. The main differences was the tubes, long for anitaircraft, short for antitank. Also the fuse setter. The antiaircraft could be used for antitank. Another thing in the kit was the gun shield, it was for the antitank gun or so the kit says. So I'm assumeing that the AA gun would be crewed by Luftwaffe crews, and the AT was crewed by Heer

[organix]

thanks for the replies guys.

interesting, I found a couple of pics online of 88s being used in an obvious anti tank role and manned by luftwaffe troops..

http://ww2total.com/WW2/Weapons/Arti...ring-px800.jpg

http://ww2total.com/WW2/Weapons/Arti...esia-px800.jpg

I reckon it was a mix of Heer and Luftwaffe with the HJ being used on AA batteries in defence of German towns and cities. I think AA crews in the field that manned guns to protect airfields, bases and strategic areas of importance were often ordered to support Heer units

[Kent Muller]

Well some may say it was too little too late, the Wehrmacht Army came to a grinding halt when the roads turned to swamps in autumn (due to very few paved roads in Russia )and their supply lines couldn’t keep up with demand, … by winter (even with the roads freezing and becoming more drivable ) their hardware became almost unusable in the bitter cold , slowing their planned advances/attacks/counter attacks. Mean while, the Russians had time to reorganize, rearm and redeploy , also with the threat of an invasion from Japan, now gone, their well equipped Siberian forces could be brought forward…. The momentum of Barbarossa was lost, IMO turning the tide of the battle somewhat in favor of the Russians . The German army was so accustomed to glory, that when hit with a series of losses, coupled with the initial lack of suitable supplies, they became demoralized in the face of the enemy…(a demoralized army is a defeated army). There were so many issues that affected the outcome, such as the decision to take Stalingrad before securing the oil fields of the Caucasus, which would have cut Russia’s vital oil supply and starved their tanks… but at the end of the day, Russia has historically been winter fighters with a huge human resource… and the knowledge that if they can hold out till winter , their enemies will slowly freeze and stave to defeat if not properly prepared ,.. remembering the vast plains of Russia were always going to be a logistical nightmare for the Germans . Evidence of the Russian’s using this tactic can be seen with their scorched earth policies (similar to the Germans tactic’s , upon their retreat), leaving nothing of use for the advancing Germans, forcing the to rely only Wehrmacht on their own supplies, with no supplement resources ( a tough feat for any General to overcome)
Another point of interest is that operation Barbarossa was delayed, due to the conflict in Greece … giving them less time to complete their objectives in Russia.
I like to think of it this way…. An elephant represents the German Army , and a swarm of ants is the Russian counterpart , while an elephant can easily kill 1000’s upon 1000’s of ants, it will eventually tier and become overrun by the endless numbers of the swarm …. Thus the defeat of Germany.
So not matter how warm their winter clothes were, …the endless Red Army devoured the German’s with their overwhelming numbers.

OF COURSE THIS IS ONLY MY OPINION

[organix]

thanks for that Kent, and yes I agree with what you've said, it was a case of too little too late. I guess my next question is to what extent was the German army prepared for that second winter? I think they had been dealt the death blow in 1941 and then with Stalingrad they couldn't come back, but I'd like to get an idea of how winter 1942 impacted compared with 1941. eg were there as many casualties to the cold? Had modifictaions been made to engine parts/different oil used to enable operation in sub zero temperatures?

[tracman]

Hi everybody,

I didn't really know what section to post this in as most other sections deal with collecting, but I have a couple of historical questions that are both completely unrelated.

Firstly, it is a widely accepted theory that the Wehrmacht went into Russia expecting a short campaign, and therefore did not properly prepare themselves for the harshness of the Russian winter. I can see how this impacted German defeats in the winter of 1941, but what about the following years? Surely The High Command would have ordained suitable supplies for them to prepare for the following winters after a tough lesson learned. German winter clothing of the period looks pretty warm e.g the Waffen SS Rabbit fur lined parkers etc and splinter pattern parkers etc. So was it a case of too little too late? Or was it a case that suitable winter supplies were in effect by 1942, however after Stalingrad etc the Wehrmacht was militarily on the retreat anyway, and the winter impacted less?

The next question concerned Flak 88 crews. Were the majority of the crews who manned these guns Luftwaffe ground forces? I think probably yes when it comes to the weapons anti-aircraft role, but what about when the gun was deployed with the Wehrmacht in an anti tank role? Did Heer units have detachments of Luftwaffe ground troops to man these?

Anyway, just a couple of wee questions I thought I would pose on a Friday afternoon, hope you are all keeping well and I look forward to your answers and the following discussion :-)

Andy

Arguably, the issue was not just that the German military had counted on a short Russian campaign, it is also that the German military did not properly learn the lessons of its own victories of 1940, as most German military units continued to rely on horse-drawn transportation throughout the war. With its horse-dependent infantry divisions covering large frontages and thus relatively immobile, and with Russian forces ever more equipped with American trucks ensuring much greater mobility, the harshness of the winter was a misery only compounded by the lack of mobility of German forces. Its trucks, which were based on civilian designs, and many of which were foreign capture in any event due to a refusal to mobilize industry for war until it was much too late, were simply not robust enough for use in areas without paved roads. Its tanks and armored vehicles ended up having to cover huge distances to go from one threatened area to another, all of which played havoc with maintenance. Of course, the Germans used lighter oils in the winter for their vehicles (this was, after all, in the days before multi-grade oils), and special hydraulic fluids for winter use, but long supply lines, poor logistics, inferior mobility, and huge frontages were more of a problem than the weather, which only exacerbated these key weaknesses. Arguably, the dependence on horses for mobility was a greater problem in harsh winter conditions than keeping motorized vehicles running, as starvation (a horse needs 10 kgs or so of fodder daily...), disease, and frostbite took out horses by the thousands....

As for "88s," they were manned in the field by both Herr and Luftwaffe units, the former also as anti-tank guns after these proved their use in the combat around Arras, when they were the only guns capable of penetrating the British Matilda tanks' front armor. Eventually, dedicated anti-tank 88mm guns were produced (Pak 41, Pak 43), which were lower and could not elevate like their Flak brothers and thus much more concealable... The typical model we are all most familiar with - the Flak 18/36/37 series, served in anti-tank units in the Herr and SS until the very end: most Luftwaffe units that used them did so in the field as AA at the Corps level, where they protected key installations and supply routes behind the lines (and rarely if ever were used as AT guns). At home, they were used to defend cities and the like from air attack (where they were often partially crewed by children). In any event, a casual review of TO&E's of Herr and SS units show these issued to organic Flak and AT units, with the key difference between both models being the sighting equipment, as Flak units need to set fuzes for rounds to explode at pre-determined heights, while AT guns fire solid shot in a flat horizontal trajectory: as one can imagine, the sighting and training to fire these missions is quite different. As regards barrels, I'm rather sure there were no distinctions, with later models (Flak 36 and 37 models) having an interchangeable front part of the barrel, ahead of the chamber, allowing faster barrel changes when these wore out.