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**Panzer Rob** · 06-09-2010, 10:58 PM

Jump to June 1944. During the third or fourth day of the Allied invasion, Gayda was wounded in a bombing raid (or fighter attack) and on 10.June was admitted to Kriegs-Lazarett-Abteilung (mot.) 613 with code 31d for wounds received during a aerial attack. His injuries must have been rather severe as he was admitted directly into the surgery wing of the Krankenabteilung.

I’ve found record of at least two USAAF bombing runs on the Calais area around these dates, taken from:
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil...hron/44jun.htm

06/08/44

Ninth AF

Around 400 MBs attack rail and road bridges and junctions, rail sidings, M/Ys, town areas, fuel storage tanks, ammunition dumps, troop concentration and strong points in the Calais area. Around 1,300 ftrs provide spt to MBs and high cover over assault area, and bomb and strafe bridges, M/Ys, gun batteries, rail facilities, vehicles, towns, and troop concentrations.

and

06/10/44

Eighth AF

Bad weather restricts operations to NW France. 873 HBs are airborne but over 200 abort due to cloud conditions. 589 including 31 Pathfinders, attack 8 A/Fs in France and 9 coastal installations in Pas de Calais area. One B-24 is downed by AA at Evreux. VIII FC, flying over 1,600 sorties, supports HB missions and launches attacks against about 80 targets, including railroad facilities, convoys, tank column, trucks, radar station, tunnels, gun emplacement, supply dump, and a power plant. About 225 vehicles, including train engines and cars, are destroyed, along with 16 enemy aircraft. 25 fighters are lost.

It’s impossible to say for sure exactly which date Gayda was wounded on, but given the rather short amount of time it would have taken to transport him to hospital despite all the confusion and activity in the area, it is quite possible that he could have received his wounds during one of these two attacks, more than likely the second, on the 10th of June, the same date entered on page 18 of his Soldbuch when he was admitted to Kriegs-Lazarett-Abteilung (mot.) 613. His black wound badge entry is dated 30.June 1944 (the date it was awarded and/or entered into his SB) so that doesn’t tell us anything about the actual date he was wounded.

more to follow........

**Panzer Rob** · 06-09-2010, 11:01 PM

After a little over a month of recovery time, Gayda was released from hospital and by late July had rejoined his unit with whom he remained until it’s surrender on 01.October 1944 to the First Canadian Army which had been tasked with clearing the coastal belt and the Ports of the Pas-de-Calais in Operation "Undergo":

Here is a link to a excellent and very detailed writeup on the taking of Calais:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/C...ictory-14.html

Calais was next. The port was smaller than Boulogne's and therefore less important in logistical potential. But the opinion of the Naval Liaison Officer at Army Headquarters (Commander R. M. Prior) was that if Boulogne was to be used with an acceptable degree of risk "the seven heavy Calais batteries must be captured as well as those at Gris Nez"; Captain A. F. Pugsley, R.N., who now took command of the offshore naval units operating in the area of First Canadian Army, concurred, and so apparently did Admiral Ramsay. The situation was complicated by the preparations then being made to carry out First Canadian Army's great task of opening the Scheldt Estuary. On 15 September, when giving preliminary consideration to that task, General Crerar had written to Field-Marshal Montgomery:

"If, subsequent to the capture of Boulogne, Simonds finds it possible quickly to exploit that success and to capture Calais, this will be done by 2 Cdn Corps. If, on the other hand, the Garrison of Calais shows indications of resisting anything but a heavy and prepared assault, then I shall move 1 Brit Corps, less 51 (H) Division to that area and Crocker will relieve Simonds of the responsibility for the capture of Calais and the containing of Dunkirk."

It was soon apparent that Calais could not be captured without a deliberate assault. However, the urgency of the forthcoming Scheldt operations dictated a change in General Crerar's arrangements; on the 19th the Army Commander directed the 1st Corps to take over the Antwerp sector while General Simonds prepared to deal with Calais and the batteries on Cape Gris Nez.

General Spry's 3rd Canadian Division, already on the ground, naturally received these latter tasks, and its staff produced their first plan for the operation ("UNDERGO") the day before the attack began at Boulogne. It was then thought, as we have noted, that "UNDERGO" might begin as early as 19 September; but the protracted fighting at Boulogne led to successive postponements, since the special armour, the artillery and even the infantry needed for Calais were engaged there. Furthermore, there was a possibility that the naval requirements at Boulogne, already mentioned, might be satisfied if the army captured the Cape Gris Nez guns and merely contained Calais. As late as 23 September, the Army Commander believed that a decision to contain might have to be made after the operation began. The argument in favour of merely masking the place was, of course, based on the urgent need to expedite the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary.

While the remainder of the 3rd Division had been preparing for the siege of. Boulogne, the 7th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. G. Spragge) and the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment invested Calais and Cape Gris Nez. Initially, the task was boldly performed by the reconnaissance regiment, which reached the Calais area on 5 September and proceeded to isolate the fortress, occupying a front of more than 20 miles to do so. On the 10th The Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.) of the 2nd Division took over the southeastern perimeter from Oye to Ardres. Meanwhile, the 7th Brigade, as already described, occupied high ground about seven miles south-west of Calais on 6 September, cutting off Boulogne from Calais and threatening the Gris Nez batteries. During the next ten days these troops gradually advanced their positions and partially cleared Cape Gris Nez.

On the night of 16-17 September the 7th Brigade, less one battalion (for the 1st Canadian Scottish were in divisional reserve for the Boulogne operation) made an attempt to capture the three heavily fortified batteries on the Cape. The 6th Armoured Regiment, the 12th Field Regiment R.C.A. and a battery of the 3rd Medium Regiment R.C.A. were in support. The result was merely to demonstrate that heavier support was necessary to take these positions. The attack made no impression, and an attempt by The Royal Winnipeg Rifles to bluff the commander of the Haringzelles battery into surrender by a threat to "blow him off the face of the earth" made no more. On the 18th the task of containing Cape Gris Nez was handed over to the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment, while the 7th Brigade prepared for its share in the attack on Calais.

The defences of Calais were of some strength but, unlike those of Boulogne, they did not depend on a fringe of outlying hills. Canals surrounded the landward side of the city--itself described as "a series of islands culminating in the CITADEL, the heart of the old city"--with marshy ground and inundated areas forming further barriers to penetration from the south and east. To one observer the flooded ground looked like "a vast lake". A firm ridge, almost like a causeway, carried the road and railway east to Gravelines; but this ridge had been fortified and could be easily defended by a resolute enemy.

The city retained much of its old fortifications, including a bastioned wall and a wet ditch covering most of the built-up area. Here again, however, the modern defences developed during more than four years of German occupation faced mainly seaward. According to Lt.-Col. Ludwig Schroeder, commandant of the garrison, no attempt had been made to deal with the problems of landward defence until about mid-August 1944. Calais had only recently been designated by Hitler as the equivalent of one of his "fortresses". Nevertheless, the enemy's works in the area were impressive. At and about Noires Mottes, some five miles south-west of Calais, a battery of three 406-mm. (15.8-inch) guns, a lesser cross-Channel battery and a system of concrete pillboxes blocked the coastal route to the city. Eastward from Noires Mottes, along the Belle Vue ridge, machine-gun positions and concrete shelters protected railway guns. Between these positions and the inundated area south of Calais the Germans had constructed a formidable strongpoint on higher ground north of Vieux Coquelles. Here a wide variety of weapons, amply protected by wire and mines, lay astride the main road from Boulogne to Calais, The eastern and south-eastern approaches were similarly defended by minefields and infantry positions supported by field, anti-aircraft and antitank artillery. Finally, in the Les Baraques area on the north-western outskirts of the port, coastal installations were shielded by still more minefields and an anti-tank ditch connecting the inundated areas to the sea.

Our Intelligence originally estimated the strength of the garrison as between 4450 and 5550, later raising the figures to "six to eight thousand". The actual total was evidently somewhat over 7500. These troops were a "mixed bag" of very indifferent quality--Schroeder described them, somewhat unkindly, as "mere rubbish"--and only 2500 were available as infantry. Nearly two-thirds of the remainder were needed to man the coastal guns and port installations. The garrison's morale, following the reduction of Le Havre and Boulogne, was under standably low. A report based on later interrogation of prisoners noted that Army personnel were old, ill, and lacked both the will to fight and to resist interrogation; naval personnel were old and were not adjusted to land warfare; only the air force A.A. gunners showed any sign of good morale-and were also the only youthful element of the whole garrison.

25 September-1 October 1944

The plan for the capture of Calais followed the familiar pattern of preliminary bombardment by heavy bombers and artillery, followed by a heavily-supported infantry assault. At Versailles on 15 September General Simonds had obtained R.A.F. approval for the use of heavy bombers against Calais as well as Boulogne. Subsequently, Bomber Command agreed to attack five main areas, including the Sangatte-Belle Vue ridge positions, the Vieux Coquelles area and coastal fortifications as well as the north-western defences of the port proper, and the citadel. The artillery bombardment was to be fired by the same units employed against Boulogne, including the field regiments of the 51st Division. Detailed preparations were made for counter-battery and counter-flak programmes in the preliminary phase; these were to be supplemented, when the ground assault went in, by heavy concentrations on local points of resistance. A feature of the operation was the use of a smoke-screen, 3000 yards long, to hide a number of artillery units from observation from the German positions on Cape Gris Nez.

The 3rd Division had successfully penetrated the outer western defenses. On the morning of 26 September Bomber Command again attacked, 191 aircraft going for Calais. The 7th Brigade units clawed their way forward during the day and by the end of it were within striking distance of the inner line of fortifications.142 This ran from Fort Lapin and the strongly-held area of Les Baraques, on the coast, south through Fort Nieulay to the extensive inundated area guarding the western and south-western approaches to the city. The defenses in the coastal sector were particularly formidable: at Fort Lapin there was a heavy battery protected by anti-tank ditches and minefields, and both it and the nearby Bastion 11 were reported to be equipped with flame-throwers. The 8th Brigade, having completed its initial task, prepared to relieve the Camerons on the east side of the city while the 7th kept up the pressure from the west.

On 27 September the forward troops withdrew slightly, enabling Bomber Command to deliver another smashing attack; 342 Lancasters dropped 1718 tons. Thereafter the 7th Brigade made steady progress. The Scottish had a hard fight before they subdued Fort Lapin; but with the help of tanks, Crocodiles and a covering smoke-screen they were able to capture the fort on the evening of the same day. Assisted by sappers of the 6th Field Company they immediately pressed forward, seeking crossings over the old water defenses at the western edge of the port. During the night the battalion managed to get "D" Company and two platoons of "B" across south of Bastion 11. Then the Germans in the bastion and the citadel "opened up in earnest" and "It was suicide to put a head above ground." The troops across the water could neither be reinforced nor withdrawn; they remained cut off with no food or ammunition reaching them for 48 hours. As the Canadian Scottish were advancing during the morning they sent a party to investigate the now quiescent Noires Mottes battery, and apparently there was a surrender to them as well as to the North Shore Regiment.

Inland, on the right flank of the Scottish, the Winnipegs attacked Fort Nieulay, whose high walls "dominate the flat country to the south, the highway [to Boulogne], and the approaches to the west". Shell-proof pillboxes had been built into the walls of the fort, which was surrounded by a wide ditch. At first the defenses resisted strenuously; but, in the graphic language of the Winnipegs' account, "the attack was pushed near enough to the Fort to enable flamethrowers to be used and after warming the enemy up a little the white flag was seen hoisted and hundreds of Germans poured out through the open doors with hands up". Meanwhile, on the brigade's right (southern) flank, the Reginas were crossing the flooded area to reach the factories in the southern outskirts of Calais.

By 28 September Lt.-Col. Schroeder's situation was desperate. His troops' morale was low and desertions were numerous. Moreover, he was embarrassed by a large civilian population (some 20,000) which had refused to leave the city before operations began. And on the morning of the 28th Bomber Command attacked again, this time with 194 aircraft.148 That afternoon a Civil Affairs officer at Ardres heard that the German commander was "about ready to consider surrendering". A message was sent to him on behalf of General Spry offering to meet him at Le Pont sans Pareil, north of Ardres, at 10 a.m. the next morning. The Germans accepted and in the evening the order went out to the Canadian units, "No further firing except on active enemy." The meeting duly took place, but Schroeder did not come. His representatives made the surprising suggestion that Calais be declared an "open city". This Spry quickly refused since, as a 3rd Division diarist wrote, "the Boche were in the town and defending same". The Germans then asked for a 48-hour extension of the truce to permit of the evacuation of the civilian population. Spry granted 24 hours, until noon on 30 September. Later in the day the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, 2nd Canadian Corps (Colonel J. J. Hurley) attended a conference in Calais at which Schroeder was present. He gained the impression that the Germans would surrender "after a sufficient show of resistance has been made to make their surrender appear an honourable one"

During the truce period, while the unfortunate people of Calais streamed out of the city by the eastern roads, to be received and looked after by our Civil Affairs staff, General Spry issued his orders for the final assault. Two hours after the expiration of the truce, the Queen's Own Rifles and the Camerons were to make a well-supported diversionary attack from the east, while the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment maintained strong fighting patrols on the city's southern perimeter. Then in the second phase the 7th Brigade would make the main effort from the west, opening the road from Coquelles and destroying or capturing the garrison.

But the uneasy interlude had completed the demoralization of the garrison. When fighting began again at noon on the 30th the German opposition crumbled rapidly. Anticipating an early surrender, the Canadians cancelled a further visitation by heavy bombers; but Typhoons and Spitfires of No. 84 Group were busily employed and the artillery gave effective support. At one p.m. the Camerons on the eastern side of the city reported, "Enemy pouring out." Asked whether this was a general surrender, they replied, "Don't know, but they are sure coming out." In the western sector the Canadian Scottish now resumed their advance. Aided by Crocodiles they soon broke into Bastion 11 and the citadel and began clearing the northern section of the city proper. "Very little active resistance was encountered as the garrison simply waited to be taken prisoner." The situation was much the same elsewhere on the 7th Brigade's front which, by nightfall, extended deep into the city.

At 7:00 p.m. Schroeder surrendered to the Camerons' commanding officer, Lt.-Col. P. C. Klaehn. "The ceremony was 'staged' as impressively as possible over a desk in a French farmhouse." Scattered fighting continued through the night, but by nine o'clock on the morning of 1 October all resistance had ceased in Calais. The total number of prisoners was about 7500.* The attackers' losses had been surprisingly light. Overall, they were "under 300". The 7th Brigade had borne the brunt; its three battalions had had 190 casualties, the heaviest weight falling on The Royal Winnipeg Rifles and The Regina Rifle Regiment. The 8th Brigade units had only 29 casualties between them.

**Panzer Rob** · 06-09-2010, 11:05 PM

Here is a map from http://www.ibiblio.org/ that illustrates the Canadian combat actions (listed above) of the capture of the Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 244 Batteries in Calais:

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