York's famous Machinegun finds a home

[tmca05]

Letters of Lt. Samuel Jameson Jr.

Brad,

Do you know who Lt. Samuel Young Jameson Jr. 328th, Co. G was? Or maybe what position he held in "G" Company.

The reason I ask is because I found a stack of letters last year in Nashville, TN (flea market find from an estate sale) of which Lt. Jameson wrote home to his sister and mother. They start from his training and run until after the war in 1919 and follow the same trail as Sgt. York did, since it’s the same company. He was in York’s unit, but so far I do not see York’s name mentioned in any of them. Lt. Jameson was wounded just days prior to York’s battle and so he was pulled out of action and I’m assuming he missed York’s big event. He did return to the unit later, so his wound could not have been too bad. He was from Georgia and some of his remarks are quit interesting for the times, especially when he ran across two black officers who were senior in rank to him in New York City, just prior to them shipping out overseas.

It’s a great grouping of his personal letters of which he wrote home and includes a few maps with positions indicated. I currently have loaned them to Dr. McCoy to study, but you are welcome to review any when they are returned to me. I’d say there are 30-40 pages in all, maybe even more.

[Brad Posey]

Thanks a lot for that information. This is a great way to illustrate the problems that I am encountering in sorting out what the A.E.F. documented concerning this battle.

I searched through all of the documents pertaing to the 82nd Division, 164th Infantry Brigade, 328th Infantry, 2nd Battalion 328th Infantry and all of the documents of the subordinate companies to the 328th Infantry and only found two references of LT Jameson.

The first is found on page 160 of “The History of the Three-Hundred-and-Twenty-eighth Infantry A.E.F.” under the roster of “men serving with A Company since coming to France” and it says:

"Samuel Y. Jameson, Atlanta, Ga.

Commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant 1st Officers' Training Camp August 15. 1917. Assigned to Regiment about the 1st of January. 1918. Served as Gas Officer of the 328th Infantry during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Severely wounded in action with the enemy about the 10th of October. 1918, at Chatel Chehery, France. Assigned to Company A in the spring of 1919."

The second is found on page 307 in the same book under the roster of members of G Company and it says:

"Samuel Y. Jameson, Atlanta, Ga.

Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on August 15, 1917. Assigned to Company in April, 1918. Special duty as Bath officer from June, 1918, to July, 1918. Transferred August, 1918, to Battalion Headquarters as Gas Officer."

Both of these entries contradict each other. LT Jameson evidently served as a Gas Officer, but was it after August 1918 or prior to that during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive as indicated in these two contradicting summaries of his service? In addition, did he serve as Gas Officer of A Company or the battalion headquarters – also indicated in these two different summaries?

The A Company roster says at he was severely wounded on 10 October 1918 at Chatel Chéhéry, yet you say the letters indicate he was wounded and out of action prior to 8 October, 1918.

Both of these summaries were found in the same book, which tells me they did not cross reference anything. Anyone familiar with the AEF knows that this was America’s largest overseas deployment prior to 1944. The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was an extremely bloody ordeal and I can only imagine the difficulties in keeping unit rosters up to date. It is evident in cases like LT Jameson.

These “discrepancies” are nothing new to research like this. The truth lies somewhere in the middle and that is what I am trying to get at. I would love to see what you have pertaining to LT Jameson, if you want to share them with me. Every little scrap of evidence helps bring a little more light on this event and our understanding of it.

My final question about LT Jameson is; what is a “Bath Officer”?

If you would like a PDF of the scans of the book I mentioned here let me know or I can email these two pages to you that mention LT Jameson.


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[Brad Posey]

In January and February 1919 statements were taken by the US army from some of the survivors of the patrol. The first set of statements was taken by Major Buxton in January and the second in February by LT Burkhalter, the 2nd Battalion 328th Infantry Adjutant.

On 26 January 1919 Major Buxton took affidavits from LT Woods, Private Beardsley, Private Wills, Private Donohue and Private Saccina. It is not known if he took affidavits from any of the other survivors since none of these statements exist anywhere except in Skeyhill’s book. According to a letter written in 1929 from Buxton to Merrithew (aka Cutting) Buxton reminds Merrithew that Sergeant Major Stafferman who typed the statements that the men signed. The first paragraph of each statement is word for word the same indicating that they were, in fact, the words of someone else. The rest of each statement is evidently each individual’s own personal account of what happened, although it looks like it was written by the same person who wrote the first paragraph of every statement. More than likely the men told their story and Sergeant Major Stafferman took the dictations using his own words to summarize what the men said. Later the men had the statements read to them and signed them or marked with an “X” if they could not write. As I mentioned earlier, this was common practice in the days when illiteracy was very high among enlisted soldiers.

On 6 February LT Burkhalter took the statements of Private Donohue, Sok, Saccina and Konotski. They are identical, word for word, and there is not a scrap of difference between them. In Skeyhill’s book all of the men’s statements are not all present and Skeyhill says that Donohue, Sok and Saccina signed identical statements to Private Konotski’s statement, which is in the book.

On 21 February LT Burkhalter took the statements of Private Wills and Private Beardsley. Beardsley’s statement is found in the book, yet Wills statement is not. It says that he signed an identical statement to Beardsley’s.



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[Brad Posey]

Here is where things get really tricky; sorting out what each man said and comparing that to other statements the same men gave later on or after the war. In addition all of this must be compared to what York says in his war diary and his two 1919 statements. And finally a mass comparison of all of these statements to the historical record of the fight; the 82nd Division History, the Pattullo article and the various letters and accounts given by York’s former chain of command.

So, this is going to be a mammoth task and I will try to present it in a way that is (hopefully) easy to understand and follow.

Please bear with me…….. and be patient, this is going to take a while……


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[tmca05]

Ref: Lt. Jameson

Since I do not have the letters with me at the moment, I can not scan them and add anything until I get them back. Most of the letters are still in the original envelopes and have his unit info on them, particularly before and after the deployment when they were not so censored. They also have postal dates on them. I do recall him writing home about being wounded and I’m pretty sure it was before the 8th because I was disappointed to see that he was not in the battle with York. It is possible that I am miss-reading his dates on the letters. I’ll know when I get them back and can scan them for you.

[tmca05]

Bath Officer ?

I have no clue what a Bath officer is, but in the letter he did mention that after the war while still in France, he was assigned as a unit commissary or snack bar officer and he then delegated that job to a young enlisted solider who was Jewish and in turn, turned it into a money making adventure. Those are not the exacpt words, but that is the jist of it as I recall.

[Don D.]

I hope this story isn't over. This has been the best thread on WAF in years.

[Brad Posey]

The story is far from over and I have not forgotten about it.

I just spent the last 4 days in the Argonne working on another project and the week before getting prepared for it so I was not able to continue with the examination of the York diary.

As soon as I get everything recovered from this last trip then I will be able to start where I left off. I really appreciate the interest!


Brad

[Brad Posey]

Where I left off I was discussing the 1919 statements found in Skeyhill’s book. There are many discrepancies between the various statements taken in January 191 and those taken in February 1919 when the CMOH investigation was taking place.

Of all of the statements, excepting York’s, Private Beardsley gives the more detailed account in both his January and February statements. Te only problem with the February statement is that it is word for word the same as the other men who submitted February statements. What is important is the differences between his January and February statement.

BEARDSLEY:

26 January 1919 Statement
In January Beardsley says that when the German opened fire from the hillside he took cover behind a tree 15 paces to the rear of York and that Dymowski and Wareing were on either side of him, both men were killed. He says that after the machinegun fire stopped he returned to where the Germans were and fired his pistol two or three times. He says that he saw York in front of him fire his pistol repeatedly. He says he saw Germans fall down. He ends the statement in saying that the German prisoners were waving their hands as if to motion the Germans on the hill firing to go away. The firing stopped and York had the men line up the prisoners in columns of twos and he took his place at the rear of the column.

6 February 1919 Statement
In February Beardsley recounts the same event this way: He says that when the Germans on the hillside began to fire the patrol was scattered in the brush. He says that “three or four of us fired two or three shots” at the Germans on the hillside. He says that York was closest to the enemy and “close up to the bottom of the hill”. He says: York “fired rapidly with rifle and pistol until he had shot down a German officer and many of his men.” Beardsley says that the officer was leading some riflemen with fixed bayonets down the hillside towards the Americans. Then, Beardsley says, the German battalion commander surrendered to York. As they marched the prisoners off other Germans on a nearby hill continued to fire at them and that they pick up a considerable number of prisoners on their way back to the American lines.

On 6 February 1919 Private George Wills signed an identical statement, word for word, to the one Beardsley signed on the same day. Both February 1919 statements are in sharp contrast to the statements made by both men a few weeks earlier.

On 26 January 1919 Wills says that when the machine fire started he was guarding some German prisoners and was very near Corporal Savage when he was hit. He also says he could see Donohue, Saccina, Beardsley and Muzzi. He says that he heard York shouting for the Germans on the hill to surrender, but he says he could no see York from his position. Then he says the Germans came down from the hill and they marched them away. In February he now agrees with Beardsley that a German officer led a group of riflemen with fixed bayonets and York shot the officer and many of his men, but neither mentions this a few weeks earlier in the 26 January statements.

I am surprised that a significant event like a bayonet charge was not mentioned in January by anyone except York in his first statement where he says that a German “lieutenant and 8 or 10 Germans armed with rifles rushed towards us.” York says one of the charging Germans threw a small grenade at him, but it missed. York says that he fired his pistol until the lieutenant was hit and that is when the machinegun firing stopped. The February 1919 statements are where the other men first mention the bayonet charge, but since each statement is identical and they do not mention this a few weeks earlier there is reason to be skeptical.

[Brad Posey]

In the 1941 Gary Cooper movie a German officer blows a whistle ordering the other Germans to surrender. In 1919 it seems that only Private Saccina recalls the German officer and his whistle in his statement. None of the other men mention in either the January or February statements. In Skeyhill’s book York mentions the German officer and his whistle on page 229 of the “War Diary”, but not in his two 1991 statements.

This may seem like splitting hairs, but it is important to note the various circumstances in which the German prisoners on the hillside surrendered. It seems that the accounts mentioning the bayonet charge agree that the surrender coincided with York shooting down the German officer leading this charge. The bayonet charge in itself is a grey area since it is only mentioned in the February accounts that are word for word identical and York’s own account.

In January Beardsley says that the German prisoners waved their hands at the Germans firing from the hillside as if they were trying to tell them to “go away”. This statement would somewhat agree with a German soldier’s statement found in the 1929 Reichsarchiv rebuttal. The soldier, who was a member of the 120th LDW and among the prisoners said:

“Shortly after we were captured, a company of sappers appeared on top of the hill, from which point they could see us and the American soldiers. The Sapper Company opened fire on us, but ceased firing when we called to them. Before long, the sappers, too, were driven towards us in the ravine; thus the number of prisoners became still greater.”

[Brad Posey]

As I have stated numerous times throughout this thread; this is no attempt on my part to downplay or discredit York and what he did that day.

The reality is that we will never know what really happened since there is no one living who participated in this fight and it is impossible for us to travel back in time and se it for ourselves. Using the documents that have survived it is possible to find some amount common ground and agreement in order to separate the facts concerning the fight and the CMOH award process.

The notable differences in the February statements from the earlier statements and the fact that these statements were taken at the time of the 1919 CMOH investigation tend to indicate to me several things.

Here is a list of what I think the investigation team concluded in order to award York with the CMOH:

1.) York was the only NCO not hit in the initial burst of fire from the hillside and he took command of the patrol.

2.) York was the only one who effectively delivered fire upon the enemy firing from the slope above and inflicting casualties on the patrol.

3.) York’s skills with pistol and rifle killed many of the enemy on the hillside.

4.) York shot down a German officer leading a bayonet charge against him and the patrol.

5.) With the exception of a shot or two, York was the only one engaged in this fight.

6.) York’s actions caused the German battalion commander to offer his surrender to York and in turn resulted in the surrender of the Germans firing from the hillside.

7.) York’s decision to lead the prisoners directly up the hill in the direction of the machineguns still firing into his unit’s left flank resulted in the capture of these machineguns and enabled the 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry attack to succeed.

8.) York was the only NCO not wounded and ultimately responsible for successfully leading the patrol and 132 German POWs safely back to the American line.

[Brad Posey]

From the list I made above what is fact, fiction or CMOH award process embellishment?

In my opinion what I listed above is in one way or another not too far off from the truth of what really happened. As Buxton and Danforth indicate in their 1928 letters, the “bayonet charge” was an isolated incident and the way I see it more than likely men from the 4th Company, 120th LDW and their commander LT Endriss responding to the sound of gunfire in their rear. They were more than likely running to the scene and not charging in a deliberate attack against York or anyone else. Of course they were responding to a crack shot from Tennessee and probably had no assessment of what was going on as they approached the scene. Otherwise at least one of them would have fired and the accounts that they did not fire for fear of hitting one of their own men does not make sense when there were a bunch of Bavarian Mineur on the hillside firing down, obviously not concerned about hitting one of their own.

Whistle vs. no whistle. I am not sure if this is really important. To the investigation team what would be important is demonstrating that York’s actions were the primary reason for the mass surrender of the Germans on the hillside and that he was in command of the patrol from this point on.

Whether the Germans already captured waved their hands for the ones on the hillside to stop firing, York shouting for the German on the hillside to surrender or York shooting down a bayonet charge and so impressing the German battalion commander to surrender is, again, splitting hairs.

[Brad Posey]

Here is York’s CMOH citation:

“Rank and organization: Corporal, U.S. Army, Company G, 328th Infantry, 82nd Division. Place and date: Near Châtel-Chéhéry, France, 8 October 1918. Entered service at: Pall Mall, Tenn. Born: 13 December 1887, Fentress County, Tenn. G.O. No.: 59, W.D., 1919. Citation: After his platoon had suffered heavy casualties and 3 other noncommissioned officers had become casualties, Corporal York assumed command. Fearlessly leading 7 men, he charged with great daring a machinegun nest which was pouring deadly and incessant fire upon his platoon. In this heroic feat the machinegun nest was taken, together with 4 officers and 128 men and several guns.”

I really do not see a lot of embellishment in this citation with the exception of the “charging” part. From all accounts York was pretty much stationary and “up close” to the bottom of the slope between the German POWs in the ravine behind him and the Germans on the hillside it his front firing at him and the rest of the patrol.

It is in the other accounts that we encounter 20- 25 machine guns and so on. I believe this machinegun count is embellished. From York’s citation it does not appear that Congress embellished very much when they awarded him the CMOH with the exception of the “charging”. The embellishment as far as the number of machineguns is concerned comes from York himself where he states in his “War Diary” that; “there must have been over twenty of them” and in the US Army report, also found in Skeyhill’s book, that says:

“Practically unassisted, he captured 132 Germans (three of whom were officers), took about 35 machine guns and killed no less than 25 of the enemy, later found by others on the scene of York’s extraordinary exploit.”

I do not doubt LT Cox’s statement where he said that between 20 – 25 dead Germans were found at the scene a few hours later when he passed through the area with his platoon, but the 20 – 35 machineguns? I highly doubt that part and think it is pure exaggeration for anyone who claimed this.

The archival and archaeological evidence suggests that there were several machineguns at the scene of this fight, but they fired very little if at all. The number of machinegun related artifacts agrees that several MG08 and/or 08/15s were present, but the expended German 7.92 cartridge concentrations found are more consistent with the fire from numerous riflemen located along this slope.

As I said earlier; it would be impossible for a machinegun located along this slope to fire controlled bursts in order to hit only the 9 Americans killed or wounded during the fight without inflicting severe casualties on their own comrades in the ravine below. Since the Americans did not see the Germans on the hillside until they opened fire and during the commotion that goes along with such an event it is easy to understand where they may have interpreted the fire to be coming from any number of machineguns when, in reality, it was aimed rifle fire from multiple riflemen of the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company that were responsible for the American casualties and who York was primarily battling.

[Brad Posey]

I think I am about finished presenting the archival documentation, archaeological evidence and the review of Skeyhill’s book and York’s War Diary. I also think I have covered just about everything written about this with the exception of the “Other Sixteen’s” position and that of the “US Army officer led research Group”, but neither of these two views are relevant to this discussion in regards to objectively analyzing all of the archival documentation and the findings from professionaly conducted battlefield archaeology.

I am prepared to answer any questions concerning this matter. So far this has been a pretty lonely thread for me. Not many questions or comments to keep the discussion active and I feel like I am lecturing to a group of silent folks with no opinion.

I am currently working on another project in the Argonne and I hope to be able to share that with you in the near future. But, as with this story, there are complications that prevent me from saying too much right now.

I will say that it sure is strange that Americans are battling today over ground that our forefathers fought the Germans on over 90 years ago. As a French archaeologist told us: “maybe this history is too close to our own time for objective consideration”.

I think what he is trying to say is that we still have a personal connection and memory of these events since they are not that distant in our history.

In other words, if someone were to say that Attila the Hun was really a pacifist I do not think anyone would get personal about it as if someone were to say that Alvin York was a coward. I think the main reason I contributed to this thread was because it got too personal in regards to the way we Americans think of SGT York vs. the way others may feel about him.

I want to present here the way I see this event based on what I feel is the best possible objective analysis of all of the relevant documentation and the results of professionally conducted field research.

The problem now is that Nationalistic pride in the achievements of our individual country’s armed forces or military heroes within the last two centuries is too close to our own time for objectivity in issuing interpretations that may somewhat differ from the contemporary citations, written histories or movies.

[Don D.]

Excellent research Brad. I have a few comments that may explain/clarify things for others.

1. Whether the patrol was being rired upon by machineguns or not. first off, there were machineguns on the other side of the hill and in other positions firing so depending upon how the sound travelled one could think it was machinegun fire. Secondly, concentrated rifle fire from numerous individuals would blend together in a crackling sound that could be thought of as machinegun fire. Remember, MG cyclic rates were rather low back then, 400-650 rounds per minute.

2. Descrepancies in intitial reports versus after a bit of time has past. It is not uncommon for soldiers in the same firefight to have different points of view. Once the firing starts and people go to ground their view of the battlefield narrows. After they have had time to reflect on what happened, talking with each other in some cases, the story will change. It happened then and it is happening now. You've done a good job reconciling them here. Whether the Germans were running to the sound of the guns or charging is a moot point. Had York not engaged them from back to front they obviously would have engaged him. He was smart in this respect. The fact that the rest of the patrol didn't note this in their initial statements can be because they were down behind cover and York was out in front of them. As for York charging, well, if he advanced to a better firing position that would count as a charge. As you've shown, he could not have stayed in the same spot the whole time and lived. The German officer that shot at him having already surrendered should be doubly ashamed, once for betraying his honor of having surrendered and secondly for being such a piss-poor shot. Not surprising that they would embellish the story of their capture.

As to the number of machineguns- well, stories do get blown out of proportion the farther away in time and space from the event. Given the size of the patrol, the fact they captured several MGs was a major feat of arms.

While I would love to hear a counterpoint from the Army historian to support his view I doubt that will happen here. This has been a great thread, well researched and laid out for all to see. That, perhaps is why so few questions have been asked. I think Stevie Wonder could see the logic presented here. Thanks for the great read.