Originally posted by mufasa
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Thanks Mike and Mufasa..I hope to make again better in the future
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Indeed Marco! We cannot thank you enough for this wonderful photo presentation!
Above and beyond Castle Hill was another key objective, it was assigned to elements of the Gurkha Division to capture this key position. Anyone know what this objective was and why it was so important?
Regards,
JohnEsse Quam VideriComment
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Nobody answer? Ok John, if you give me permission, I will reply.Originally posted by John Hodgin View Post
Company C of the First Battalion of the 9th Gurkhas reaches Hangman Hill (Hill 435) but the rest of the battalion can not follow it until the next night. Between 17 and 18, two companies of the Fourth Battalion of the
6th rifleman, serving as a supply column, on reaching Gurkhas on Hangman Hill, but then can not back down, since the side of the mountains are swept by the fire of rifles, machine guns and mortars of German paratroopers who, with the reconquest of Hill 236 are wedged between the Gurkhas on Hangman Hill and Essex on the Castle Hill, from where they dominate completely.Comment
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Hangman Hill from Gurkhas pointof view ...Comment
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Hangman Hill from german point of view...Comment
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The cable-car tower on top of Hangman Hill...this give the name to the hill.Comment
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This photo was taken by S. Bahr, a german paratrooper that was in Cassino city. The parachute are launched by Allied airplanes and try to give ammunition and food to the Gurkhas stopped on Hangman Hill
(sorry for my not perfect english, I hope all understand)Comment
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Top of Hangman Hill today...Comment
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The area between Hangman Hill and Abbey...completely without of any cover..this is the space that GURKHAS were to go to attack the Monastery..Comment
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And I think that would have been annihilated, because the Germans dominated the battlefield..Comment
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Top of Hangman Hill...Comment
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And, last...a view from Hangman Hill..Comment
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during my army time. 50year party in cassino.
knight cross winner herbert fries. he shot 15 tanks in cassino town whit a panter gun.Comment
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GUSTAV LINE AREA, APRIL 1944
To break down the German resistance to <ST1
<?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:City w:st="on">Cassino </st1:City></ST1and Montecassino Allied needed troops who had "something more", such as to make deal with the possibility of successful street-wise German paratroopers.<O</O
Used by soldiers as strong reasons to support a battle that heralded very bloody.
Flipping the units employed now by VIII Army, the eyes jumped on only one that meets these requirements.
Towards the second half of March, the British Army commander of VIII Army, Oliver Leese, met General Wladislaw Anders, commander of the II Polish Army Corps, suggested that the next attack on the fortress of Monte Cassino were taken in by his men.
General Anders was a very ambitious and quite expected that the task was entrusted to a major campaign in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><ST1Italy</ST1</st1:country-region>, to break even inactivity for some time that afflicted his men. Among other things, this was taken by the Russians a pretext to accuse him of not wanting to fight the Germans (Stalin did not like that troops of one nation on its own fight for geopolitical hegemony of Western powers).<O</O
The chronicles of the interview mentioning that Anders was granted ten minutes to decide whether to accept the assignment and how many sources have claimed that the Polish general accepted without taking into account the price that his men would pay for Montecassino, we prefer still think that, in those ten minutes, his mind was filled with a violent motion of indecision.
After the answer was “YES”, Leese assured that the II Polish Army Corps would have the freedom in the action necessary to carry out the task, both at HQ level, both as to its conduct timely on the battlefield.
When, after the rendez-vous with Leese, Anders announced to his masters, the official decision to accept the "proposal" to attack British Montecassino, these proved not very enthusiastic. The grounds of their concerns were not related to alleged cowardice, but the awareness that the Polish Corps had suffered losses "oppressive" (words of General Kazimierz Sonskowski), estimated between 4000 and 5000 men (of which 2000 - 2700 deaths).
But now the decision had been taken and there was more to pull back, we could only prepare a valid and capable of success, which resulted after having discarded several options, all carefully evaluated.
In practice, the 3rd Infantry Division "Karpazia" was to attack the zone of Hill 593 and share Masseria Albaneta with the support of the 2nd Tank Brigade and the 5th Infantry Division "Kresowa" was employed instead of Hill 575 and share of Colle S. Angelo, then dropped Piedimonte San Germano on the other side.
On 15 April, over 50,000 men of the II Polish Army Corps was put in motion to reach positions from which their attack would be developed.
The 3rd Division began to move from Carpinone-Frosolone-Sessano, while the 5th Division moved from the area of Prata Sannita-Ailano-Capriati al Volturno.
VIII The British Army began to provide everything for which the Poles could need: the whole valley of the Rapido was covered with camouflage smoke curtain practically perennial; a 1:2000 scale model was specifically designed and made available to the officers State Major Anders to study the movements of attack; 18,000 smoke candles were positioned in front of the lines of approach to the first lines and more than 1,250 mules came from behind to be used for carrying ammunition and food supplies.<O</O
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