Combined Bomber Offensive Analysis
The most controversial aspect of Anglo-American air power had to do with the Combined Bomber Offensive, the strategic bombing effort against Germany. This author at least would rate its contribution as one of the four essential elements in Allied victory over Nazi Germany, the others being the Eastern Front, the battle of the Atlantic and American productive superiority. Let us then consider some of the particular contributions that the bombing efforts made to winning the war.
It is hard to measure the impact of bombing because, in contradiction to many of the tenets of air power, so much of its effect was indirect. We can, of course, measure increases in German production due to Speer's utilization of the whole of Europe's economic structure. But what would German-controlled industry have produced, had the Reich's cities not been pounded by British bombers? Perhaps the best that we can say is that German utilization of their own economic resources and those of the European nations under their control was severely impeded by the increasingly effective bombing after 1942.
Moreover, the quality of German-produced weapons declined significantly after 1942. The responses that the Nazi government made to the night-bomber offensive suggest the profound indirect impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive. The growth of the Flak (anti-aircraft fire) forces defending the Reich at a time when on any number of fronts German ground forces were confronting increasingly numerous and effective opponents suggests the impact the bombing made on the minds of the Nazi leadership and their worries that the home front might again collapse as in 1918. The number of Flak batteries rose from 791 guarding the Reich in 1940, to 967 in 1941, 1,148 in 1942 and 2,132 in 1943. By the end of 1943 the Germans had nearly 10,000 high-velocity anti-aircraft guns and 500,000 men firing huge numbers of shells into the skies over the Reich and hitting little. The impact of such weapons and manpower on other fronts in 1943 or 1944 hardly needs emphasis.
The second indirect effect of 'area' bombing also occurred in the minds of the Nazi leadership. Worried by the bombing's impact on German morale, Hitler and his advisers hit on a strategy of retaliation, one entirely in accord with the tenants of Douhet and Trenchard. As a result, the Germans poured enormous resources into the so-called revenge weapons, the V-1 and V-2. The former did not require a huge investment, but the latter made no sense at all. The V-2 demanded complex technological support; it was inordinately expensive; it used up scarce resources; and its production overloaded the instrument and electrical-componenThe second indirect effect of 'area' bombing also occurred in the minds of the Nazi leadership. Worried by the bombing's impact on German morale, Hitler and his advisers hit on a strategy of retaliation, one entirely in accord with the tenants of Douhet and Trenchard. As a result, the Germans poured enormous resources into the so-called revenge weapons, the V-1 and V-2. The former did not require a huge investment, but the latter made no sense at all. The V-2 demanded complex technological support; it was inordinately expensive; it used up scarce resources; and its production overloaded the instrument and electrical-componen<wbr>t industries. W
The American effort is easier to evaluate. In 1943 the campaign's results were disappointing, especially considering its losses. But it did impose heavy losses on the Luftwaffe and these carried over into 1944. In that year the massive campaign by the Eighth Air Force against the Luftwaffe's production base slowed the rate of increase in German aircraft production. But its most important contribution was the fact that it pulled the Luftwaffe's fighter force up into the air, where US long-range fighters could destroy it. The collapse in May 1944 was the direct result. The attacks on the German and Romanian oil industries made the regeneration of the Luftwaffe's fighting strength impossible; it also presented the Germans with insoluble problems in the ground war. In February 1945 Soviet armies conquered the province of Silesia in less than a week; German forces in the area possessed over 1,000 tanks, but all were immobilized by lack of fuel and were consequently useless.
Strategic air power also contributed to the campaign in Normandy and the eventual collapse of Nazi Germany in spring 1945. Tedder's transportation plan worked particularly well due to the capabilities Bomber Command developed in its efforts over the Reich. The tragedy was that having developed capabilities that allowed it to bomb even more accurately than the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, Bomber Command's leadership returned to a policy of city-busting that minimized rather than maximized the possibilities.
In the end, air power did not win the war in Europe by itself. Rather its contribution reflected a broad-based application of capabilities that contributed significantly to victory in the air, on land and at sea. The failures of the Luftwaffe were symbolic of the Third Reich's fate. The German leaders held goals that were manifestly beyond the reach of their nation. The devastating effect of German successes in the first war years should not disguise the dilettantism of those who conducted the Reich's grand strategy Intermixed with an exceedingly high level of competence on the tactical and operational levels was a general inability to see the relationship between ends and means. The Germans waged the struggle with operational and tactical competence to the bitter end, but the tenacity of that defense only ensured that the final defeat would be all the more terrible.
From the group..... rommelshq@yahoogroups.com
The most controversial aspect of Anglo-American air power had to do with the Combined Bomber Offensive, the strategic bombing effort against Germany. This author at least would rate its contribution as one of the four essential elements in Allied victory over Nazi Germany, the others being the Eastern Front, the battle of the Atlantic and American productive superiority. Let us then consider some of the particular contributions that the bombing efforts made to winning the war.
It is hard to measure the impact of bombing because, in contradiction to many of the tenets of air power, so much of its effect was indirect. We can, of course, measure increases in German production due to Speer's utilization of the whole of Europe's economic structure. But what would German-controlled industry have produced, had the Reich's cities not been pounded by British bombers? Perhaps the best that we can say is that German utilization of their own economic resources and those of the European nations under their control was severely impeded by the increasingly effective bombing after 1942.
Moreover, the quality of German-produced weapons declined significantly after 1942. The responses that the Nazi government made to the night-bomber offensive suggest the profound indirect impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive. The growth of the Flak (anti-aircraft fire) forces defending the Reich at a time when on any number of fronts German ground forces were confronting increasingly numerous and effective opponents suggests the impact the bombing made on the minds of the Nazi leadership and their worries that the home front might again collapse as in 1918. The number of Flak batteries rose from 791 guarding the Reich in 1940, to 967 in 1941, 1,148 in 1942 and 2,132 in 1943. By the end of 1943 the Germans had nearly 10,000 high-velocity anti-aircraft guns and 500,000 men firing huge numbers of shells into the skies over the Reich and hitting little. The impact of such weapons and manpower on other fronts in 1943 or 1944 hardly needs emphasis.
The second indirect effect of 'area' bombing also occurred in the minds of the Nazi leadership. Worried by the bombing's impact on German morale, Hitler and his advisers hit on a strategy of retaliation, one entirely in accord with the tenants of Douhet and Trenchard. As a result, the Germans poured enormous resources into the so-called revenge weapons, the V-1 and V-2. The former did not require a huge investment, but the latter made no sense at all. The V-2 demanded complex technological support; it was inordinately expensive; it used up scarce resources; and its production overloaded the instrument and electrical-componenThe second indirect effect of 'area' bombing also occurred in the minds of the Nazi leadership. Worried by the bombing's impact on German morale, Hitler and his advisers hit on a strategy of retaliation, one entirely in accord with the tenants of Douhet and Trenchard. As a result, the Germans poured enormous resources into the so-called revenge weapons, the V-1 and V-2. The former did not require a huge investment, but the latter made no sense at all. The V-2 demanded complex technological support; it was inordinately expensive; it used up scarce resources; and its production overloaded the instrument and electrical-componen<wbr>t industries. W
The American effort is easier to evaluate. In 1943 the campaign's results were disappointing, especially considering its losses. But it did impose heavy losses on the Luftwaffe and these carried over into 1944. In that year the massive campaign by the Eighth Air Force against the Luftwaffe's production base slowed the rate of increase in German aircraft production. But its most important contribution was the fact that it pulled the Luftwaffe's fighter force up into the air, where US long-range fighters could destroy it. The collapse in May 1944 was the direct result. The attacks on the German and Romanian oil industries made the regeneration of the Luftwaffe's fighting strength impossible; it also presented the Germans with insoluble problems in the ground war. In February 1945 Soviet armies conquered the province of Silesia in less than a week; German forces in the area possessed over 1,000 tanks, but all were immobilized by lack of fuel and were consequently useless.
Strategic air power also contributed to the campaign in Normandy and the eventual collapse of Nazi Germany in spring 1945. Tedder's transportation plan worked particularly well due to the capabilities Bomber Command developed in its efforts over the Reich. The tragedy was that having developed capabilities that allowed it to bomb even more accurately than the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, Bomber Command's leadership returned to a policy of city-busting that minimized rather than maximized the possibilities.
In the end, air power did not win the war in Europe by itself. Rather its contribution reflected a broad-based application of capabilities that contributed significantly to victory in the air, on land and at sea. The failures of the Luftwaffe were symbolic of the Third Reich's fate. The German leaders held goals that were manifestly beyond the reach of their nation. The devastating effect of German successes in the first war years should not disguise the dilettantism of those who conducted the Reich's grand strategy Intermixed with an exceedingly high level of competence on the tactical and operational levels was a general inability to see the relationship between ends and means. The Germans waged the struggle with operational and tactical competence to the bitter end, but the tenacity of that defense only ensured that the final defeat would be all the more terrible.
From the group..... rommelshq@yahoogroups.com
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