Heinkel He111 P 1940 - what kind of communications?

[Gran Sasso]

For a planned exibition about the battle of Rotterdam 1940 we need an answer for this question - did they used already the FuG 10, or still the long wave radio which help of long antenna-cabel pulled by the plane?

Thanks in advance!

[Funksammler]

I understand that all H-111 P versions were fitted with the FuG III, the later P's with the imporved FuG III Ua (with a rotating transformer to power the transmitter instead of a wind generator in the earlier models and the improved S IIIa version). Both the FuG III and the FuG X are equipped with a fixed and a trailing antenna, so in that respect there is little difference. Only the later H versions were equipped with the FuG X.

I have read the story that the formations destined to bomb Rotterdam could not be recalled because they had reeled in their trailing antenna's during the bombing run. I find this hard to believe because the FuG III or FuG 10 receiver would have had ample sensitivity with the fixed antenna, although the range of their transmitters would have been reduced significantly.

It is more likely that the command transmitter situated in Germany was too weak and the aircraft were operating on the limit of the range. The Luftwaffe did however have vehicle based command transmitters that they could have placed considerably closer to the operational area. Frankly I do not think the Luftwaffe planned for the raid to be recalled, if they had done so they could have make the communications work reliably. The stories about technical failures sound a lot like making up excuses after the event....

regards,

Funksammler

[Gran Sasso]

Frankly I do not think the Luftwaffe planned for the raid to be recalled, if they had done so they could have make the communications work reliably. The stories about technical failures sound a lot like making up excuses after the event....

Thanks for your opinion - and exactly what you state above should be finally laied to rest, by proofes. So there will no longer be those speculations "it was planned, they would not stopped anyway", etc.

The exibition (cooperation of durch and german museums and collectors) would be based on facts only.

[Funksammler]

Well, to distinguish fact from fiction, you will need at least a basic understanding of the radio equipment available to the Luftwaffe at the time.

I have discussed the FuG III versus FuG X a while back on another forum: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=196203

You can also learn same basic facts about the FuG IIIa_U here: http://www.cdvandt.org/Tel%20data%20Stat%20274iF.pdf

Range estimates for the equipment vary, based on various sources I have studied, 300 Km should be considered conservative. The reception range can be expected to at least that even with the use of the shorter fixed antenna, especially since higher powered ground based transmitters were available to the Luftwaffe.

Given that Rotterdam lies less than 120 km from the German border and significantly closer to the then established front line, there is little doubt in my mind that bombers were well into radio range, whatever the antenna configuration used at that moment.

And yes, there are ways in which the radio communication could have failed but the point is that this could have been foreseen and planned for. The luftwaffe even had He-111 command planes equipped with two FuG III sets so that simultanious communication on shortwave and longwave could be maintained. So the Luftwaffe had ample means and capabilities to guarantee communications had they chosen to do so. Yet they chose to plan their raid without a fail-safe method of recalling their aircraft in case their ultimatum to the Dutch was accepted (surely an outcome that could have been anticipated).

As they say, failing to plan is planning to fail.

regards,

Funksammler

[Gran Sasso]

Thanks again - will forward this to the curators.

[Chrille]

He 111

As far as i know FuG 10 was used in P2 on onwards , erlier versions from p1 and erlier had FuG 3.

best Chris

[Funksammler]

Sources are not very consistent, for example this one: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Heinkel_He_111 quotes that the FuG X was used from the P 4 forward, I have seen others stating from the H series forward.

Gardermoen's P1 is fitted with a FuG X, proving that early P's were re-fitted at some point. The timing of the changeover is unclear. It is unknown if the versions used for the Rotterdam bombing were already re-fitted or were still using FuG IIIa-U. I remember seeing the story about the trailing antenna being to blame for the communication failure in relation to the FuG III.

Perhaps it is actually irrelevant to the story about the trailing antenna, as both the FuG X and FuG III would not be able to receive on longwave while the fixed antenna was in use for shortwave (air to air) communications.

regards,

Funksammler

[Funksammler]

Further to my comment that the Luftwaffe posessed He-111 "Führungsflugzeuge" fitted with a twin FuG III, later version "Führungsflugzeuge" were fitted with a twin Fug X (or at least the short wave section of the FuG X). A nice picture of such a setup can be found in Trenkle's "Bordfunkgeräte - Von Funkensender zum Bordradar". Trenkle estimates that this setup was available in 1939/40, so this fits the Rotterdam timeframe.

These aircraft were specifically equipped so that the formation leader could communicate with the other aircraft in the formation on shortwave (using the extra FuG X) while maintaining contact with ground command on Longwave. The "extra" Fug X had it's own separate antenna to ensure simultatious operation of both sets.

Even Trenkle expresses his wonder over how communication could have been lost during the Rotterdam raid if such "Führungsflugzeuge" were deployed, so this seems to be the key question that needs to be answered. Given that the Rotterdam raid was a major one involving some 100 aircraft, it seems hard to believe that the Luftwaffe would not have done so...

regards,

Funksammler