York's famous Machinegun finds a home

[Brad Posey]

Here is the modern map with the locations of where the Germans "thought" they were on the morning of 8 October, 1918

I emphasize the word "thought" because it is evident in their war diaries and post-war unit histories that they were not really sure what was going on that morning west of Chatel Chehery.

For anyone who has studied the German war diaries of the action in the Argonne will notice that after 26 September, 1918 there is a dramatic change in the way war diaries look and the quality of their content. 1917 and earlier war diaries are rich with maps, often colorful expertly hand drawn maps that detail everything. The descriptions of events are also well written and detailed. After 26 September, 1918 (the start of the allied Meuse-Argonne Offensive) everything now appears adhoc. Some unit diaries do not even exist and the rest are sketchy with abbreviated entries, sometimes accounting for several days of action in a sentence or two.

[Brad Posey]

I will be back tomorrow to discuss the German rebuttal report in much more detail.

[Brad Posey]

The Reichsarchiv in Berlin requested that all of the officers involved in the incident submit statements to their office describing what occurred that day. They new the units that were in the area that day and it was easy to see that something dramatic happened that morning by reading any of the unit war diaries which the archive had access to.

The 120th Landwehr Infantry Regiment was the focus of this attention. A Rittmeister von Sick was the commander of the 3rd Battalion and by the morning of the 8th had absorbed the 2nd Battalion and was effectively in command of the entire regimentin the field that morning. In his report as well as his war diaries it was known to the Reichsarchiv that shortly after the American attack began on 8 October something occurred a little to the north of his position. From guys escaping capture returned to his CP and told him that Lt. Vollmer had been captured and the 4th Company, 120th LDW gone. Te 4th Company was a part of the 1st Battalion under Lt. Vollmer and from his statement we see that he mentions the capture of not only himself and members of the 4th Company, but soldiers from what was left of the 210th RIR and the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company who had both been placed under his command.

The Reichsarchiv started requesting statements from officers and men belonging to these units. One must be careful when reading the statements and seeing the list of those who were questioned during the investigation. The report itself contains statements of men from the units I have so far listed here, but they also questioned men from the 125th LDW who were adjacent the 120th LDW on Hill 167, although none of their statements were used in the Reichsarchiv report because the 125th was not involved in the York fight at all. Some of the modern researchers have misunderstood this list of soldiers questioned as well as one of the statements from an officer in the 120th LDW who mentions seeing a Lt. Lipp from the 125th LDW once they had been taken to the American CP. Lt. Lipp had obviously been captured on Hill 167 and was with a group of prisoners who were also taken to the same CP that York’s 132 prisoners were taken to. It is known that York was given additional prisoners at the CP and order to take them all to Varennes.

These are the units the Reichsarchiv determined were involved in the incident that happened just north of Rittmeitser von Sick’s CP that morning:

The Battalion Headquarters and staff from the 120th LDW
4th Company, 120th LDW
2 Platoons from the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company
A small group of men from the 210th RIR

[Brad Posey]

MAJOR SPANG – Operations Officer, 120th LDW

Major Spang, the 120th LDW Operations Officer made a statement to the Reichsarchiv. He does not have much to offer since he was not there when this event took place. Here is the best piece of information that can be gleaned from his report:

“Aided by the fog, the dense woods and numerous ravines, the enemy penetrated our lines at various points and with some forces reached our local reserves which were located west of HILL 223. The 1st Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, the 210th Reserve Infantry and the 7th Bavarian Sapper Company bore the brunt of this action.”

“We received one bad report after another in those days; some of them were exaggerated, others unfounded. Observers informed Division Headquarters that part of the 210th Reserve Infantry had removed their belts, dropped their rifles and surrendered, when some men shouted ‘the Americans are coming”.

“It was impossible for the Division Staff to make a detail investigation of each individual report. Captain Winzer, the Division Supply Officer, was sent to the Brigade and Regiments for the purpose of making an estimate of the situation. It is possible that these reports and the feat attributed to Corporal York have some connection. On the other hand, I heard nothing of certain elements having surrendered to one single man with only a few companions.”

SUMMARY – Not a lot to go on, but there are a few clues. He says the event occurred where the local reserves were, that is the 210th RIR and the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company.

[Brad Posey]

CAPTAIN WINZER – Supply Officer, 120th LDW

“In the area back of the Division, there prevailed a regular panic. “The Americans have broken through!” In order to bring the stream of retreating men to a halt, the Division Commander ordered a cavalry squadron, which he had at his disposal, to cut off the retreat in the rear. The Brigade Commander had lost all contact with his regiments. I was surprised, therefore, to encounter a comparatively high morale in the frontline. Despite their heavy losses, the troops were still masters of the situation; there was not a sign of a panic.”

SUJMMARY – That was it, his entire statement. Not very much at all to go on here except what he says about the morale of the German front line troops. Numerous other statements from his fellow officers will severely contradict what he says about the high morale.

[Brad Posey]

RITTMEISTER (Captain) von SICK – COMMANDER, 3rd BATTALION, 120th LDW

…….”Early in the morning, I heard lively rifle fire to the rear of my command post, that is, in the valley north of HOHENBORN HILL. Shortly thereafter, several men of the 4th Company reached us with the message that strong hostile elements had broken through their lines and captured a number of their men, including First Lieutenant Vollmer. At first I did not believe this, as I thought that an enemy patrol might have penetrated our lines. Consequently, I dispatched a patrol to the north; after a while this patrol returned with the information that no trace of the 4th Company could be found, but strong hostile elements were pushing on through the valley in the direction of the observation tower on HUMSER HILL.”

“It is probable that Sergeant York of the 328th American Infantry captured several prisoners in the course of this action. It is doubtful, on the other hand, that he single-handed, killed 25 German soldiers, not to mention his capturing 132 Germans. The claim that he captured 35 machine guns is an outright lie. I cannot imagine where he could have found 35 machine guns in such a small area, even if he included the light machine guns. I do not believe that 35 machine guns were employed that day in the entire area between CHATEL and the NORTH-SOUTH ROAD.”

At this point he also praises the morale of the 2nd LDW Division and says that it was “boastful: of SGT York and he probably counted other prisoners as his own. He goes on to say at the end of his report:

“The “Major”, referred to in the American account, must have been the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, First Lieutenant Vollmer, whom the Americans took prisoner at that time. I can contribute but little towards clarifying this case, inasmuch as the dense fog then prevailing shut out all view. Crown witness may be considered First Lieutenant Vollmer; to my knowledge, he was a postal official in Württemberg. Further, I wish to name Captain Krimmel, now a factory director at Reutlingen.”

[Brad Posey]

LIEUTENANT VOLLMER – COMMANDER, 1st BATTALION, 120th LDW

This is perhaps one of the more interesting reports because it must be viewed with extreme scrutiny. LT Vollmer delayed at submitting his report and the Reichsarchiv reports a certain amount of frustration over this delay. When he did submit it, he then retracted it until he had the opportunity to read the statements of all of the other officers involved. His report is hard to follow and confusing since it is apparent he is more interested in saying that it was impossible for him to surrender to such a small number of Americans. Here are a few excerpts:

As he is describing positioning his battalion the night of 7 October:
“I noticed that the sector following the edge of the woods from south to north and opposite HILL 223 was occupied by very weak forces. Consequently, I ordered Lieutenant Endriss and his 4th Company to occupy the edge of the woods and establish contact with the adjoining sectors. I spent the night with the companies in reserve.”

“In the morning of October 8, I called on Major v. Sick, 3rd Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, and expressed to him my grave concern for the small force occupying the left flank. Major v. Sick requested me to assume command of the left half of the regimental sector,, inasmuch as the entire sector was too large for him to control. In addition to the 1st Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, I thus assumed command over the 7th Bavarian Sapper Company and the remnants of the Prussian 210th Reserve Infantry; the latter I did not see, however, for the present.”

“I went forward immediately to orient myself, crawled along the front from right to left and noted that the enemy apparently had moved up closer under the cover of darkness. Moving forward a short distance, I observed some German prisoners who were being removed from the hill south of CORNAY; these prisoners, I presumed, belonged to our neighbors, the 125th Landwehr Infantry.”

(This established that the 125th were “neighbors” and NOT a part of their forces defending the southern part of the valley between Hill 223 and 167.)

“Failing to notice anything that would point toward an impending enemy attack, I decided to visit the new elements that were placed under my command. I was approximately 300 – 400 meters from the edge of the woods, when I heard loud shouting in the direction of Lieutenant Endriss’s company. At the same time, I saw our men retreating eastward, pursued by American soldiers. Accompanied by my adjutant and a messenger, I hurried toward the point where I heard to noise and met some 30 or 40 men, all that remained of the 210th Reserve Infantry. These men were about to remove their belts and side arms; I had to force them at the point of my pistol to resume fighting. Without doubt, it was due to the flanking fire that the enemy the turned south and southwest.”

(This is a little confusing, but it places him in the rear 300 – 400 meters from where the 4th Company was under LT. Endriss. It also places him with the 210th RIR who seem to be, as SGT York indicated, getting ready to eat breakfast.)

“Suddenly, we heard some yelling in the rear. As I turned and looked across the valley, I saw a line of American troops, with about five paces interval between men, located half-way up the east slope of the NORTH-SOUTH ROAD. Possibly this was the same enemy who, I feared, had penetrated the front of the 125th Landwehr Infantry and gained our rear; then again, the Americans might have pushed back that part of our front which had faced south. I ordered the few men who were still with me to open fire on those targets. My men had hardly begun to fire, when someone called from the valley “don’t shoot; there are Germans here”. The situation was critical; I was commander without troops; moreover, reconnaissance was impossible on account of the dense undergrowth.”

(There is another German officer who will also describe firing on German prisoners by mistake. These prisoners are men from the 125th LDW being evacuated from the Hill 167.)

“There was little time to deliberate. Suddenly several American soldiers came toward me constantly firing their rifles, I returned the fire as well as I could under the circumstances, until I was surrounded and – alone. I had no choice but to surrender. One of the enemy, with his pistol aimed at me, directed me where to go; as to the others, I do not know where they went. Reaching the edge of the woods, we encountered the Bavarian Sappers with Lieutenant Thoma. I had no idea how strong they were; at any rate, I saw no more than four or five men. As a matter of fact, I did not know that the sappers had gone into position in my sector. Realizing that is was hopeless to put up a fight, and in order to prevent further useless bloodshed, I called out to Lieutenant Thoma that the enemy had enveloped our right flank and gained our rear. After some hesitation, the Bavarian Lieutenant surrendered.”

(LT. Thoma is the officer I mentioned earlier, his statement is very interesting because not only do we have his statement from the Reichsarchiv, but one I found in the Munich Archives taken in 1919 before anyone in Germany, especially him, knew of this. In other words, in 1919 he knew the circumstances of his capture, but not that he had been captured by a single America patrol. I honestly believe the Germans thought at the time they were being attacked in the rear by a major American breakthrough on Hill 244 when in reality it was 17 Americans and not the forward patrols of a larger force.)


“We moved on, crossed the position formerly held by Lieutenant Endriss’s company and saw Endriss lying on the ground with a serious abdominal wound. Finally, I alone, guarded by the American soldier, reached the American advance guard company which was established immediately in front of the former position of the 4th Company. There I met a large number of other German prisoners, including several officers; additional prisoners continued to come. After the American Lieutenant tried to interrogate me, he motioned me and several other officers with his pistol to stand up under a tree. Through an American soldier who spoke German, I reminded the Lieutenant of the fact that we were prisoners and expected to be treated as such as prescribed by the International Law. I also asked the officer to take care of the seriously wounded Endriss. This was done. We officers were then removed to CHATEL. There I was separated from the other officers, led into a former German dugout and interrogated by an American Major.”

(What Vollmer is describing is his capture and from what he says here he alone was captured by a large American force and this is simply not true and is contradicted by the other German statements. What is interesting is that he established the location of the 4th Company as well as a MG position which he says were directly in front of the American advance guard company. This advance guard is the 2/328th CP which is plotted on the Buxton/Danforth map as well as confirmed by coordinates given for the CP in 328th Field Messages written that day.

“If it was York who disarmed me and led me to the American advance guard company, it is very unlikely that he commanded those elements which gained our rear. The individual incidents followed each other so rapidly that he could not have made his way through the dense undergrowth and reach me in such a short time. As may be noted from my description, my entire staff consisted of three persons at the most. I was in no mood for drinking coffee. As to the remainder of York’s description – provided it applies to me at all – it is true only in that York constantly kept his pistol in the small of my back. Everything else is pure imagination, probably a product of a typically American megalomania. As to the machine guns, I recall having seen only one gun of the 4th Company; in the morning of October 8, this gun was still in action, despite the fact that is was located only a few paces from the American advance guard company. I observed no minenwerfer; nor did I know where any were employed.”

(Here Vollmer again denies the “coffee drinking” and insists that this whole event is imagination and American megalomania. But, he does help us in confirming where the 4th Company was and the MG that was firing into the left flank of G Company, 328th Infantry that morning.)

[Brad Posey]

LIEUTENANT GLASS – ADJUTANT, 1st BATTALION, 120th LDW

“At daybreak, October 8, 1918, I received orders to report to the 1st Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, and replace the Battalion Adjutant, Lieutenant Bayer, who was ill. The Battalion was commanded by First Lieutenant Vollmer. The Battalion was located in a wooded ravine. The 4th Company was placed at the exit of the ravine, near the edge of the woods as security element and first line; the Company was facing the CORNAY – CHATEL ROAD and partly the hill near CHATEL.”

(This is perhaps one of the better German descriptions of where this event took place. LT Glass says the battalion was in a “wooded ravine”.)

“……In the rear of the 4th Company, we met several groups of men who belonged to another regiment, probably the 210th Reserve Infantry. Their arms and belts laid aside, these men were eating breakfast. It may be that these men were “the staff whom Sergeant York surprised during their morning meal”. I do not recall whether there was an officer among these men. When we expressed our surprise over their carelessness, the men declared that they had “hiked” all night and, first of all, needed “something to eat”. We knew then that these were the first arrivals of the support division which was promised us.”

(This statement speaks for itself and once again gives us valuable clues. What LT GLASS is describing is where the event took place and confirms what SGT York said about the Germans eating breakfast or otherwise not fighting. This area had to be a least a short distance from the open valley where the main attack of E and G Company, 328th Infantry was taking pace between Hills 167 and 223. A wooded ravine as described by the others would offer a certain amount of security.)

(LT. Glass goes on to describe some Americans in the right front of the 4th Company that appeared and suddenly disappeared. Could this be the patrol as they left the American lines?) He goes on to say:

“……I then looked for the Battalion Commander and learned that he had gone to the rear. Some 70 meters behind the line, I noticed him standing near me. I rushed up to him and had hardly started to make my report when I was suddenly surrounded by a number of Americans. Not until then did I see that Lieutenant Vollmer had been captured. I am not definite whether there were still more prisoners, nor how many Americans there were present. On the other hand, I still have in my mind a fairly clear picture of the American soldier in charge; it was he who kept his pistol aimed at me. He was a large and strong man with red mustache, broad feature and, I believe, freckle-faced.

(Well here we have a pretty good description by a German officer that fits SGT York pretty good as the one who led the column of prisoners back to the 2/32th CP.)

“…..These first prisoners possibly included the two Corporals Willig and Kirchner of the Light Machine Gun Company; these two noncommissioned officers had preceded their machine guns for the purpose of reconnoitering suitable gun emplacements. Outside of these two men and Lieutenant Kubler, whom I mentioned above, I knew none of the prisoners.”

(We will see the names of Willig and Kirchner later when we get into the actual individual German unit war diaries.)

“The Americans drove us up the hill. Suddenly a German officer and several men with fixed bayonets jumped up on our left, that is, from the direction of our lines. Of all the shouting and yelling that ensured, I recall only the words exchanged between the officer and Lieutenant Vollmer: “I will not surrender!” – “It is useless!” – “I will do so on your responsibility!” The officer was Lieutenant Thoma of the Bavarian Sapper Company. It is possible that the American soldier ordered and threatened Lieutenant Vollmer. I did not see, however, that this American shot the companions of Lieutenant Thoma.”

(Now we find another clue that agrees with the American accounts of immediately after the fight the German prisoners were driven up a hill where they ran into other Germans. Once again Thoma is mentioned. Keep this in mind as we get to the Thoma statements.)

“Either in the course of this incident or a few steps farther on, we saw a trench before us. Approximately one meter deep, this trench was crowded with American troops standing not only man to man, but also in double rank. I noticed also several machine guns. I could see about 30 meters of this trench. About ten meters in front of this trench, a German officer was lying on the ground with an abdominal wound. The man was on his back; it looked as if he had been shot from the rear. Two Americans were taking care of him. While I failed to recognize the wounded man, Lieutenant Vollmer informed me later that he was Lieutenant Endriss, the Commanding Officer of the 4th Company. We crossed the trench and reached the meadow which I had observed while on reconnaissance. Here we saw a group of some 20 or 30 American soldiers. Additional prisoners were brought up; it is not impossible that Corporal York gradually rolled up the 4th Company from the flank and rear. Like myself, the Americans failed to recognize Lieutenant Kubler as an officer. I also recall an elderly officer, probably Lieutenant Link of the 125th Landwehr Infantry.”

(This part of the statement is extremely interesting because we have a good description of the march back to the 2/328th CP. Though there were no trenches in the area that were dug by the Germans during the war there are however several mediaeval boundary ditches. One of them is on this hill a short distance west of the 2/328th CP. In Patullo’s 1919 Saturday Evening Post article the author describes spending 3 days with York and the investigating team fro the 82nd Division at Chatel Chehery. In his article he mentions an “old trench” that the patrol used to gain access to the top of the hill and that the patrol passed back over this same trench on the way back to the battalion CP. Now we have a German officer who also confirms this trench and the trench is still there on the northern slope of the hill a short distance west of where the 2/328 CP was running north to south over the hill. He also mentions seeing an officer from the 125th LDW and it is not clear in his statement, but at this point they were at the American CP and the 125th officer was captured on Hill 167 by the main attack of E and G Companies.)

……Another American cut off the shoulder straps on Lieutenant Vollmer’s overcoat, opened his coat and took his Iron Cross 1st Class. To his protests and attempts to defend himself, Lieutenant Vollmer received as only reply the words “hold still.”

(Thoma confirms what Glass says here in his 1919 statement about the American collecting souvenirs from the German prisoners.)

[Brad Posey]

LIEUTENANT KUBLER- PLATOON COMMANDER, 4th COMPANY, 120th LDW

“At dusk of October 7, we took up a position west of HILL 223. I posted my men for the night and set out to make a final inspection of the company sector, when I saw that we had no contact on our right flank. Immediately I sent out patrols to establish this liaison. The patrols returned during the night with the information that the 2nd Machine Gun Company was located on our right. Personally, I regarded the situation as very dangerous, for the Americans could easily pass through the gaps in the sector of the 2nd Machine Gun Company and gain our rear. I called the attention of my company commander to my apprehensions, whereupon he dispatched a messenger to the Battalion Commander with a warning of our critical situation and a request that our company be permitted to occupy HILL 2.”

“Unfortunately, my proposal was not approved. After several fruitless attempts on my part to contact the 2nd Machine Gun Company, I tried once more to effect a change in our position, by sending a messenger to the Battalion Commander; I informed the latter that, unless the gap was closed, I would, on my own responsibility, occupy HILL 2 with part of the 4th Company. I received the following reply; “You will hold the position to which you have been assigned.”

(It seems that LT Kubler had a good grasp of the desperate situation his unit was getting ready to be in with no contact to their right and Hill 2 being unoccupied by other German forces. It is also apparent here that LT Vollmer did not have a good grasp of the situation and was somewhere in the rear. Kubler mentions the 2nd MG Company that once again, other researchers have somehow tried to bring into the York fight. AS we will see they were to the right of 1/120th LDW, but they wee positioned at the junction of the North-South Road and the Decauville Railroad. The gap on Hill 2 is the subject here and the 2nd MG Company had nothing to do with that or the York fight as others have claimed.)

“At daybreak, we gained the support of one company of the 210th Reserve Infantry and some Bavarian Sappers.”

Here we again confirm the units involved in this incident.)

“At that hour, First Lieutenant Vollmer, the Battalion Commander, accompanied by his adjutant, Lieutenant Glass, called on us to inspect our position. Just at that moment a tremendous bedlam broke loose in the rear. The American artillery isolated us by delivering a heavy barrage on HILL 2. Showered with rifle grenades, our company lost a considerable number of dead and wounded. The Battalion Commander ordered me immediately to defend the edge of the woods with my shock troop; while he and my company commander intended to repulse the Americans with the other officers and men, that is, the remainder of the 4th Company, the 210th Reserve Infantry and the Bavarian Sappers.”

(Here Kubler established LT Vollmer’s position in the rear with Endriss, the 210th RIR and the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company trying to organize them for counter attack.)

…..”Things did not look right to me; placing Warrant Officer Haegle in charge of my shock troop, I left with two men to reconnoiter the situation. We were barely 100 meters away from my shock troop, when, all of the sudden, we found ourselves surrounded by American soldiers with their fixed bayonets trained on us. The enemy challenged us to surrender. Realizing that resistance was of no avail, I accepted the bitter fate.”

“From this point on, I wish to contradict the description given in the Swedish newspaper. Three Americans accompanied us three prisoners to the rear; while the other enemy soldiers continued to advance against my shock troop. On a stretch 20 meters long, I passed at least 20 Americans. I noticed at least one squad of American soldiers at the exit of the woods, standing in a trench formerly occupied by a light machine gun of my company; further I saw Lieutenant Vollmer and the other officers surrounded by eight Americans who, flourishing their pistols, were describing a regular Indian dance round their prisoners.”

(Kubler describes the trench near the 2/328 CP.)

“I met Lieutenant Vollmer again at VARENNES and asked him how it happened that his men did not move up to support us. He replied that the 210th and the sappers were so demoralized that he had to threaten the men with his pistol before they would advance. Naturally, this confused also the men of the 4th Company.”

(Again Kubler statement provides a little insight into the location of Vollmer as being with the men of the 210th RIR and the 7th Mineur Company when the event occurred.)

[Brad Posey]

“SOLDIER” – 4th Company, 120th LDW

(Note: Interesting that they do not mention the man by name.)

“We were about to hurry back to our company, when about eight Americans came running down the hill in our rear.”

“The enemy kept firing on us and killed several men of our party. In other words, they did not capture us, while we were drinking coffee; that is a lie. Shortly after we were captured, a company of sappers appeared on top of the hill, from which point they could see us and the American soldiers”

“The Sapper Company opened fire on us, but ceased firing when we called to them. Before long, the sappers, too, were driven towards us in the ravine; thus the number of prisoners became still greater.”

(In my opinion this is perhaps one of the more enlightening statements given by the Germans, unfortunately we do not know the manes name. He places the incident as taking pace in a ravine and the Americans – patrol – running down the hill towards them. He also states that the Bavarians were on the ridge above them and they were eventually forced down the hill increasing the number of German prisoners.)

[Brad Posey]

LIEUTENANT THOMA – 7th BAVARIAN MINEUR COMPANY

I will gladly describe the details of my capture, so far as I remember them, although I can contribute but little toward explaining the article which appeared in the Swedish newspaper.

During the night of 7 – 8 October, two platoons of my company, including myself, were placed at the disposal of the 120th Wuerttemberg Landwehr Infantry and assigned to the command of First Lieutenant (Reserve) Vollmer. At about 8:00 A.M., October 8 Lieutenant Vollmer ordered me to fill a wide gap which existed in our firing line. I advanced with one platoon, while holding the other platoon in reserve behind a slope until I had reconnoitered the situation. We passed an infantry regiment with a high regimental number; I think it was the 210th Reserve Infantry. We were surprised at the indifference and lack of precaution exhibited by these troops; the men had taken off their belts and side arms and were eating breakfast.

The firing line was located on a slope covered with beech trees and undergrowth. On the left flank, I met a machine gun; its crew, I believe, consisted of only one man. This particular point afforded excellent observation. Instructing my platoon leader to send out a connecting patrol to the right and to place his men into position, I decided to remain with the machine gun. We had brought along several boxes of ammunition and, so far as I recall, one or two light machine guns.

I gave orders immediately to open fire on some Americans whom I saw walking about on an open slope to my left. It is possible that, at first, that I fired on American troops who were leading German prisoners to the rear. Naturally, I ceased firing on such targets as soon as I recognized them. I regulated my fire once more; as yet I had not received no message from my platoon leader, although I heard the sound of lively rifle fire from the direction of the platoon

And so I decided further to reconnoiter the firing line and convince myself that the platoon had taken up the designated position. I had advanced but a few steps, when suddenly I heard shouting in the woods and the command, given in German, “take off your belts”.

Quickly I gathered together a few of my men and hurried in that direction, all the while calling out loud “don’t remove your belts”.

We advanced with fixed bayonets. Suddenly we were face to face with some Americans and their German prisoners; I recognized only several men of my company and the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Vollmer

I exchanged a few words with Lieutenant Vollmer, but cannot say exactly what these words were. In effect, I called out: “I won’t let them capture me.” Vollmer replied something like this: “It is useless, we are surrounded.” It was too late to withdraw, for several Americans appeared in my rear. And so I was lead off with the other prisoners.

Unfortunately, I possess no notes regarding the activities of my company; nor did I keep a diary.

(This is one the best German accounts in that it appears to not contain the “cover-up” material found in the other senior leader statements. LT Thoma commanded 2 platoons of Mineurs – aka “Sappers” – who were being used as replacements to fill growing gap in the German front line due to attrition suffered by the allied offensive.

We will look next at another statement issued by Thoma in 1919 just after he was released from a POW camp and compare what he said then to what he says in the Reichsarchiv investigation.

In this particular statement it is interesting to note that he places his unit within proximity of the 210th RIR and the 210th soldiers were not in a state of readiness for battle. He goes on to say that he moved forward and left one platoon in reserve on a slope. Remember what the last 120th LDW soldier stated about the “Bavarians” above them on the ridge. This also agrees with the 82nd Division History in describing the soldiers on the “western facing slope” that fired on the patrol as they were lining up the prisoners initially captured.

Thoma also agrees with Vollmer’s statement about accidently firing on German POWs being evacuated from the hill on his left front (125th soldiers on Hill 167). Again he agrees with Vollmer about an exchange between the two that resulted in Thoma’s surrender.)

[Brad Posey]

Before I go on to LT Thoma’s 1919 statement I want to include a list of other German soldiers who were interviewed during the Reichsarchiv investigation, but evidently their reports were not used in the Reichsarchiv report. It can be assumed from the information we have that it may have been Private Scheurmann who gave the “Soldier” statement we saw earlier. I would also assume that the medical soldier was perhaps a soldier thought to have been one of the 2 German medical soldiers described by York in Tom Skeyhill’s book. It is certain the at the 2 7th Company soldiers interviewed were soldiers from the 7th Company, 125th LDW who were on Hill 167 when this event took place. Since a 125th LDW officer had been mentioned as being one of the other prisoners assembled at the 328 CP it is apparent that the Reichsarchiv left no stone unturned in attempting to find out all of those present during this event. Yet, there are no statements in the report from anyone in the 125th LDW or the 2nd MG Company. I interpret this as the Reichsarchiv determined that the soldiers from the 125th LDW and the 2nd MG Company were played no part in this specific incident.

It is equally interesting that there are no statements from men of the 210th RIR and from the 1st MG Company, who are documented as being captured or killed during this event. From what we know there were only a handful – maybe 20 to 25 – men from the 210th present and we have no way of knowing from surviving documents if an officer from that unit was present. The 2 NCOs captured from the 1st MG Company are documented in their unit’s war diary and agree with the statement we saw earlier that places Willig and Kirchner at the scene, yet no statements in the Reichsarchiv report.

In saying that, we also have no idea of the post 8 October 1918 fate of the German survivors and the ability of the Reichsarchiv to successfully contact these men if they survived the war and their ability to extract a statement from them. It certainly seems to be an “officer corps” matter to the Reichsarchiv.

Here is a list if the other German soldiers interviewed by the Reichsarchiv, but no statements from these individuals were included in their report.)

Medical Soldier Breitweg (21 February, 1929)
Private Scheurmann – 4th Company (11 February, 1929)
Private Hirsch, 2nd Machine Company (12 February, 1929)
Sergeant Beck – 7th Company (23 October, 1928)
Private Fetzer – 7th Company (25 February, 1929)

[Brad Posey]

Before we get into Thoma's 1919 statement here is the cover citation of the "Verlustliste" - List of Cassualties- from the 7th Bavarian Mineur Company. You can see LT Max Thoma as being captured on 8 October 1918. I found these documents in the Bavarian Military Archives in Munich.

[Brad Posey]

Here is Thoma's name on the list.

[Brad Posey]

Being that this statement is being seen for the FIRST time I will include scans of the original documents as well as the official translations of the document.