Prelude to Monte Cassino

[SMP]

I am sure Clark thought he was doing the right thing, but here in the UK there are many Italian vets who hate him with a passion. I can only guess how the Texans feel about him.

[John Hodgin]

I am sure Clark thought he was doing the right thing, but here in the UK there are many Italian vets who hate him with a passion. I can only guess how the Texans feel about him.

Steve, a lot more was involved than "doing the right thing." Clark had great pressure placed on him to immediately attack along the Cassino front in order to help detract German reserve units from attacking at the Anzio beachhead.

My father, who was stationed in Naples during this time, didn't think much of Clark either

[SMP]

Steve, a lot more was involved than "doing the right thing." Clark had great pressure placed on him to immediately attack along the Cassino front in order to help detract German reserve units from attacking at the Anzio beachhead.

My father, who was stationed in Naples during this time, didn't think much of Clark either

I am sure, John.

There was no pressure on him to liberate Rome when he did. That was pure self-promotion. The agony of fighting in Italy was made worse by him allowing the Germans to escape and regroup following the slaughter at Cassino.

Sorry to divert this thread.

Regards,
Steve

[John Hodgin]

I am sure, John.

There was no pressure on him to liberate Rome when he did. That was pure self-promotion. The agony of fighting in Italy was made worse him allowing the Germans to escape and regroup following the slaughter at Cassino.

Sorry to divert this thread.

Regards,
Steve

Actually, there was constant pressure, from Churchill, to carry the fight forward in Italy and thus demonstrate to the Russians that the Allies were doing "their part" in the war.

[Homer Hodge]

Let me add a few comments about Mark Clark in general and the Rapido River crossing in particular. Clark was vain and inexperienced. Like many U.S. generals, Clark thought the Brits were soft and overcautious. By contrast, the Brits thought the U.S. commanders drove their troops too hard and relied too much on costly frontal assaults. Clark’s boss, Alexander, added to the problem by his unwillingness to issue direct orders or assert his authority to subordinates. This allowed Clark to get away with ignoring Alexander’s objectives and intent. Clark’s irrational dislike of his British subordinate, Richard McCreery, commander of Tenth Corps, and lack of faith in the fighting power of the Brits, caused him to fail to exploit Tenth Corps’ crossing of the lower Garigliano on the 5th Army left flank on 17 January and rely instead on a US 2d Corps crossing of the Rapido, spearheaded by the 36th “T-patchers.” Although McCreery’s attack came in a sector where Senger und Etterlin least expected it and had penetrated a position that he could not easily reinforce, Clark failed to reinforce his success, allowing Kesselring to move and resubordinate the 29th and 90th PzrGren Divs to 14th Pzr Corps. Instead, he sent the 36th on mission impossible across the Rapido. One can rationalize that a Rapido crossing provided a more direct way up the Liri Valley toward Rome vice the narrow coastal corridor facing Tenth Corps; however, reinforcement of Tenth Corps once across would have gotten 5th Army in position to penetrate the Gustav line. Clark’s irrational fear that the Brits were trying to deny him the opportunity to liberate Rome also added to his unwillingness to let McCreery’s Tenth Corps become the main effort.

[Marco]

FIRST BATTLE FOR CASSINO
The first assault was made on January 17. Near the coast, British X Corps (56th and 5th Divisions) forced a crossing of the Garigliano (followed some two days later by British 46th Division on their right) causing General von Senger, commander of German XIV Panzer Corps and responsible for the Gustav defences on the south western half of the line, some serious concern as to the ability of the German 94th Infantry Division to hold the line. Responding to Senger's concerns, Kesselring ordered the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:City w:st="on"><ST1lace w:st="on">Rome</ST1lace></st1:City> area to provide reinforcement. There is some speculation as to what might have been if X Corps had had the reserves available to exploit their success and make a decisive breakthrough. The corps did not have the extra men, but there would certainly have been time to alter the overall battle plan and cancel or modify the central attack by U.S. II Corps to make men available to force the issue in the south before the German reinforcements were able to get into position. As it happened, 5th Army HQ failed to appreciate the frailty of the German position, and the plan was unchanged. The two divisions from Rome arrived by January 21 and stabilized the German position in the south. In one respect, however, the plan was working in that Kesselring's reserves had been drawn south. The three divisions of X Corps sustained 4,000 casualties during the period of the first battle.

below,a general map of the operations

[Marco]

British troops in Minturno, January 18, 1944

[Marco]

Construction of a military bridge on Garigliano, near the old bridge of 1800

[Marco]

Another bridge on Garigliano...

[Homer Hodge]

Thanks, Marco. Your map and quote helps to better explain what I was trying to say. Clark's refusal to change the plan to exploit Tenth Corps' crossing was based on his own irrational distrust of the British and, as Steve, said his desire to personally capture Rome and prevent the British from doing so. In fact, the British Eighth Army was primarily focused on defeating the German army rather than capturing Rome.

[Homer Hodge]

As other members have said, Marco, you really need to put all this "then and now" photos into a book for publication! They are superb!

[Marco]

THE BLOODY RIVER
The two-pronged 36th Division assault aimed at the capture of San Angelo, across the Rapido, and the establishment of a bridgehead. The attack was carefully prepared in detail and preceded by reconnaissance patrolling, the spotting of bridging equipment, the clearing of lanes through known minefields to the crossing site, and a plan of strong artillery support.
But the physical odds were too great. This was apparent before the attack to all experienced soldiers.
Thirty minutes before 2000 hours of January 20, fourteen battalions of artillery signaled the opening preparation. But this did not hinder the enemy from sensing the attack and returning the fire in volume. Dense fog blacked out the night completely. As both 141st and 143rd infantrymen approached the crossing sites, the story was the same: Incoming artillery and mortar fire, men moving over reportedly cleared lanes stumbling upon German anti-personnel mines, many casualties, shell and mine fragments ripping and rendering useless the rubber boats being carried for the crossing, guides losing their way or taking the wrong turn in the pitch black, precious time consumed in repeated reorganization. In one company alone, the company commander was killed, the second-in-command wounded, and thirty men were casualties before reaching the river.
At the water's edge German machine guns and small arms close to the shore spattered into first elements attempting to cross. Boats overturned in the swift waters or were punctured when the mortars fell. A brigadier-general rooted out an attached bridge-building party from foxholes one and one-half miles from the crossing site where they belonged.
Just prior to daylight small forces of both regiments got across on makeshift bridges. The Ist Battalion of the 143rd found itself pocketed in interlocking German machine gun fire with the river to their backs. Then enemy tanks opened fire from San Angelo. To escape being wiped out completely, the battalion commander ordered his men back.
The bulk of A and B companies, 141st, dug in and stayed on the west bank throughout daylight of the 21st. But no communication could be had with them and no follow-up could occur over the exposed river site during the day.
The Corps commander ordered the attack for the Rapido bridgehead to be resumed by a daylight assault. There would be no surprise, now. Germans, too, were bringing up reinforcements, and calling down continuous fires upon the river areas.
First set for 1400, the late arrival of more boats delayed the time until 1600. The 143rd Infantry, 1st and 3rd Battalions, again jumped off at that time. Though the river was smoked heavily for the attack, the Germans again countered with strong defensive fires. Both battalions, with the exception of Company C, were over by 1830. Casualties were heavy. The 2nd Battalion moved across after midnight and reached the flank of the 3rd Battalion about <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:metricconverter w:st="on" ProductID="500 yards">500 yards</st1:metricconverter> inland after daylight. Trapped in grazing German machine gun fire, a network of wired defensive positions, and under heavy concentrations of mortar and screaming meemies, the men were unable to make any headway. The 3rd Battalion reported running out of ammunition at 0900. Resupply from dumps along the river, established during the night, was made despite the blanket of enemy fire. The 1st Battalion, after the loss of its battalion commander and each rifle company leader, became badly disorganized. The gallantry of the 2nd and 3rd Battalion attempts to break through the German line was spent vainly. The attack was crippled and then driven back.
The second 141st Infantry attack had been delayed until after dark of the 21st. The extreme difficulties encountered the night before were identically repeated, but by daylight the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were over. Every possible effort to reorganize and continue the attack was made under the deadly curtain of German fire. Use of the river crossing was denied soon after daylight and gradually all foot bridges were destroyed. Supply and evacuation were impossible. Still, the men hung on.
Then at 1700 the Germans launched a heavy counterblow, striking our forces simultaneously on three sides. Although ammunition supplies were already low - and there had been no resupply - the first German attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Yet again, in half an hour, the attack was resumed. American fire, in constantly diminishing volume, was heard three hours longer. By then it was entirely German. But German machine pistols continued to speak against American resistance until midnight.
About fifty haggard 141st Infantrymen struggled back and swam the cold Rapido that evening.

Men of the 36th division on rubber boats. Many of these boats were pierced by bullets and shrapnel and sank with all people.

[Marco]

"Texans" under german fire...

[Marco]

German Pz.Grenadieren open the fire against american troops in the Rapido area. This frame is taken from a "Deutsche Wochenschau" documentary.

[Marco]

German patrol searching Americans survivors on the opposite bank of the river...